US Foreign Policy towards West Asia with Special Reference to Saudi Arabia, 1970-91 by Kausar, Farhana
us FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS WEST ASIA 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO 
SAUDI ARABIA, 1970-91 
"mm 
THESIS 
SU^miJU^ FOR Jk\E AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF 
i JBottor of $|)tIos;op]^p 
IN 
„ Political Science 
z^-^-
/ 
BY 
FARHANA KAUSAR 
Under the Supervision of 
PROF. T. A. NIZAMI 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH (INDIA) 
September, 1998 
u A til 6 
I I Ace. No ) ^ 
T5370 
786 
FOR 
MY PARENTS 
This day is the result of their unfathomable affection. 
Chairman 
& 
Editor, INDIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICS 
l>hon,t\°''"=''[mll 
Fax 
40t 7 20 
364 (t 365 
I Residence . 403 183 
91—057J—409617 
OEMRTMEMT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
ALI6ARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH—202 002 
Dated ZS'.,f.:.fA.. 
CERTIFICATE 
This IS to certify that the entire work on 'US Foreign Policy Towards West Asia 
With Special Reference to Saudi Arabia , 1970-91' has been carried out by Miss. 
Farhana Kausar under my supervision. It is her original work and a critical analysis of 
US-Saudi relations based on primary' and secondary sources. 
This thesis is recommended for submission for examination for the auard of the 
Ph.D degree. 
Acknowledgement 
It IS my primary duty to observe 'Sajdae-Shukr' to the (irace of 
Allah the most merciful without Whose blessings this work would 
never have been a possibility. 
To my supervisor, Prof. T.A. Nizami, Chairman department of 
Political Science, AM.IJ, Aligarh , ffall short of words to express 
my deep sense of gratitude jor his presence, ever with his scholarly 
guidance, sincere suggestions, help and tireless co-operation 
throughout the course of this study. 
I am thankful too, to my teachers Prof. M.A. Kishore, Prof. B. 
Rahmatulla and Prof. Iqbal Khanam for their encouragement and 
moral support whenever sought for. 
I am grateful to my senior colleague Dr. Naheed Murtaza Khan, 
Prof in Political Science, Women's ('ollege, A.M. (I, for her constant 
care and the intelligent discussions that proved a vital support to 
me. 
1 am also indebted to my colleague Dr.Anwar Alam, lecturer, 
department of Political Science, A.A4 I'. for his valuable advice, help 
and the keen interest he showed in the completion of this work. 
To my mother and brothers, I remain ever thankful for their 
unfailing support and for everheing there where I needed them most. 
I owe my sincere thanks to my friend Dr. Farah Naaz, lecturer, 
department of Political Science (H.R), ,/amia Millia Islamia, New 
Delhi, for her strenuous efforts in collection of the primary sources 
required for the study. 
// IS my pleasure to thank my friends Nazura and Tanzeem for their 
cheerful company, precious advice and support that I essentially 
needed. 
My thanks to Rakhshanda too for her co-operation in 
preparation of table and diagrams. Besides, my sincere thanks to 
Dr. Anisa also for her assistance and warm hospitality during my 
stay at Hyderabad. 
It IS obligatory to me to pay my thanks to the Dean and the staff 
of the Dean Faculty of Social Sciences, A.M. 11,. for awarding me 
merit scholarship during my Ph.D course. 
I can not over look the appreciable facilities and help extended 
by the staff members ofM.A. library, A.M.II, C^entre for West Asian 
Studies, A.M. (I, Centre for Strategic Studies , A.M. IJ, Seminar library 
of the department of Political Science, A.M.IJ, American Centre 
library (IJSIS), New Delhi, library of ICSSR, New Delhi , and 
American Studies Research Centre (ASRCJ, Hyderbad 
Last, but not least, I sincerely acknwledge the support of non-
teaching staff of the department of Political Science ,A.M. U. 
I am also thankful to Transword, Naved Exclusive Computer 
Centre, and New Book Binding Works for typing and binding the 
material successfully. 
Farhana Kausar 
Contents 
Page No. 
Preface 
Chapter-1 i-io 
Geo-Political and Historical Perspective of West Asia 
A- Geo-Physics of West Asia 1-3 
B. West Asia during the World War I and II. 3-5 
C. History and Geography of Saudi Arabia. 5-7 
D. Discovery of Oil and its Impact on West Asia. 7-10 
C h a p t e r - I I 11-27 
u s Foreign Policy and Superpowers Rivalry In West Asia. 
A. Geo-Historical Background of US. 11-14 
B. US Interests in West Asia and Various Policy Measures. 14-22 
C. US-Saudi Relations - - A Survey from 1933 to 1969. 22-27 
C h a p t e r - I I I 28-56 
Strains and Linkages between US and Saudi 
Relations - 1970 to 1981. 
A. 1973 Oil Embargo and US - Saudi Relations. 31-34 
B. US Policy and Kissinger's Shuttle Diplomacy. 35-42 
C. President Carter, Camp David Agreement and 
Saudi Reactions. 42-52 
D. Major Events in 1979, Threat to Persian Gulf and 
Saudi Reversion to US. 52-56 
C h a p t e r - I V 57-81 
Major Events Determining the Thrust of Relations between US and 
Saudi Arabia - The Reagan Administration 1981-88. 
A. Implications of Camp David Accord and Egypt - Israeli Peace 
Treaty- 1979. 
B. Lebanon war 1982, Reagan Plan and Fez Plan II 
C. US AWACS deal with Saudi Arabia. 
D. US and Iran- Iraq War. 
57-61 
61-64 
64-69 
69-81 
C h a p t e r - V 82-114 
The Post - Cold War Period - Gulf War. Soviet Disintegration and US 
-Saudi Ties. 1990-91. 
A. Post Cold War Period and International Scenario. 82-83 
B. Iraqi Aggression on Kuwait and Threat to Saudi Arabia. 83-89 
C. US Foreign Policy and Defence of Saudi Arabia -
Objectives and Strategies. 89-97 
D. Soviet Role in Gulf War. 97-100 
E. Soviet Position and its Disintegration. 100-103 
F. US Supremacy and New World Order. 103-106 
G. Gulf Security Arrangement and US Strategy 
To Capture Oil Flow. 106-110 
H. US-Saudi Ties After the Gulf War 91. 110-114 
Chapter- VI 
Conclusion 
Bibliography 
Appendices 
115-137 
138-155 
156-160 
Appendix-I 
Appendix-l l 
Appendix-Il l 
Commission on US Saudi Economic and 
Defence Relations 1974. 156 
Table - 1 , Saudi Arab's Crude Oil Export 
to USA (I975-I996) and illustration. 157-158 
Table -II, Import of Crude Oil by USA 
(1975-1996) and illustration. 159-160 
PREFACE 
West Asia is a region of great significance in world politics. Political, 
social,strategic, emotional, ethnic, religious and economic upheavals have 
diversified its character. It has been a centre of .'^rab nationalism, pan Arabism, 
ups and downs of external political influences and persisting problem of 
Palestine and superpower's rivalry. 
Since the end of the world war II, the United States has been a major 
actor in West Asia. Its rich resources and proximity to Soviet Union makes 
the area as an arena of superpower's rivalry. Up to the end of world War II, 
western powers played their effective role in this region and US did not feel 
that its active presence was required in this region Prior to the world war II, 
the US reputation in West Asia v\ as that of social work and missionary appeals. 
Specially Britain played its influential role in West Asia. 
After the end of world war II and begining of the cold war in 1945 
when all the western powers withdrew from here. Soviet union advanced the 
cause of Arabs. Coming closer to them it supported politically and militarily 
against the creation of Israel state in 1949. 
The US presence started in reaction of Soviet moves in this region. In 
fact it was actually started to materialise since Truman doctrine 1947, 
Baghdad pact and CENTO (1954-1955) The I S participation in this region 
created a new intensity and dimension to the cold war on the region. Shortly 
after, the Egyptian president Nasser announced Suez canal nationalization 
in 1956 and US got another opportunity to reasses her role by declaring 
Eisenhower doctrine of 1957. Consequently, some new postures were added 
in US policy towards West Asia The US foreign policy towards West Asia 
has been characterized and determined by three important factors during the 
cold war -
1 Soviet containment 
2. Support to Israel 
3. Exploitation of oil and other resources of West Asia. 
Significantly, US got consolidated its position only after 1970 when 
Soviet influence slightly decreased in the region after the arrival of President 
Sadat. The US has been very particular to establish friendly relations with 
Arab monarchies The US- Saudi relations established since 1933 and at 
that time ARAMCO and SOCAL companies with US - Saudi collaboration 
strengthened their ties. Israel factor has always been sensitive to US-Saudi 
relation and due it, their relationship several times got strained. 
In 1973-74, Saudi Arabia including other OPEC members imposed oil 
embargo on US and other western oil dependent countries. Relations were 
again very tense. The arrival of President Carter gave an opportunity to the 
US to fulfil its objectives , unfortunately Camp David Agreement (1978) 
and Egypt Israeli Treaty 1 979 again proved a set back and shock for Saudi 
Arabia Their friendship soured again Eventually, the year 1979 proved very 
much decisive in this regard USSR'S intervention in Afghanistan, Islamic 
Revolution in Iran, Mecca incident in Saudi Arabia, energy crisis during Iran-
Iraq war etc - all threatened to US economic interests and Saudi security in 
the Gulf They realized each other's significance and came closer again. 
In 1981. generally speaking, relations between US and Saudi Arabia 
were on smooth sailing. Despite their mutual ambivalence and differences on 
matters their economic and diplomatic relations did not get disturbed The 
formation of G.C.C , Fahd plan and Ronald Reagan's proposal for AWACS 
played very important role in this direction 
However, 1982 Israel-Lebanon war again embit tered US- Saudi 
relations. President Reagan tried his best to mend the fences It took time but 
I l l 
the relations again levelled up after the approval of AWACS transfer from 
Congress. 
The year 1990-91 underwent some major incidents specially Gulf war 
1991, Soviet disintegration and US supremacy etc. During the Gulf war, Saudi 
Arabia emerged as leading partner of US and offered its land for coalition 
forces During these days the weak Soviet Union provided a fertile ground 
for US to take full advantage in West Asia and all over the world with its 
monopoly and dominance 
When the US forces continued to be on the Saudi soil they became 
apprehensive of US designs in the region. Apart from it, unsettled Arab-Israeli 
problem, US harsh behaviour with Iraq and unnecessary US intransigence-
all these factors are being proved ver>' pernicious so far as US-Saudi relations 
are concerned Saudi Arabia, very vigilantly and consciously denied for 
further stationing of US troops The future prospects at present moment are 
not very healthy as US initiative to improve relation with Iran,sufficiently 
proves this point. 
The present study consists of six chapters revealing US-Saudi relations 
and major thrusts that determine their ties from 1970 to 1991. 
The first chapter outlines the geographical framework of West Asia, 
geopolitical situation of Saudi Arabia and its rich sources. Establishment of 
ARAMCO and roots of US- Saudi ties and founding developments have also 
been covered in this chapter. 
The second chapter explores the different shapes and contoures of US 
foreign policy in West Asia in changing world scenario from 1945 onwards. 
It has also touched Soviet role in the region and superpowers rivalry. 
The third chapter presents a panorama of linkages and strains during oil 
embargo 1Q73 and Saudi reactions on different issues as Camp David 
IV 
Agreements etc. The implications of Saudi-US relations in the promotion of 
trade and commerce in the region have also been analysed. 
The fourth chapter sheds light on Reagan period and Saudi AWACS 
deal. It also traces out the causes of their adherence immediately after some 
politcal turmoils in 1979 -80 and abruptly strained relations after 1982. 
The fifth chapter deals with recent major incidents that directly and 
greatly affected the entire international community emd.especially West Asia 
like Soviet disintegration. Gulf war, German unification and dramatic end 
of the cold war etc. 
Finally in the sixth chapter an attempt has been made to investigate the 
causes of recent developments in West Asia, specially, US-Saudi strained 
relations after 1994. It highlights on permanent thrust areas and fixed 
priorities that determine and compel their relationship to be sound in future. 
Some important tables and diagrams related to their oil expor t , transfer of 
military equipments and commission to strengthen their economic and defence 
relations have been included in the appendices. 
CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter - I 
Introduction 
Geo-Political and Historical Perspective of West Asia 
The spectrum of West Asia gives a reflection of different kinds of 
tensions, unrests and turmoils in its various forms i.e. economic, political, 
strategic, territorial and emotional. The political scenario of West Asia is 
full of conflicts and Western influences - both regional and global in nature. 
There are many unifying factors which have'shaped its historical and 
political development Further, the diversity of geography, cultures, 
religions, languages and social and ethnic groups within the region has 
given a distinctive character to this region 
A. Geo-Phvsics of West Asia:-
The region centres around the junction of Africa and Europe where 
the land mass is deeply peneterated by the seas— Mediterrarian sea. Red 
sea. Black sea and Arabian sea etc. The land and sea routes tie the region 
with the rest of the world Along with these— people, ideas and plants as 
well as the trade flourished which nurtured cities and enriched empires 
here. The region was a great transit zone and a major crossroad in the 
World ' 
The geographical factor in West Asia has great significance since no 
other region is located so strategically as West Asia where three continents-
Africa, Europe and Asia meet together.- It lies immediately to the South 
of Heartland (former Soviet Union) and forms alongwith Western Europe 
more than half of Rimland ^ 
) BeamouiK Peter. H Black and Wagstaff. The Middle Eas( Geographical stud\. John 
Weley and Sons Press. Toronto 1976. Page No 7 
2 Jack. Ernest. Background of the Middle East. Cornell Unnersitx Press. New York 
1952. ppll-12 
.'' Chatterji. C Nicksho\. Muddle of the Middle East Albanian Publication. Hauzkhas. 
New Delhi. 1973. P2-3 
Historical Background 
Of all the external influences, the legacy of Ottoman empire had 
deepest impact on their thinking. The Turks entered into this region as 
slaves, they were more political than speculative, more realistic than 
mystical and more worldly than other Muslims. They accepted Islam 
because it fostered their material spirit. Turkey was the most active and 
advanced country at that time. Only this empire had foothold in European 
soil. In Asian side it meant Asia minor or Anatolia and Anatolia had been 
the core of the Ottoman empire and their imperial activities flourished 
from this centre." 
The Ottoman empire readhed at its hight of glory in sixteenth century. 
They peneterated deep into the heart of Europe and threatened the Roman 
empire In Southern Russia too, the Turks occupied Black sea and 
Caucasian mountain And in north African coast Islam had reached its 
zenith under the Caliphates.^ (1683) 
The downfall of the Ottoman empire was not overnight , it took 
different turns at different stages. Problems of succession to the throne of 
Caliph and governor, corruption among high officials and rise of powerful 
European nation states contributed to undermine the empire Apart from 
it, there were some reformist groups known as 'Tanzeemat' led by Rashid 
Pasha and Midhat Pasha and lastly there was Hamid II among young Turks. 
Gradually, European powers started to take interest as Portuguese were 
motivated by commerce and they assisted 'Mumluks ' . France joined due 
to Its economic competition with Italy. Britain was with France and highly 
interested in Iraq (Basra) and Saudi Arabia Russia since the time of 
Catherine empress was interested in northern border of the empire and 
there was a long six years war with Russia and Ottomans for Iranian border 
that ended with the treaty 'Kuchuk Kainarji' of 1774.* 
4 Ibid . p 73 
5 Ibid, p y 
6 Peretz. Don. The Middle East Toda\. Hnd (Edn ). Holt Riiiehart and Winston. 1971 
U S A . p p 6 l to 81 
3 
The first direct onslaught started when Napolean Bonaparte initiated 
direct military intervention in 1798 and after his collapse in 1814, again 
British suzerainty started in this area (West Asia). After thirty eight 
years,Crimean war took place in 1853-1856 in which Britain, France and 
Ot toman were in the same alliance against Russia on the matter of 
protection to the Catholic orthodox Christians in Palestine. After some 
years , France fought with Prussia (Germany) and Ot tomans had to 
participate in that war from French side. There had been a chronic rivalry 
between Russians and Musl ims, this malice again manifested in Balkans 
war of 1880. Russia strongly supported slavism, slavs and Christians 
against the Muslims of Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenergo and Rumania 
(these were under the Ottoman empire. Meanwhile prime minister Bismark 
made a secret deal with Austr ia and Russia that is known as Berlin 
conference of 1890 Germany encouraged Russian occupation in Balkans. 
German interest in West Asia increased and railway lines were established 
between Basra, Kuwait and Berl in. ' 
B - West Asia dur ing the World Wars I and II . 
The glory of Ottoman empire had started to loose all its charm and 
strength and these two world wars proved to be death knell for this empire. 
The Ottomans joined Axis powers during the World War I and there were 
followingsecret agreements among Allied victors to divide it. 
1 Constaninpole agreement and Hussain MacMohan 
correspondence 1913-1914 
2 London Agreement 1915 
3 Sykes Picot Agreement 1916 and 
4 Balfour declaration 1917 
After the end of World Warl the Ottomans were destroyed and 
everything was determined and distributed through League of Nation's 
Ibid . p p 82 to 9? 
4 
Mandate system among the major powers according to their interest. Treaty 
of 'Sevres ' finally gave death blow to the Ottoman of empire. After one 
year of the treaty of 'Laussane of ( 1923) in Switzerland it futher 
consolidated the position of Western imperial powers in the region. In 
1923 Turkey (Anatolia) was kept free from foreign control and the arrival 
of Nationalist Mustafa Kamal Pasha (Ataturk) gave a new colour to Turkey. 
Very soon Turkey became a modern doorway of commerce and trade 
between West Asia and Europe. As a result of open door policy U.S. 
interests were involved only in Saudi Arabia with ARAMCO oil company 
and in Iraqi Petroleum company. In World War II, West Asia again got 
involved in internat ional affairs. At the end of war Britain lost its 
paramount position in the region, Russia asserted its influence in North 
Iran and US was developing its position after its reentry into the war. 
France was no longer able ' to contain nationalist movements in Lebanon 
and Syria. Bri tain was facing t remendous cha l lenges due to rising 
nationalist movements in Egypt and Iraq. And even in Palestine Britain 
was no longer to control the situation. Meanwhile a gradual cold war 
between Russia (USSR) and( US) 'West ' started. Upto 1949-50, Britain 
also left most of the areas and after the creation of Israel state the Palestine-
Israel issue was handed over to the U.N.O. Britain departed from the scene 
and the vacuum was filled up by the emerging superpowers - USA and 
USSR.^ 
The US interest in West Asia at that time was not strategic but it was 
political and economic and it established its air bases in Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt . Whereas Sovie t interests were s t ra tegic , pol i t ical and 
ideological . After British departure US successfully tried to hegemonize 
the area. Another important reason to have an upper over West Asia was 
to protect the region -(lest the area fall under the Soviet influence and 
become a tool of the hands of Soviet Union). This would have been 
certainly intolerable for the US. Since 1947 the Truman doctrine' became 
8 Ibid. p.p.95 to 120 
5 
the part of US foreign policy to contain Soviet influence and it was 
considered as a 'peacetime West Asia commitment ' specially for Greece 
and Turkey. ' 
C -History and Geogranhv of Saudi Arabia 
All of the independent countries of West Asia are successor nations 
of Ottoman empire directly or indirectly. The one remaining area of 
former Ottoman empire in southern West Asia is known as Arabian 
peninsula, it lies between Persian Gulf and Red sea '" 
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a land mass of immense 873,972 
square miles in size, constituting a distinct geographical entity bordered 
on West by the Red sea in the South, by the Indian Ocean in east and by 
Arabian Gulf The kingdom is itself bounded on the north by Jordon, Iraq 
and Kuwait, on the east by the Gulf countries - Bahrain, Qatar and U. A E., 
on the south by the Sultanat- e Oman and two Yamani republics and in 
West by the Red sea " 
The Great Britain had acquired extensive political influence along 
with the eastern and southern coasts of Arabian peninsula '- King Abdul 
Aziz (1880-1953) Ibn Abdul Rehman Al Faisal Al Saud is considered to 
be one of the greatest chiefs and leaders of this century and one of the 
most prominent history makers in modern times In harsh condit ions and 
difficult circumstances he set out from Kuwait to Riyadh with a small 
army and some followers and fought for his ancestoral glory (ruled by 
Imam Abdul Aziz 1765-1803, Ottoman period) He succeeded in regaining 
Saudi Arabia.'"' 
9 Ibid, p 121 
10 Cooke. V Headle\. Challenges and Response in Middle East. Harper and Brothers 
Publishers. New York. 1952 p p 4 8 
11 FarsN. Al Fond. Modernit> and Tradition - The Saudi Equation. Kegan Paul 
International. New York 1990. p 1 
12 Ibid, p 87 
13 Dialogue Toda>. International Quarterl>. Vol VIFl. No 4. 1994. P4 
6 
After conquering Riyadh and securing it. King Abdul Aziz led his 
campaign for unification of the whole country. He annexed Al Qassim, 
Al Ahsa, Asir and Hail. He conqueredTaif and Mecca in 1924 Afterwards 
entire Hejaz area was under his rule '* The process of unification was 
nearly completed by 1926 and in 1927 the British government had to 
recognize King Abdul Aziz 's supremacy in the area of Sultanate of Najad 
and Hejaz.*^ 
Since the situation was well under control. King Abdul Aziz declared 
the formal establishment of the government of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
on September 23 , 1932 corresponding to 135 1 Hijri when a majority of 
the world powers recognized the sovereignty of the new nat ion . And this 
day became National Day of Saudi Arabian Kingdom. '* 
The territorial differences with Yamen wer-e resolved by the peace 
treaty of Taif concluded in May 1934 and the process of reunification 
was over '^  Everything was settled down, a per iod of reorganization, 
restructuring, reorientation and development started. Oil was discovered 
in 1933, the main resource of Saudi Arabia At pol i t ica l level King 
concluded different treaties and participated in foundation of Arab League 
in 1945 Lastly, it also become a member of U N O in the same year. 
When the kingdom of Saudi Arabia was formed in 1932, it lacked 
modern government, insti tutions, and well organized administrat ion. 
Gradually, Quranic prescriptions and principles of Shariat were made the 
base of Saudi political system After 1953 a Council of Ministers was set 
up for the whole Saudi Kingdom including Hejaz and Najd King Faisal 
was the first Prime Minister of that council In 1964 he became king after 
14 Ibid, p 5-6 
15 Iqbal Mohd Sheikh. Kingdom ef Saudi Arabia Glimpses of Progress. P 1 (Saudi Embassy 
in India 94) 
16 Dialogue Toda> 1994. op cit p 6 
17 Iqbal M Sheikh. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia- Glimpses of Progress. Saudi Embassy in 
India. 1994. p 1-2 
7 
king Saud and he was assassinated by his nephew in March 1975. He was 
succeeded by King Khalid who died of heart attack in June 1982 and 
King Fahad preceeded him. '* The kingdom has been under the Western 
influence specially United*States of America. 
D. Discovery of oil and its impact on West Asia 
In general oil is the most strategic raw liquid material armies on which 
alone - armies navies and airforces can move even the atomic age. Thus 
the geostrategic uniquness of West Asia is based on twin pillars:- one of 
which represents the old centre of world communicat ion and the other 
newly developed natural power oil, vital for peace and war b o t h . " 
The history of oil in the.Middle East and the Arab World goes back 
many centuries ago. A German mission first reported oil in 1908 in West 
Asia In 1933 Petroleum was discovered in Saudi Arabia and by 1938 
Dammam, RasTanura and other oil fields had started to produce a plenty 
of oil.-" 
Since the world war II oil output increased rapidly During the early 
1940's Iran was the largest oil producer followed by Iraq and Saudi Arabia. 
During the decade 1955-1965 Kuwait became the largest oil producer 
followed by Saudi Arabia and Iran. With the dawn of 1970's Saudi Arabia 
and Iran emerged as leading producers of oil in West Asia.- ' 
Signif icantly, oil resource in West Asia has g a i n e d immense 
momentum and this natural resource pro\ es to be central factor which 
determines the economic, palitical and strategic developments in West 
Asia 
18 Peretz. Don. The Middle East Toda\. Praeger Publication. New York. 1983. p p 469-
473 
19 Jack Ernest, Background of the Middle East. Cornell Uni\ersit> Press. New York. 
1952. p 19 
20 Fars>. Al Foud. op cit , p 96 
21 Beamount. Peter. H Blake Wagstaff. The Middle East A Geographical Stud>, John 
Wile> & Sons Publ Toronto. 1970. p 270 
Oil.the Liquid Gold in Saudi Arabia 
With the discovery and exploitation of petroleum during the past 
half century, Saudi Arabia became the world 's largest exporter of oil and 
natural liquids. In 1933, the founder of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia granted 
the right to the Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL) to explore 
oil in kingdom Oil was discovered in 1933 to 1938 and its utilization 
f lourished through U.S. company and the same was r enamed as 
ARAMCO(Arabian American. Company of Oil)in 1944. In 1948, four U.S. 
companies shared in ARAMCO The largest oil rifinery is situated in Ras 
Tanura with a capacity of 10 million tonnes per annum and this is owned 
by ARAMCO ARAMCO was producing 500,000 barrels of crude oil a 
day at that time (early fiftees). It increased by an average of 19 percent a 
year from 1945 to 1974 reaching 82 million barrels a day in 1974.— 
The Petromin Company of Petroleum and Minera l s . 
To develop the entire natural resource sectors and harness it to the 
service of overall developments, the government established Petromin as 
the state Petroleum company "in 1962. Petromin's role is to maximize the 
usefulness of the kingdoms soil, gas and minerals Its range of activity 
includes refining, pipelines, storage, drilling and power generation More 
recently the Kingdom has formed the Saudi Arabian Market ing and 
Refining Company (SAMARJC).-* 
OPEC Organisat ion of Petroleum Exporting Count r i e s 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries produces 2 5 % of 
the world oil reserves Saudi Arabia plays a pivotal role in affairs of the 
of(OPEC). The idea of OPEC was initiated by Arab League to develop a 
common policy of major petroleum companies operating within their 
22 Dialogue Tod;n. International Qiiarterh. Vol VIII. No 4 1994. p 26-27 
23 FarsN. Al Foud Op cit.p 9S 
24 Ibid, p 102 
9 
boundaries including non Arab states such as Venezuela from Latin 
America. 
The nego t ia t ion s tar ted in 1947 in Wash ing ton to achieve a 
coordinated pet ro leum policy among the large expor t e r s . In 1949 
Venezuelan delegation exchanged views on petroleum policies with Iran, 
Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia The first Arab petroleum congress was 
convened in Cairo in 1959 The government of Saudi Arabia and Venezuela 
issued a declaration on 13th May, 1960, recommending to pursue a 
common policy in order to protect their rightful interests but the countries 
did not take immediate action. Sudden decrease in petroleum prices in 
1960 made them feel endar\gered and encouraged them to unite on a 
common front. Thus Baghdad conference, (10-14 August, 1960) declared 
its intention to establish this organization finally. Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, 
Iran Iraq and Kuwait were among the members. It came into existence in 
September I960.- ' 
As OPEC's largest producer, Saudi Arabia realizes the importance 
of stable global economy and has therefore acted as the organization's 
primary moderating force..The Kindgom functions as "swing producer" 
adjusting its production in response to fluctuation in the world market 
and according to OPEC quotas -'' 
OAPEC Organizat ion of Arab Petroleum Exper t ing Countr ies . 
The proposal for OAPEC was submitted by Saudi Arabia in 1967 
summer in order to establish an Arab Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries . For the first time the agreement was signed in January 1968 
and it was finalized. The headquarter lies in Kuwait The member countries 
of OAPEC are Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria and U. A.E. Since its creation OAPEC has made great efforts 
25 Ibid, p p 108-110 
26 DisJogiie Toda> op cit . p .1"? 
10 
towards achieving its goals and serving the economies of all Arab as well 
as member countries. OAPEC has played a key role in reducing duplication 
of effort and investment and rationalizing aspects of oil and gas 
production," 
Thus Saudi Arabia has been a country of immense significance in 
West Asia by its resources oil, gas that is vital in world economy and by 
its political set up and multi- dimensional policies that has opened many 
avenues for superpower involvement especially the U.S. Ever since its 
independence it has been fostering and advancing friendly relations with 
the U.S. 
27. Foud Al Fars}, op cit, p.p.117,118 
CHAPTER-II 
11 
Chapter - M 
u s . Foreign Policy and Superpowers Rivalry in WestAsia 
A. Geo-Historical Background of U S:-
The United States of America is a Federal Republic composed of 50 
states. The central one third of North America is bounded by Canada on 
the East, by the Atlantic Ocean on the South, by the Gulf of Mixico on 
extreme south and on the west by Pacific Ocean The total area of the 
country is 9,529,063 square kilometres. '-
By virtue of its experiences and the political position, US dominates 
the World.Not schooled by continuous involvement in international politics 
as were the Europeans, the US approach of foreign policy has been very 
peculiar to them and that of the other powers.- The US has got a very 
peculiar type of foreign policy in each period since its independence. It 
has been greatly successful in its sophisticated diplomacies which reflected 
a style, sense of wisdom, dec is ion making , behaviour and m o d e r n 
techniques etc US has been greatly successful in acquiring its aims and 
objectives and serving its interests through various tactics & strategies 
Broadly speaking, the foreign policy of US can be classified into six 
periods 
1. Pre-independence period - struggle for freedom. 
2. Post-independence period - (a) policy of isolation. 
(b) Policy during the world war 1 - A short entry into the world war and 
support to allied powers, 
(c). Twenty years transitional period - withdrawal from the world affairs 
1 The New Ens>clopaedia of Bntaniiica. Vol 29. Uiii\ersil\ Press. Chicago. USA 
1993.p 149 
2 Spanier John. Aniencan Foreign Polic> Since World War II. Tata Mac Graw Hills 
Publishing Compan\. New Delhi. 1988.p 1 
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and policy of neutrality or renaissance of the isolationism. 
(d). Re entry into the world affairs and absolute abandonment of neutrality 
since world war II. 
(e) Begining of cold war and US emergence as superpower. 
(F). Post cold war foreign policy and disintegration of Soviet Union. 
^° ^After a long struggle US achieved its independence on July 4, 1776 
and United States of America came into existence.-' 
The foreign policy of new Federal state was declared in President 
Washington 's farewell speech. His admin i s t ra t ion dec la red a little 
involvement and less engagements with outside world, and stressed on 
economic relations with other countries. This po l icy was revitalized 
during President Monroe 's period (1817-1825) The Monroe doctrine 
was declared in 1823. Monroe doctrine proved as a hallmark of US foreign 
policy and still it is of immense significance for US interests They always 
take inspiration from that doctrine as it preserves foreign policy interests. 
The annual message to Congress was addressed on Dec 2, 1823 as:-
1 US would no longer be "used as colony 
2 Policy of non-interference - "Any attempt on the part of the European 
states to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere would 
be considered dangerous to our peace and security". 
3 Another important aspect of Monroe doctrine was based on economic 
interest - " We should not consider any attempt on their part to extend 
their system to any portion of its hemisphere as dangerous to our 
peace and security if it is in our economic interest". 
Leopold W Richard. The Growth of Amencan Foreign Poltc\. Alfred. A Kaoff. 
New York. 1962. p p ."5-4 
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Monroe doctrine has political and economic considerations and it 
became a foundation stone for future US foreign policies. The doctrine 
does not allow any external involvement or spread of any system to that 
hemisphere. At the same it permits to do according to the time, situation 
requirement and need in order to protect US national and economic 
interests for ever. Eventhough the US entry into the World War I made 
possible the defeat of Germany it soon re t rea ted to its customary 
isolationism. But since 1939 Nazi threat was real ized stronger than 
communist leading to German attack on Soviet Union in 1940 despite 
Non Aggression Pact of 1939. Moreover, Japan made a massive attack 
on US Pearl Habour port in 194 1 which led to the entry of US forever in 
the world affairs. After the end of World War II and victory of allied 
powers the composition of the international community changed its picture. 
The meeting of the US*President Roosevelt, Stalin from Soviet Union, 
British Prime Minister Churchill and Chiang Kei Shek from China in Yalta 
in February 1945 and in Postdam in July 1945- led to the total end of the 
War, U.N.O. too came into existence in the same year." 
Gradually, Britain withdrew its influence from the world politics and 
US and USSR emerged two ideologically confronting superspowers. The 
world was divided into two hostile blocs and this was the begining of the 
cold war. Virtually, the Western bloc was under US influence and the 
Eastern European part was under the leadership of USSR, the socialist 
bloc. Ever since 1945 onwards, the US gave up its character of aloofness 
and isolationism and ushered in a modern competit ive world with all its 
diplomatic Skills and tactics. This was the t ime, when the policy of 
containment was introduced by George F. Kenon in which he insisted to 
4 Pratt. W. Julius. The Histor> of United States Foreign Polic>. Prentice Hall Englewood 
Cliffs. U S.A . 1955 P686 
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concentrate to keep off Soviet Communist influence. Truman doctrine of 
1947, Marshall Plan 1947, .military blocs including NATO, SEATO, 
CENTO, OAS, all these strategies were used as bulwark against the Soviet 
influence/ 
The main objectives of US foreign policy were-
1. To contain Soviet activities. 
2. Liberalism and open door diplomacy. 
3. To ensure freedom to-the mankind every where in the world. 
4. To assist any nation in the world and to promote self 
determination and human rights to secure democratic system. 
5 International peace and security. 
6 Free trade, economy and industrialization 
7. Welcome to private investments. 
8. Economic and military aid to the small nations against Soviet threat. 
9. Development of military alliances 
10. To support small countries in regional conflicts. 
B- US Interests in West Asia and Varies Policy Measures : -
West Asia has long been a cradle of attraction for major powers 
specially UK, France, Russia and USA After the World War Second it 
became centre of rivalry of two superpowers as per their interests and 
requirements. 
In the 18th and 19th century US took only sporadic interest and it 
involved slightly in Mediterranean, Syria and Saudi Arabia for its economic 
interest. Apart from it, US's reputation was of only missionary appeal 
5 Needier. C Martin. (Ed ) Dimensions of American foreign polic.\. Nostrand Pubhshing 
coinpan\ Inc New Jerq 1966._p p 4-8 (see details of Truman Doctrine and Marshall 
PlMn\ 
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and social work, trade continued but not at larger scale. The US did not 
declare war against Ottoman empire nor it entertained Treaty o f ' S e v r e s ' 
and 'Laussane ' of 1920 and 1923 respectively. President Wilson had 
already endorsed Balfour declaration of 1917 that gave boost to the Zionist 
movement which henceforth struggled Arab resistence to make Palestine 
a Jewish state"^ 
The post war challenges and weak position of Great Britain made it 
difficult to sustain its economic and military commitments to the Arab 
countries. It was the growing power of Soviet Union which challenged 
this weakness and forced the US to assume its responsibility in the area. 
The US perceived its respoTisibility and role as guardian of Western 
interests in Arab World and subsequently to build up a deterrence against 
it (Soviet Union).^ 
The interests of the US in Arab world are Following :-
1. West Asian petroleum is a principal source of power for the Western 
European economy and a basic source of global defense.US always 
liked to exploit this petroleum resource as much as possible 
2. To keep an upper hand on Jewish interest." 
The oil in West Asia emerged as significant wealth specially since 
1945 when its value was realized during the war. Despite the lack o1 
adequate transportation, refining and production facilities by 194^, the 
crude ou tpu t of Iran, Iraq. Saudi .-^rab and Bahrain was es t imated 
6 Leopold. Richard: The Growth of US Foreign Polic\. Alfred A. Knoff. New York. 1962. 
PP. 41-43. 
7 Badeau. S. John; The American .Approach to the Arab World. Harper & Row 
Publishers. New York. 1968. P .^ -4 
8. Ibid.. R 17-20. 
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194,000,000 barrels . ' 
At the same time Soviet Union became as a major actor in West Asia. 
This region has a strategic proximity with Soviet Union and Soviet Union 
took interest here since long t ime back specially in Nothern tier area and 
warm water stream. After ' the world war II, Soviet policy towards West 
Asia became reactionary due to the US interests in the region. For instance 
after the arrival of Shah of Iran in early fifties. US interests found their 
expression by exploiting out oil whereas Soviet Union always sought to 
use Afghanistan, Iran, Baltics and Transcaucasian for its defence and 
polit ical purposes Ini t ial ly the Soviet interests were s t ra tegic and 
defensive. '" 
The Soviet interests flourished on two grounds mainly political and 
strategic. 
1. As far as USSR ' s s trategic interest is concerned it fostered its 
influence in the region to provide a corridore for direct challenge to US 
navy in Indian Ocean and to keep watch on US activities of submarines in 
the West Asian region and in Diego Garcia (Indian Ocean) 
The another aspect of strategic interest of USSR in West Asia is to 
keep away West i e US and its allies to exploit fabulous amount of oil 
This precious asset should not go to its enemy (western Europe, US and 
its allies) but to its friends (Eastern Europe) The Comminist Soviet Union 
has always been active to den\ the oil to be used by Britain, US or any 
other anti-Soviet regime 
10 Ismail. Y Tariq. The Middle East in llie World Politics- A snid> of Coiiteniporan 
World Politics S\racuse UnnersitN Press. 1974. PP 1-"! 
9 Aron. Da\id Mille. Search for Seciirit>. Saudi Arabia, oil & Anierician foreign polic>. 
1939-1949. Uni\ersit\ of North Carolina. 1980. PP 12.'^ -124 
17 
Secondly, as far as political interest is concerned the erstwhile USSR 
very diplomatically projected a picture of new perception of 'western ' 
colonization in Arab world and subsequently tried to gain favour of Arabs, 
Third World and socialist countries. The Soviets declared that despite 
being communist they were not against Pan Arabism and Arab cause 
specially sponsored by Egyptian President Jamal Abdul Nasser. It got good 
relation with Syria, Algeria,' Iraq and Libya including Egypt. Economic 
and military aids were promoted by USSR. Secondly the other side of 
political interest was to play a card through the ferver of Arab nationalism 
to keep off US and its Zionist moves in West Asia. Automatically Soviet 
Union carved out a clean ima g e among socialist Arab reg imes as 
Particularly in Iraq and in Syria. 
Evidently, the US policy characterized on the above grounds except, 
its oil interest and USforeign pol icy towards West Asia is based on 
following three major interests. 
1. To exploit fabulous amount of petroleum of West Asia. 
2. To keep off Soviet influence and to counter communist tendencies. 
3. To beef up a permanent ally ' Israel ' to maintain Jewish lobby, in 
Congress for keeping control and watch over the Arab resurgence and 
activities. 
Crea t ion of Israel and US foreign policy Since 1948:-
The most disturbing problem in West Asia is Arab-Israel conflict 
that had stirred the entire arep with political unrest since 1948. The crisis 
is not new one and has its deep roots since 1 880 with the increasing spirit 
of nat ionalism among many groups of Jews. It was the outcome of 
aspiration to establish a Jewish polity in 'Zion' named area in Jerusalem 
but it e x t e n d e d to the a r e a o f Pa l e s t i ne . . Th is m o v e m e n t w a s 
institutionalized by Theodore Herzel in 1897 in Zionist Congress at Basle 
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in Switzerland. The British support was from the very beginning to the 
(WZO) World Zionist Organization. Consequently, Britishers offered them 
a place in East Africa but they did not accept it as it did not suit them. 
Britain very diplomatically made some promises with Sharif of Mecca 
but in Sykes-Picot agreement (1916) the Arabs were betrayed by Britain, 
France and Russia jointly Moreover, in November 1917 Britain issued 
Balfour declaration through which Palestine was totally neglected and a 
Jewish state was stablished and m f^^'S it was deT;l^red-by-W-N-r0-" 
This was a great setbacH to Palestinians and the Jews started to shift 
there, gradually they occupied most of the areas and many Arabs were 
ousted from their homes This resulted into first Arab -Israeli conflict of 
1948. This was the time when Britain was not capable enough to tackle 
the problem, the matter was left for U S and itwholeheartedly took the 
responsibility Now Israel is the most important and inevitable ally of 
US in West Asia which is serxing US political and strategic interests. 
Significantly, the US presence after British withdrawal was only 
poss ible through the creat ion of Israeli state and US could give an 
impression of its power and influence to the rest of the world. On the 
other hand, the Jewish problem was very ticklish for US it led to double 
directioned US policy in the Arab world There are friend countries like 
GCC and other Arab countries which are having healthy relation with US 
and some of the Aiab countries are very critical of US by virute of its pro 
Israeli Position But desJDite these constraints US never wants to make 
angry any of the party It has to extract the oil and it would not let shatter 
its Arab strategy On the contrary, simultaneously, ' Israel ' is a permanent 
11 Pertez. Don. The Middle East Toda>. Holt Rinehart and Winston, New York. 1971. 
p 101 See details of S>kes*Picot agreement and thete.vt of the declaration of Israel 
state Balfour declaration of 1917 
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ally which has to be developed by US support at any cost. By balancing 
this situation US could pressurize to extract maximum oil from this region. 
Being consious enough with US activities Soviet Unioti, on the other hand, 
very carefully tried to satisfy Arab's psychological and economic needs 
by supporting them economical ly and militarily whenever required. 
Additionally, Soviet Union declared itself as a sympathizer of Thrid World, 
non-alignment', ' socialism' and "Baath ideology' and 'anti imperial ' and 
anti' Zionist' strategy. Though this step was taken to counter US influence 
it could not withstand for a long time. In 1955 CENTO was converted 
into Baghdad Pact though Iraq had been Soviet friend but at that t ime Iraq 
Prime Minister Nuri Said considered Iraqi membership essential for this 
pact. His political consideration were absolutely different. Naturally, he 
became a victim of severe criticism for his pro western orientation. '^ 
The Suez canal crisis of 1956 was one of major crisis in West Asia 
and superpower's interests w'ere distinctly clear in this area. Suez canal 
was opened in 1869 and since 1888 it became an" important shortest way 
to connect Europe and West Asia but it was totally under the control of 
Britain and France. In Anglo-Egyptian agreement in 1936 the canal was 
recognized as belonging to Egypt and in 1954 Egypt was solely responsible 
for its defence. The events that led to the nationalization on of Suez canal 
company in 1956, were partially forced upon Egypt by the Western 
powers:-
1. Creation of Baghdad pact in 1955, Nasser opposed this pact,tooth 
and nail. 
2. A number of Israeli raids on Egyptian border increased Nasser 's desire 
to strengthen its defense. 
3. Enlargement of Aswan Dam. 
12 Foreign Affairs Report. Jul> 1960. p 80. 
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When Nasser declared the canal was nat ional ized; the Western 
reaction camenegative and resultantly there was a tripartite attack on Egypt 
from Britain, France and Israel. US and USSR took a joint initiative in 
ceasefire and forces evacuated Egypt by December 1956. 
At this moment US played cards very cautiously and calculatjvely. It 
showed its resentment against Britain-france and Israel as well. The 
incident had just happened before two months of Presidential elections. 
President could have Jewish support but here US very tactfully emerged 
for peace making efforts accompained with its adversary USSR. According 
to US mastermind it was very important and urgent to be a 'mediator' at 
that crucial juncture to satisfy Arabs and to countinue its control over 
petroleum wealth, (lest Britain and France might have created some other 
situation and control West Asian oil ). 
The next smart and tactful move was Eisenhower doctrine of January 
1957 to counter Soviet proximity in the region. There was another lurking 
fear-Iest Soviet Union would reap the benefit of this ceasefire and spread 
its tentacles through its ideological coinpatibility with socialist Arab 
regimes. 
The Eisenhower doctrine was based on anti communist assumption 
in West Asia that was very vital for US security and it was categorically 
announced that any communist move would not be tolerated at any cost. 
US achieved remarkable success in its West Asian diplomacy through this 
doctrine. It kept continue the following things-
1 Keeping Soviet Union away from the area. 
2. Maintaining a very clean image of US among Arab countries. 
3. Increasing Soviet-Egypt tension (as Soviet Union did not support it 
during Aswan Dam construction). 
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4. Continuing US influence over oilflow '' 
With the arrival of General Qassim in 1958 the political scene in 
Iraq changed redically and he witiidrew its membership from Baghdad 
pact in 1958. Eisenhower administration was much more realistic than 
Truman's so far as West Asia is concerned June 1967 war erupted out 
when President Johnson was busy to face monolithic Vietnam war Jordan 
waters, Arab guerilla warfare emergence of Al-Fateh group led by Yassir 
Arafat (later as PLO), exclusion of UN emergency force from Israel, return 
of Sinai peninsula, failure of UAR, Syrian claim to be strong opponent of 
Israel and other unsettled problems and Arab disunity led to sporadic 
clash that converted into a full scale war on 5th June 1967 when Israel 
attacked on Egypt Syria and Jordan '* 
By 10th June 1967. it had completed its p reempt ive strikes It 
delivered a severe blow to the Arabs and Israel, very successfully occupied 
Sinai. Ghaza strips, Golan Heights and West Bank and nothing was left 
for Palestine From June to November 1967 p roposa l s and counter 
proposals were put forward in the United Nations in an at tempt to bring 
peace Generally, US took the side of Israel whereas Soviet Union sided 
with Arabs On November 22, 1967 UN was able to approve resolution 
242 wirh unanimous vote for the Israeli withdrawal from occupied 
territories in recent conflict '^  
From the point of view of US foreign policy, the June war(1967) 
brought major shifts in position of big powers in West Asia Israeli forces 
n Spainer. John. American Foreign Policv since World War II. Tata Mac Graw Hills 
publication. New Delhi. PP 99-100 
14 Seabur>. Paul and Wilda\sk>. US Foreign Polic\ Perspectnes and Proposals for the 
1970s. Mac Graw HiUs Book companx. New Delhi. PP 192-205 
15 Arianiani. Yah\a. Middle East Past and Present. Prentice Hall Englewood Cliffs N J 
New Jers\. USA 1970 pp"i71--573 
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brought major shifts in position of big powers in West Asia. Israeli forces 
were shielded by massive protection umbrella of US and British army 
and aircraft Basically, US response to the June war focussed on two major 
points. 
1 To avoid military confrontation with Soviet Union 
2 To bring about speedy settlements which would lay lasting foundation 
for peace than armistic conflicts as happened earlier. 
3 Soviet Union seemed to derive psychological benefits from the Arab 
nations though it had not rendered any wholehearted support to them 
wheather material or military.'* 
The US entry into West Asia was not like a new colonizer but it 
came into the region as a champion of West Asian polit ics to counter 
Soviet influence and to exploit oil wealth. Before the end of world war II, 
its interests were peripheral, it did not touch the area till British presence 
and kept mum in every matter . Once it ushered in'political unrest of the 
region its policies have been oscillating between the realities of the world 
affairs and domestic considerations. Each president viewed and interpreted 
the area and its problems with different angles according to the priorties 
and challenges. But they preserved their basic national interest as per 
Monroe doctrine every where and every time intact. 
C- US-Saudi Relat ions - A Survey from 1933 to 1969.:-
Saudis have had a very different kind of experience with Western 
imperialism The classical Islamic view of international relations has 
remained intact because Western influence were less pronounced in Saudi 
Arabia. Originally, this view reflects a bipolar world made up of Darul 
Islam (territory under Islamic rule of law) and Darul Harab (territory 
16 Seabur>. Paul, op cit. pp 205-208-212 
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outside the rule of Islam) Within Darul Islam there are not only Musl ims 
but all monotheists or Ahlal-Kitab Christians and Jews also. Darul Harb 
includes non Ahlal Kitab and all atheists This explains Saudi apathy to 
Marxism. In cooperating with USA since 1933 at the time of establishment 
of ARAMCO Saudis see themselves not as the agents of imperialism but 
as the protector of the world from aheist communist danger 17 
US formally recognized the regime of King Abdul Aziz Ibne Saud in 
May 193 1. In 1933 Shah Abdul Aziz Ibne Saud obtained the oil concession 
through SOCAL Standard Oil Company of Califorina and subsequently 
made Saudi Arabia world's largest exporter of oil. On November 7, 1933 
US and Saudi Arabia signed a provisional agreement for d iplomat ic 
representation, commerce and navigation Saudi Arabia played a very 
important role during the world War II with US. As War spread to West 
Asia, US interests in Saudi Arabia increased. These led to a very close 
political relations between the two.'* 
US was greatly impressed since the war period by the enormous 
potentials of West Asian Oil and state Department's efforts continued to 
secure the US Stake in Saudi Arabian oil. It continued its emphasis on the 
impor tance of official ties with Saudi Arabia Americans not only 
recognized a national interest in Saudi Arabia but acted to preserve it 
through security, financial.'technological and military assistance and by 
pursuing a friendly policy towards Arab World in general ' ' 
Significantly, Saudi Arabia is a leading constructive power in the 
17 DaMd. E Long. The US and Saudi Arabia-Ainbnalent Allies. Wesuiew Publication. 
London. 1985. PP5-6 
18 Ibid . PP 101-102 
19 Miller. Aron Daxid. Search For Securit>. Saudi Arabia. Oil and Foreign Polic> (1939-
1949) Uni\ersit> of North Carolia. US. 1980 PP 125-126 
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Arab world. The basic determinants of its foreign policy are security of 
Arabian peninsula. Islamic Arab world solidarity, anti-communism and 
anti Zionism. "^ 
Saudi Arabia much of its brief history as an independent state lived 
in isolation comparatively. Most of the Arab states were swept by various 
ideological currents as nationalism, socialism and communism etc. Saudi 
Arabia remained attached to its own interpretation of Islam and Shariat. 
At that time the danger of external aggression was less. The British and 
US arrangements were there but they proved to be good exploiter of Saudi 
petroleum. This was very much related with Saudi internal concerns. Saudi 
economic well being, technological knowhow and industrial structure have 
been continued to be dependent upon external powers. And most important 
factor was security for which Saudi Arabia had to look for US help. This 
security concern increased aftfer Yamen crisis in early sixties and escalating 
socialist influence On the other hand US found Saudi Arabia a very 
f lou r i sh ing marke t for oi l , t e c h n o l o g y and even for o the r smal l 
commodit ies to be sold in Saudi Arabian market. Consequently, except 
some ambivalence in their approach at different time, both the countries 
reaped the benefit '^ The US approach to Saudi Oil was based on two 
general considerations. 
1 Eager to conserve domestic reserves and to develop Arabian crude 
source of energy for European recovery. 
2. The Department of State urged administration to cons ider the 
consequences of American support for the partition of Palestine and 
the establishment of Jews By the fall of 1947, the Palestine question 
20 Ens>clopaedia of the Third World. Vol III. Facts on file Publication. New York. 1978. 
P 1697. 
21 Qiiandt. B William. Saudi Arabia in 1980s. The Brookings Institue. Washington. D.C . 
1981. P.I 
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was rapidly emerging as curcial consideration and development of 
US policy towards West Asia. The US support to partition plan also 
seemed damaging to t he US position in Arab World but on the other 
hand oil was" to be protected as resource'from Arab world. Loy 
Henderson Near East Assistant Secretary expressed that-" We shall 
need Arab friendship if we are to retain our petroleum position in 
Arabs. Already, as a result of partition policy regarding Palestine, 
Saudi attitude towards US has changed sharply and its demands in 
the oil companies are becoming more extravagant."" 
Reports from Saudi Arabia indicated that if US wished to maintain 
the unquestioned friendship of Saudi Arabia, it must alter its position in 
Palestine. Ultimately, the US supported UN's decision of creation of Israel 
and brought it into practice by force because of Jewish lobby's pressure 
in Congress. The US policy was an error and the endorsement of Zionist 
objectives was a result of misguided humanitarianism. The importance of 
securing Saudi Oil was encompassed by an even greater strategic priority, 
and this priority was to contain Soviet infilteration in West Asia and to 
have an upper hand over Arab World through Israeli threat perception. 
Despite US exploitation of oil and its desire to preserve its grip on 
it, somewhere Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries also took calculative 
steps; as seen after the June War 1Q67 and in Oct 1973 during (Arab-
Israeli crises), oil supply was curtailed to the US and its Western allies. 
The OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting countries had already 
appeared on the scene through Venezuelan and Saudi Arabian efforts in 
1961. But at this crucial juncture in 1971-74 a proposal for Arabian 
petroleum countries organization was presented that was OAPEC. The 
22 Miller David Aron. Op cit. pp 179.187.193 
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development of US-Saudi commercial and economic relations started with 
the extention of US-Saudi Lend Lease aid to the kingdom in 1943. At the 
same t ime mil i tary relat ion were formally init iated. Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency with US'collaboration was established. In the broadest 
sense economic and military relations were based on Saudi desire of US 
commitment to protect the regime from foreign attack and US desire to 
make Saudi Arab an strategic military base for its vital interests. US 
military training mission MTM and transfer of M-41 , M-47 and F-86 
equipments, strengthened it -" 
The US-Saudi re la t ions developed on mutual co-operat ion and 
understanding but the most disturbing area of stress was and still is creation 
of Israel Saudi reaction and resentment against US support to Zionism 
made them ambivalent in their relations.-'' 
The demise of Western d-ominated security system surrounding Saudi 
Arabia began to decline since 1950 onwards with the virtual appearance 
of Soviet Union and its increasing power in Egypt As currents of 
nationalism. Pan Arabism led by the president Nasser, the US-Saudi 
relations remained 'understrain ' Though Saudi Arabia silently supported 
Arab nationalism, it found itself in sharp conflict with the revolutionary 
forces in Arab world. Apart from it, Saudi Arabian leader King Saud 
expressed his strongoppo'sition to CENTO and remained reluctant to 
support Eisenhower doctrine 1957. It appreciated Nasser ' s effort to 
restore Arab 's viability to deal with West but at the same time increasing 
Nasser 's influence made Saudi Arabia much concerned Evidently, Saudi 
Arabia was facing a tough time by having strained relations with US and 
23 DaMd. E Long. Op cit . pp 75-78. '?6-.'?9 
24 Peck. Malcolm. Saudi .A r^abia in US Foreign Polic.\-A case stiid\ in the sources and 
determinants of US foreign POIICN. Fletcher school of Law and Dipcoinac\. USA -197{). 
p 202 
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Britain and being allergic with radical revolutionary changes including 
revolution in Iraq and creation of UAR in 1 96 1. *^ 
The outbreak of Yaman civil war in the fall o f 1962, in which Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt intervened and supported opposite sides - made the 
security consideration more strong for Saudi Arabia and this was realized 
by US Saudi Arabia was supported by US when Egypt and Saudi Arabia 
were on the verge of direct war. Various defence pacts were signed in 
sixties as( SAMP) Saudi Arabian Mobility Programme, Saudi Armament 
Repair Maintenance SARMP and US supply of modification kits for F-86 
and AIM-9E missiles cemented the relations -^ 
In the light of several factors the US occupies a crucial place in Saudi 
foreign policy in determining its future so far as its internal infrastructure 
and external security is concerned. It has been caught many times in Arab 
complexities. On Arab-Israeli issue Saudis ha\'e tried to play a safer role 
- declaring an ant i - Israel i policy, while refraining in prac t ice from 
becoming too deepl> involved in the diplomacy of Arab Israel conflict. It 
can t be \ ocal because it has to be faithful to US and despite many evident 
differences and ideological divergence they maintained those aspects 
protected which were vital for their interests mutually 
2.'^  B Oiiiidt. op cit p 7 
26 Bradle.\. Paul. Recent US foreign Polic> in Persian Guif 1971-82. Thompson and 
Rutter. New York. 1982 P42 * 
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Chapter- MI 
strains and Linkages Between US And Saudi Relations 1970 to 1981 
The year 1970 proved a very interesting and favourable year for the 
US policy towards West Asia After the death of Nasser in September 
1970 and total withdrawal of British in ter ference , US achieved its 
objectives more successfully and effectively. Anwar Sadat ' s arrival played 
a role of catalyst for US calculative moves in West Asia. Sadat proved to 
be much more realistic in his approach and pragmatic in terms of Egyptian 
interest. The vacuum left by Nasser wascalculatively utilised by both Sadat 
and the US leaders upto mid seventies, consequently, they found a free 
hand to fulfil their aspirations 
Though this was the time of detente and US-Sovie t relations had 
improved but US never liked that the area of the Persian Gulf or non 
Gulf Arab countries would be fully dominated by the Soviet Union or 
China orany of communist power China was given recognit ion by US in 
1971 and it was emerging as major power in Asia 
Soviet Union and Arab World worked together but the moment Soviet 
Union wanted to overshadow the area, the Arabs did not like it. They did 
not want Soviet Union to do as Britain had done so far Arabs wanted to 
be sovereign in their areas and use the Soviet Union jus t as confident 
protector friend so far as their sentiments of ant i- imperial ism and anti-
ziomism were concerned ' 
On the other hand king Faisal of Saudi Arabia started to take special 
kind of interest with Egyptain leadership (Sadat ) and became more 
1 Kanet. E Roger. The SOMCI Union and the De\ eloping Nations. John Hopkins 
Uni\ersit\. Baltimore London. 1*^ 74 p p 169-70 
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conscious for West Asian security perspective But the most delicate 
problem was sensitive issue of Palestine and furthermore use of Arab 's 
wealth, resource and oil to beef up Israel against the Arabs during the 
wars^ 
At this crucial juncture US formulated its own Gulf Policy for which 
it always looked to the British support in pre-seventy period President 
Nixon had already declared that West Asia was of greater significance 
than Berlin and Vietnam. These circumstances forced US to develop a 
Comprehensive West Asin Policy based on two grounds" 
1 To settle Arab-Israel problem based on UN resolution No.242 
2. Secondly, Saudi Arabia and Iran were taken as significant central 
areas simultaneously. This move developed US twin pillar diplomacy in 
Gulf and it continued very successfully till the fall of Shah of Iran.'^ 
Saudi- Egyptian honeymoon proved as catalyst for US at that crucial 
juncture when situation was favourable everywhere for US except Soviet-
Iraqi treaty of 1972 and other Baathist movements President Sadat, the 
pro-West leader found Saudi Arabia best potential ally for economic and 
political support After his visit to Egypt, King Faisal referred Egypt as 
the "citadel of steadfastness" and urged support for Egypt" 
The Egyptian threatre had already shifted from Soviet Union to US 
umbrella specially after 1967 War when Soviet Union drew its hands in 
supporting Egypt during the crises This development brought a suitable 
pol i t ical c l imate for Saudi Arabia spec ia l ly u n o p p o s i n g soc ia l i s t 
2 Dowdi. M S & Dajani. Economic Diploinac\ Enibergo Lexerage and world Politics. 
Washington Press London. 198.'i-p-19 
3 Long. E DaMd. US and Saudi Arabia the Ambixalent Allies. WesUiew Publishers. 
London. 1985- P117 
4 Doiodc op.cit. p 120 
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movements and communist parties in Syria, Iraq Lebanon and A l g e r i ^ t c 
U.S. found itself in a more secure position as its enemy was getting tough 
time. Saudi-Egyptian friendship was a miraculous turn for US interests in 
this region. Saudi Arabia is not only a great possessor and exporter of oil 
but also the biggest country in the Arabian peninsula with unparallelled 
religious prestige in the Arab and Muslim World on account of the two 
holiest shrines of Islam here. The enormous oil revenues, it has earned 
particularly in i970 's , have further enhanced its capacity and prestige in 
the areas around Arab Gulf and Red Sea For the Arab countries and P.L.O., 
the kingdom is great source of funds for the war against Israel and for 
their economic stability It is a lso a crusader against Zionism and 
Communism simultaneously and this factor suits the Arab World.^ 
Astonishingly, a country of such mixed values (which stood against 
Israel and Communism both at the same time, which liked US protection, 
a Christian country despite having the entire Islamic ethos and which also 
supported Palestenian and Arab cause) - is of solid importance for the US 
and at the climax of these de.velopments US long term goals were to be 
achieved through a different kind of foreign policy towards West Asia in 
general and Saudi Arabia in particular since 1970 
1 To maintain a constant flow of Saudi Oil to US. 
2. Search for peace resolution of Arab-Israel conflict 
3. Continued Saudi support to the US position in Gulf in keeping Gulf 
free from Communist influence whether Soviet Union or China 
4 Consequently, U S became a major arms supplier to Saudi Arabia 
and made twin pillar diplomacy successful. U.S. was already a great 
supporter of Iran '^ 
5 Bhootani. Surendra (ed). Cojiiejnponin GnJf Ac;ideinic Press. Ne« Delhi.J98().PP6J-
62 
6 Emile. A Nakhleh. The US and Saudi Arabia. US hUer prise Instt for Public Polic\. 
Washington. 1975. PP 64-66 
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In the early 1970s, the US became deeply involved in all aspects of 
Saudi Arabia's comprehensive military modernization. In 1971 US agreed 
to equip the Saudi airforce with F-5 planes and train Saudi personnel to 
maintain them which was expected to take close to a generation. 
In 1972 the US agreed to modernize the relatively small Saudi navy 
including 13 patrol gunboat which were core elements of navy. Since 1971 
US Saudi economic relations were somewhat on tough lines because some 
of Congressmen showed antipathy towards large scale Arab investment 
in US business But later on,- a joint commission on security affairs and 
commission for economic cooperation were set up in 1974 
A. 1973 Oil Embargo and US~Saudi Rela t ions :-
19 73 was really a decisive year when US started to think Aseriously 
about the peace settlement in West Asia The wave of Nasserism had 
already gone off but Sadat's policy was still overshadowed by Nasser 's 
dashing personality and legacies June 1967 war and after that war of 
attritions' had posed a precarious situation in West Asia Israel was now a 
strongly established reality in West Asia to keep a watch on Arab activities 
and it became quite easier for US to have control over Arabs. The US 
perception of Israel is that the country is not harming Arab world while 
the Arabs always have a repulsive feeling to it and that Israel is a great 
threat for their peace and security in the region • 
Superpowers ' combined efforts to bring peace in West Asia through 
UN 242 resolution. Gunner Jarring peace mission and Roger 's Plan I and 
i r all of them proved a failure and settlement could not be materialized. 
7 Mahmood. Mohaimnad. Soxiet Polic> Towards Arab -Israeli conflict 1948 to 1988. 
Gi\an Publication House New Delhi 1989 P P 89 to 101 (See details of Roger Plans I. 
II and Jerring Mission) 
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The road of tension and conflict was still there because Israel had not 
returned then occupied territories yet and this move of Israel triggered off 
the feeling of revenge in Syria and Egypt simultaneously. Consequently, 
War broke out on October 6, 1973. when Egypt-Syrian combined offensive 
war launched on the Golan Hights and across the Seuz Canal border. Israeli 
forces suffered much damage from both the sides. Soviet Union started to 
support Egypt and Syria, US provided aid to Israel to stave off Soviet 
backed victory. Lately, the crisis was resolved by UN Security Council 
under the resolution 338, 339 and 340.^ 
This was the time when oil was used by the Arabs as strategic weapon 
to make Western powers and Israel technically crippled. Saudi Arabia never 
liked Israeli moves, being an ally of the same power which was a confident 
friend of Israel, Saudi Arabia halted oil exports to the US to protest US 
airlift of arms andammunition to Israel. The Arab oil embargo spread the 
panic of petroleum scarcity among the western world and oil market.^ 
Quadrupling of oil prices rose more than 10% in 1974. President 
Ford was no more smart enough than Nixon to tackle the continuation of 
inflation and stagnation in economy. Congress was also not in position to 
take a quick decision at the time of crisis. '" 
By now during the three crises of Arab-Israeli tensions of 1948, 1956 
and 1967, Petroleum was not-given any importance and in 1967 war a 
light embargo did not adverseh affect the volume of petroleum production 
in Saudi Arabia. And oil production continued to be increased. But during 
1967 war Israel left a te r r ib le and d i s a s t e r o u s effect on A r a b s ' 
8 Gaimborough, J.R.: The Arab-Israeli conflict - A Politice Legal analysis. Grower 
Publishing Company Vermounf. USA. 1986. P.P. 187 to 188. 
9. Great Decisions; Polic> Papers. Foreign Policy Press, New York, 1984, P.58. 
10. The New Ensyclopaedia of Britannica; University of Chicago US, 1993. P.264. 
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infrastructure and that defeat was a great challenge to make them concious 
of the value of their oil. President Sadat in an interview to Newsweek on 
July 3 1 , 1972, warned US that "its interest in Arab world will become 
shortly a part of the battle for the recovery of our land". And oil weapon 
was to be used very soon. Kuwait, Libya, Iraq and Algeria all gave a stern 
warning to US. According to Washington Post, on April 13, 1973, Saudi 
Oil minister Sheikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani made it clear that Saudi Arabia 
would not significantly expand its present oil product ion unless US 
changed its pro-Israeli stance in West Asia. Saudi warning was warmly 
welcomed and appreciated by the Arab states and PLO itself." 
On October 17, 1973, O A P E C Organization of Arab-Petroleum 
* 
Exporting Countries in Kuwait decided to cut oil production monthly by 
5% over the previous sale. The very next day Saudi Arabia declared 10% 
cut of oil and all shipments to the US as US (Nixon administration) 
continued military supply to Israel. It continued till five months and all 
Gulf countries UAE, Qatar, Behrain, Oman—all supported this viable 
stand. US, Holland, Portugal, Rodeshia, South Africa, Spain, France 
Britain, Canada were denied the supply of o i l . ' ' 
President Nixon cal led for a crash programme to make the US 
independent of foreign energy but that project could not beeu" concrete 
results. '^ The oil embargo adversely affected the US economy which 
suffered a deficiency approximately about two mill ion barrels o f oil a 
day. Over a five months period the embargo costed a half million American 
jobs and a decline of Gross National Product GNP between 10 to 20 
11 Dowdi. M S Dajani. op cit . p p 122-126 
12 Bradle>. Paul. Recent US polic> in the Persian Gulf 1971-82. Thomson and Rutter. 
New York. 1982 p 48 
13 Tillman. Seth P . The US in the.Middle East Inleresi and Obstacles. Inadian Unnersit). 
Broomingtons 1982. P 76 
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million The oil price increased 11.05 dollars per gallon instead of 5 
dollars-just doubled. '" 
The October war had a profound impact on traditional pattern of 
alliances among the Arab powers. A new Arab balance emerged with a 
g rea te r r ecogn i t i on of P a l e s t i n e and a b h o r r e n c e with I s rae l . An 
insignificant and lesser role of Soviet Union appeared on the scene. And 
US appeared more concious for oil than over before. Sadat- Faisal 
combination offered an apportunity to the west tq adjust themselves with 
new realities in an atmosphere where Arabs had gained initiative ,identity 
and recognition '"^  
After the October war Algeria emerged as powerful country and Cairo, 
.41geris and Riadh established a new political framework for the unity of 
Pan Arabism (including Africa and West Asia) This war had shown that 
the Arabs with their manpower, resource and unity can make any war 
grossly unacceptable both from Israel and its internat ional patrons. 
Moreover, it tore away the mask of Israeli economic prosperity' and dragged 
the country at the brink of disaster "' 
Soviet Union lost its long standing image among the Arab world. It 
shattered Arabs anticipation that Soviet Union would strongly support 
against this crisis but Soviet arms supply was stopped in 1974 and President 
Sadat unilaterally abrogated.Soviet-Egyptian treaty concluded in 1976, 
«iad flnalJy turned towards U.S. plank.'^ 
14 Bradle\. Paul. Op Cit. P49 
1 .^  Naram an. R K . Lessons and Consequences of the October War. Vikas Publishing House. 
New Delhi. 1977. PP29-"i() 
16 Ibid PM)-:A 
17 Mahmood. Mohammad. op c i t . P l l S 
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B . U.S. Policy and Kissinger^s Shutt le Dinlomacv:-
After involving extensively in the politics of West Asia during the 
period 1967, the US became an inevitable part of West Asian peace process. 
It was looked as the champion of peace making process. The US policy 
after the traumatic impact of 1973 War, was implemented through the 
shuttle diplomacy initiated by the then Secretary of States Henry Kissinger. 
He had been very actively and continuously involved in West Asian 
matters. Kissinger 's shut t le 'diplomacy was material ized step by step. 
Though the entire Arab was not happy due to its pro-Israeli orientations, 
it was a crude fact that there was no alternative to have some hopes for 
peace making except through US. '" 
The US was feeling proud of as its image was clean as peacemaker. 
This was the time to get involved in West Asian matters more and more 
because Soveit Union had already cut a sorry figure in the eyes of Arabs. 
During the embargo period many times Kissinger warned of retaliatory 
action but the Arab reaction remained stable as was evident from conference 
held on Nov.28, in Algires. In December 1973, Saudi Arabia was willing 
to lift total ban on some conditions regarding Palestinian political and 
territorial rights but Kissinger did not give any green signal with concrete 
commitments. Geneva conference in Dec. 1973 under the co-chairmanship 
of USSR and US emphasised on the following points of settlements. 
i. Scrupulous adherence to the truce. 
2. Separation of Egypt and Israeli forces would be given first priority. 
3. Israeli withdrawal from occupied terri tories.recognition, borders 
security arrangements aiid guarantees to the settlement of Palestinian 
problems. 
18 Allen DaMd. Alfred Pijper (ed). European Foreign Polic> Making and the Arab Israeli 
conflict. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 1984. P 191 
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4. Jerusalem contait^s holy places as Baitul Muqaddas ' and 'Masjide 
Aqsa^ considered 'holy places by three religions Muslims, Christians 
and Jews hence Muslims-including Palestinians have right to go there. 
The opening of Geneva conference had pos i t ive effect on fifth 
OAPEC conference in Kuwait on 24-25 December 1973 and 2 5 % cut of 
oil was eased. Subsequently, Sadat proposed to end the embargo against 
US in next OAPEC meeting on January 2nd 1974 in Cairo. But Kuwait 
and Svria opposed this stand and wanted king Faisal to continue the oil 
boycott against the US affairs because at least Israel should withdraw 
from all the occupied territories. Sadat was in favour of lifting the embargo 
as US had shown a green signal of Egypt-Israeli agree ment under 
Kissingarian shuttle diplomacy '" 
Henry Kissinger 's efforts to mediate for a sett lement were marked 
by a series of \ a r ious visits to Israeli and Arab capitals i.e. Jerusalem, 
Riyadh, Cairo, Kuwait and Damascas etc This resul ted into several 
agreements on West Asian peace problem "step by step". This "step by 
step" policy included ceasefire agreement of Nov 11,1973 and first round 
of Arab-Israeli ta lks in Geneva on December 21 -22 and two other 
disengagement agreements in 1974 ie Eg> pt and Israeli agreement in 
January 1974 and Syria and Israeli agreement in May 1974. 
President Sadat took it as positive posture and this was the moment when 
Sadat showed a slight allegiance with US.-" 
There was a mixed reaction among the .Arab states. Though Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia were ready but Kuwait, Syria, Libya, Algeria, Iraq etc. 
were not agreed with Kissingerian diplomacy and it was considered as 
19 Doudi. M.S:. Op. cit.. P.P 140-14.'^  
20 Bradle>. Paul:... Op. cit.. P.R4S)-5(l 
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'black mailing' move President Ford and the Secretary of State still 
concentrated on US requirements and goals in West Asia. Senator 
FuUbright expressed apprehension that US policy makers might come to 
the conclusion that military action was required to secure the oil resources 
of West Asia. Henry Kissinger had also indicated the use of force, (if it 
was necessary). Ultimately, in OAPEC's eighth conference in Vienna, 
Egyptian- Saudi axis demonstrated its strength by succeeding in lifting 
embargo over US and lately it was eased on other countries ie Portugal, 
Neatherland and South Africa e tc- ' 
Despite the settlements, the situation was still in hung-over posture 
because neither Arabs attained the goals (Palestine recognition and return 
of their occupied territories) nor US was in comfort as it was passing 
through a very tough time in facing Vietnam war Some analysts say that 
this embargo stand was weak in its later stages when US threatened West 
Asia especially OAPEC countries to tackle with force. They themselves 
were well aware of their oil strength and lastly they had to be flexible in 
their approach without plucking any pleasant fruit On the other hand the 
other school opines that oil embargo had left a great impact on West and 
it was a bold collective step The US threat to the Arabs was just the use 
of power ' to gain from the oil rich countries what it wanted to protect its 
economic interests. 
Effect on US-Saudi Relations:-
As far as US-Saudi relations are concerned it affected somewhat their 
friendly ties because Saudi Arabia always supported Arab cause silently 
but during embargo period it became subtle in its reaction against Israel 
with other friends. 
21 Tillman. Seth. . o p e n . P 95 
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There were two types of approaches amongthe leaders of Saudi 
Arabia. King Faisal had been on softer lines whereas prince Bandar Bin 
Sultan and Sheikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani always strongly opposed West 
strongly, US reactions and threats, Later on the situation shook the entire 
scenario of West Asia that absolutely changed the p i c t u r e -
Though the diplomatic, economic and military supports were not 
forzen by the US but the relatfons got strained to a larger extent. In October 
1976, Vice President Carter declared "if the Arab countries ever again 
declare an oil embargo against our nation , I would respond instantly 
with economic and military cut off \~' 
US policy makers were facing dilemma whether to use or not to use 
counter measure against Saudi Arabia because since 1970 onwards US-
Saudi relations had got deepened and both of them realized each other 's 
need and importance. This pre-condition and their importance for each 
other - posed a problem for US either to be more harsh or to be realistic 
and friendly to Saudis in terms of its economic interests .Moreover, US 
tw in pillar diplomacy was of immense significance politically at that time 
because President Nixon had declared Iran and Saudi Arabia both as 
'responsibility" of US for their security and on the other hand, US would 
serve its vital interest through oil import from them. The pr imary 
responsibility To maintain security in this area and build up of their 
mil i tary capabilit ies there were two important goals for USand this 
situation also changed the orientation of U.S. policy.-" 
"The Arab oil embargo and demands for the new international 
economic order that was heralded by the third world like a hurricane. 
22 Doudi. M.S Op., cit . P.132 
2? In Ramzam. R K s book Qouted - The New York Times. October ID. 1976 
24 Ibid . RP 7.65 
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convinced Kissinger that he finally would have to pay attention to the 
smaller nations of West Asia" South Asia, Latin America and Africa"^^ 
Assistant Secretary referred to the new programmes and supplies of 
defence material to Saudi Arabia as US was setting the transfer of F-15 
Free Fighters, F-4 Phantom, F-5B and F-5E etc. Apart from it sales 
programme was initiated to recognise and equip the National Guards US 
c o m p a n i e s ' efforts to improve Saudi Arab i a ' s defence capabi l i ty 
continued At the same time Soviet Union supported South Yamen's 
sporadic hits by Mig-21 on Saudi border that made US and Saudi Arabia 
very much closer and concerned for each other -* 
Surprisingly, even after the end of oil embargo when the situation 
was very critical and there was a lurking fear of another embargo in 1976, 
Kessinger had criticized many times Saudi Arabia for this stand as the 
embargo was felt as knee jerk to them but they kept into consideration 
Saudi s common interests Secretary for West Asian affairs Alfred Atherton 
expressed that Saudi Arabia carried a considerable weight in West Asia -
"Our ties to Saudis are broadly based on mutual cooperation and cover 
many areas of interest, including that of national security and self defense 
US-Saudi relations are two way street on which vuluerability of matters 
from both the sides has to be considered Profoundly opposing the Soviet 
expansion in West Asia, Saudi Arabia looks to the US as world stature" ~' 
He further emphasized with security and economy points so far as US-
Saudi relations are concerned 
25 Stoessinger. John. Henr> Kissuiger - The Anguish of Power. W W Norton. New York. 
1976. PP217.22C) 
2h Hearing before the House of RepresenJames. Congress Subcommittee on Near East 
and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 2'?rd Congress. 1st Session. US 
Govt Printing Press. Washington. 1973 PP.34. 10 
27 Department of State Bulletine. Vol 74. No 1917. 1976. 22nd March P377 
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A- "Saudi Arabia's vast terrain, its resources and the fact that its armed 
forces today are small and not well equipped. 
B- Saudi Arabia looks its military relation with the US as integral part 
of its security. 
C- Refusal on our part to provide reasonable equipments would be seen 
as consc ious and wi t t ing s tep away from our p re sen t c lo se 
relationship." -** 
Saudi Arabia depends on its oil revenue to diversify its economy to 
build a broad industrial base and to educate and train its nationals. Despite 
Saudi Arabia's creditable economic progress since 1962, several serious 
disabilities still hindered rapid modernization. Since 1970-75, in economic 
field Saudi Arabia stepped an outstanding take off stage practically and 
developmental expenditures increased. In 1975, Saudi Arabian government 
adopted a five year plan for more rapid growth of economic development 
of human resource. SAMA since 1962, Petromin 1962, CPO, ISDC 
Industrial studies Development centre, played a-key part in solidifying 
Arabian infrastructure.-^ 
Subsequently, statesments of President Nixon and President Ford 
emphas ized on global economic interdependence and coopera t ion 
Kissinger 's speech in Chicago in 1974 on the consumer nations to be 
United to force profound challenges to their courage, vision and will, 
reflected his concern to search for an alternative energy source and 
cooperation among theoil consuming nations."" 
28 Ibid P.38() 
29 Emile. A Nakhleh. the US and saudi Arabia American enterprises Instt for Public 
Pol!c> Research. Washington. 1975. P.P 14-20 
3(1 Department of state Biilletine-. speech of Kissinger on Enprg> Crisis - strategy for 
cooperatne Action. No\ . 1974. Burwiii of Public affairs. U.S Washington D.C PP.1 
to 4 
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The major and dist inct feature during 1974-1975 in US Saudi 
economic relations is joint commission on ^Economic' and 'Securi ty ' 
cooperation The commission was established by the Secretary of State, 
Kissinger and crown prince Fahad.( see in Appendix-I). 
Really it is a matter of wonder that despite having such close relations 
and being on the same road in various aspects, Kissinger's brinkmanship 
thought for the use of feree in West Asia for oil exploitation But many of 
US officials were not m favour of it and many policy experts criticized it 
as US was paranoid of a new embargo to be in future. Leslie H Gelb 
commentator on Kissinger 's policy expressed his views as "It was found 
to be militarily feasible and highly risky, remote and hypothetical"." ' 
Had this step been materizlized by Henry Kissinger, the consequences 
would have been very adverse and detrimental to the US and Saudi 
relations But some considerations from both the sides resisted to take 
this move Neither there was any second embargo nor any Kissingerian 
military and forceful move When the energy crisis over, some new 
realization and under-stadnding emerged between U S and Saudi Arabia 
Economic joint commission played a key role as catalyst in bringing 
both the countries close together very much Henry Kissinger viewed -
"we consider this a mile stone in our relations with Saudi Arabia and with 
Arab"* count r ies in g e n e r a l " And Pr ince Fahad e x p r e s s e d " th i s 
augursexcellent opening in a new glorous chapter in relations between 
Saudi Arabia and USA'."'-
Sayyed Umar Al Saqqaf, Minister for Foreign affairs of Saudi Arabia 
31 New York Times. Januan 19.1975 Qouted in Einile Nakhlehs book. P 59 
32 Departmenl of Stale Bulietine. \ol 71.Nol827Juh 1. 1974. Bureau of Public Affairs 
Washington. D C P 9 
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made an official visi t to US in August 1974 and apprec ia ted US 
peacemaking efforts in West Asia. Kissinger also expressed his views that 
both the countries have great potentialities They understand each other 
and help each other whenever needed most. They are the friends for a 
long per iod." 
Saqqaf and Kissinger again emphasised on oil policy that was the 
policy of negot ia t ion , cooperat ion and construct ion between friend 
countries. The post embargo special relationship between US and Saudi 
Arabia represents the high stage of mutual cooperation. Both the counties 
were able to diversify their sources of respective supplies Saudi Arabia 
could better pursue its relations with US and supported Arab cause and 
took a strong stand during the Arab Israeli war 1973. Both the countries 
could hope to gain a firm foothold politically and economically with each 
o t h e r "•' 
C- Car ter , C a m p David Agreement and Saudi Reac t ions : -
The US foreign policy has a long history in West Asian region and 
its different m o \ e s and designs were determined by Israel factor, Soviet 
containment and special relations with its allies i e Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Kuwait, and Iran etc. President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) , brought forth 
some different postures in policies towards West Asia and peace process. 
On the other hand President Sadat 's sudden change in his approach 
reinforced it and subsequent Egyptian tilt towards US gave a strong 
foothold to US in West Asia ' 
Henr\' Kiss inger ' s diplomacy o f ' s t ep by s tep ' was slightly changed 
by Carter as he concentrated qn a comprehensive peace settlement in West 
">? DeparlmeiU of State Bvilleime. \o l 71. No \f,y) September 1074. P425 
."^ 4 Deparlmenl of State Bulletme. \'ol 71 No.18.19 September 1974. P 42.^ 5 
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Asia. Carter administration, like its predecessor faced much problems in 
maintaining a special relationship with both Saudi Arabia and Israel at 
the same time. In the meantime US commercial, economic and cultural 
ties with specific West Asian states i.e. Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel and later 
with Egypt improved dramatically. US was cons idered as the most 
desirable intermediatory power in Arab-Israel conflict. This new reality 
gave a picture of decentralization" of the friendly states and genuine 
acceptance of all major West Asian countries as partners of US in the 
construction of a regional security order This new concept opened up 
anddeveloped relations with all its friend countries."' 
During the Carter administration the first visit was made by Secretary 
of State, Vane, from 9-1 5 Dec. 1 977 to Saudi Arabia and he brushed up US 
Saudi -Arabianpartnership in pursuit of peace and economic stability. Later 
on. Carter visited Saudi Arabia in Januarv 1978 and received a warm 
welcome by King Khalid.''^ Moreover ,Secretary of Defence, Brown, 
presented a proposal for aircraft sale to Egypt. Syria and Saudi Arabia, 
this included 75 F-16 and 15 F-15 to Israel. 50 F-5"s to Egypt and 60 F-
1 5 to Saudi Arabia President Sadat's courageous leadership was playing 
a key role in US policy formulation in West Asia Saudi Arabia had 
consistently been a good ally of US since 193?. The Secretary stressed 
that F-75 could play a central role in defensive approach to Saudi Arabia's 
security as it was needed by Saudi Arabia as replacement for the older 
British Fighting 'Tntercepton\ Secretary further expressed "if these F-15 
were not supplied to Saudi Arabia it would mo\ e toward France for 'Mirag" 
missiles and that mo\ e w ould not be acceptable to US. Saudi Arabia stands 
for peace and deserves our support. There are many factors on security 
-"5 Ramzani. R K. Op cit. .P.P 66-67 
.^ f' Department of state Bulletine. Vol 78. No2(il() P4.^. See also in D.S B. Februar> 
1978 Vol. 78 No 2011.P 11. 
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grounds of immense importance which US and Saudi Arabia commonly 
share Moreover, Saudi Arabia is well aware of its military limitations 
and it would choose these condition/^" 
In this connection President Carter sent an identical recommendatory 
letter to the members of Congress on May 12.1978 ' 'Keeping apart Israel's 
permanent interest and our unshakable commitment to it, Saudi Arabia 
has also become a firm friend of the US. It has not only been firm supporter 
of peace process but a moderating and conciliatory force on a wide range 
of global issues It is beyond challenge that Saudi Air Defence system 
must be modernized and augmented Saudi's are taking their vital step to 
defend themselves against their radical neighbour South Yamen assissted 
by the SoAiet Union and this is a high time for US to gain opportunity. 
Significantly, the proposed sale will enhance US nat ional objectives 
contribute to our security and promote peace in West Asia ''"'^  
However, US has been very calculati \e in its steps and decision 
making They always wanted to board on the two boats simultaneously 
without any fear, by making a different t>pe of relat ionships with both. 
Specially the national interests of a countrx are the primarx objectives to 
be achieved both materially and psychological 1\ Keeping in view to 
preserve its interests, for instance, if there any emergency or any specific 
circumstances occur, US"s reluctance, resentment and turned face for the 
time being to its permanent ally, Israel, does not guarantee improved 
relations with other Arab countries at the same t ime Similarly, an 
openhearted aid and assistance to its Jewish ally (Israel), does not prevent 
"^ 7 Statement b> tlie Secretary of Defense Brown befor Senate. Foreign Relations 
Coiiunittee on Ma\ v 1978. Heaiing before Comiiutiee oi\ Foreign Relations. US Senate. 
95th Congress. 11 Session PP 20-22 
?S D S W Vol 78. No 2015. June 1978. p 40 Public papers of Presidential Speches 
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an expanded and strengthened contacts with pro-American or neutral Arab 
regimes Every thing depends on the exigency of t ime and requirements 
of US foreign policy and its objectives '"^  
During these days Sadat's presence in Egypt proved to be great 
support for US as its objectives were concerned in West Asia at that time 
In early stages Sadat was overshadowed by Nasser ' s legacy but gradually 
it shifted its line under the US infeuence So far as 'Egyptian interest 
were concerned i.e Sinai peninsula, he decided to be friendly with US 
and Israel both, apart from its neighbour states Moreover, Soviet Union 
had already belied Egyptian expectations during the wars of 1967 and 
1973 and otherwise Sadat's dramatic visit to Israel in November 1977 
broke a psychological barrier and grounds were prepared for the peace 
agreements to be solemnized in Camp David ""' 
Naturally, it is crystal clear that President Sadat 's changed moves 
developed strained relationship between Egypt & Arabs. Despite Sadat's 
invitation to attend peace initiative to the Arab countries, specially, PLO 
and radical Arab states ie Syria, Jordan,Lebanon etc categorically refused 
to attend peace confeience Howe\er. Sadat-Canei efforts continued and 
finalh' It led tripartite meeting at Camp Da \ id on Septeber 17-18, 1978 
The Accord had Two Agreements: 
1 A framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and 
Israel and Israeli withdrawal from Sinai peninsula 
2. The second one was framework for Palestinian autonomy in the West 
"9 Gifford Prosser (edt) The Nation.il Interest of the US in foreign Polic\. Um\ersit\ 
Press Washington. D C 1981. p 122 
4(» Great Decisions. Foreign Polic\ Papers Foreign Polic\ Association. Ne^\ York. 1988. 
p 5 7 
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Bank, and Ghaza strip '^ 
President Carter's satisfaction can easily be found in his own words 
"Those of us who were at Camp David really got to know each other-that 
is every one except Begin and Sadat It was to be much later, after final 
peace treaty was signed, that a modicum of friendship and respect 
developed between the two men The tensions and personal relationships 
during the negotiations stripped away the facades with which people in 
public life often surround themselves for self protection. The framework 
for peace in West Asia and the framework for conclusion of the peace 
treaty between Israel and Egypt were two major steps forward. For few. 
however, all three of us .. .with pride and good toward one another because 
of our unexpected success" "*- This landmark agreement ushered in a mixed 
critical atmosphere of the Arab world and consequently could not gain 
appreciat ion because of its onesided and discr iminatory nature and 
solution. Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Algeria and PLO 
itself did not look it with positixe angle The second agreement of this 
accord related to the Palestinian's cause and their right, was entirely 
ignored Sadat even did not pay heed on it and satisfied so far as its 
negotiations ultimately, peace treaty between Egypt and Israelwas signed 
on March 26, 1979 -" 
When Sadat made his choice for negotiating \\ ith Israel, Saudi Arbia 
pointedly did not join him and when he signed the Camp David Accord 
Saudis joined radical group (Iraq. Syria, Jordan etc ) condemning Egypt 
41 See details of te\l of Camp Da\ia Agreement in Juredine Pari A and R D Mac Laurin 
(ed). Be>ond CampDaxid. S>racuse Uiii\ersit> Press. New York. 1987. p.l06 
42 Carter. Jimiin. Keeping faith.'Memoirsof A President, collins St James Place London 
1902. PP 402.403 
43 Eg>pt Israeli peace Treat\s te\t see details in white papers on Eg>pt- Israeli Peace 
treat\ UAR of Eg\pt. Ministr\ of Foreign Affairs Go\t Printing office. Eg>pt. 1979 
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and cutting financial aids also Surprisingly, US hopes for broadening the 
Arab -Israel peace prospects also rested mainly on the Saudis despite their 
rejection of Camp David accord and their break of their diplomatic 
relations with Sadat.'"' 
Saudi Arabia silently supported just cause of Arabs but could not 
express in articulated manner In Camp David Accord the Arab cause, 
the autonomy of palestine, and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the 
Arab territories and other matters were talked of meticulously but nothing 
was acted upon except return of Sinai peninsula and subsequent peace 
treaty between Egypt and Israel Nobody cared the other Arab states 
including Palestine. 
In dissonence with Camp David Accord, Saudi reaction was not 
directly against USA but the entire resentment was with Sadat and his 
de\ lated plans and his some new political postures which were absolutely 
not suitable to the Arabs Sadat's \ i s i t in October 1977 to Israel was a 
direct challenge to Riyadh. Many t imes Saudi Arabia tried to persuade 
President Sadat to abandon his pro-Israeli initiatives because Saudi Arabia 
always silently opposed Israel And Egyptian tilt towards Israel was 
somehow undigestable for Arab states. Arabs perception has always been 
of a different sort that Israeli can never be a friend and despite a good 
deal of smooth and harmonious relationships, it is Jew who always betrays. 
If any brother country goes to shake hand with Israel it is good but that 
should not be at the cost of Arab cause and Arab's identity Saudi Arabia 
and other Arab states had sensed that Camp David accord wouldnever 
favour them and naturally PLO's autonomy and Arab's ' say ' as well as 
their real cause, for what they had been struggling for. And Israel would 
44 Journal of Foreign. Affairs. America and the norld". Vol 60. No.31981. Council on 
Foreign Relations d\c USA. P P()()4-619. 1981 
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be a menace in their self detreminaton. 
Saudi Arabia's efforts to drag Sadat from the US Israeli allegiance 
were tireless. It sought to achieve this through Arab League Council and 
Committee for Arab Solidarity, chaired by Dr. Numayri, the then president 
of Sudan. But all the Saudi endeavours could not bring any concrete result 
in restablishing Syria Egypt and Saudi triangle ^' 
The Saudis again reacted at the US perception at that time that 'Saudi 
Arabia' is becoming an obstacle in peace process Crown prince Fahad 
categorically stated that they supported Camp David only for the cause of 
peace in West Asia. The situation was very difficult as Saudi Arabia had 
to give an explanation to US so far as it did not favour Camp David 
Agreement On the other hand, Saudi Arabia had to satisfy the radical 
Arab states that there would be no compromise so far as Palestinian 
problem was concerned. Apart from it, Saudi Arabia reaffirmed its stand 
for Palestine and .Arab cause Eventually it was a situation of di lemma 
and after sometime Saudi Arabia released economic aid to Egypt as it 
feared the US pressures might delay entire West Asian peace process. It 
had to preserve its image in the eyes of US (for security concern) and in 
the eyes of Arabs for its ( r e l ig ious , emot ional and ethnic cause) 
Meanwhile, in Baghdad conference in October 1978, Saudi Arabia had 
difficult time to face Syria-Iraq axis and consequently it fostered its 
relations with Iraq.** 
The signing of Egypt-Israeli treaty dragged Saudi Arabia in a foreign 
policy dilemma. Either it had to take side of Arab radicals thereby 
damaging its ties with Egypt and US or it would maintain its ties with US 
45 Middle East Re\lew. Vol 18.No 1. 1985.86 P P27 
46 Ibid p 28 
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Egypt axis. Saudis continued to keep economic sanctions at very low level 
and did not like the idea of absolute breach of diplomatic relations with 
Egypt; proposed by Syria and Iraq in Baghdad conference 11/*^ 
This was the critical time when many political upheaval took place 
i.e. Iranian revolution led by Khomeini and at the same t ime Iraq under 
the Baathist leadership of Saddam Hussain, emerged as regional power. 
Iraq had contributed in ceasing North-South Yamen conflict and Iraq-
Syrian alliance got strengthened All these new developments weighed in 
Saudi decision making to seek security by siding with- radicals Karen 
Eliot a policy expert who interviewed leading Saudi officials has to lay 
as follows. 
"The Saudis believe that Arab solidarity is better protection than close 
ties with the US Washington has no influence over Iraq. Syria or PLO-
those Arabs whom the Saudis fear most . These wor r i e s have been 
reinforced by event in Iran""^ 
Saudi Arabia tried to maintain relat ions with Egyp t somewhat 
reluctantly but simultaneoush forced Egypt to abandon the negotiations 
with Israel The then crown prince Fahad explained the Saudi attitude in 
an interview in Riyadh in June 1979 with New York t imes columnist 
Antony Lewis. 
"Even after Camp David we are hoping that US government would 
push in the direction of getting Israel to withdraw its occupation from 
1967 boundaries and recognize the legitimate cause and right of Palestine. 
But the signing of the Egypt-Israeli treaty shattered all the hopes ." In the 
47 Ibid. P2<J 
48 Wall Street Journal. June 11. 1979. P J4. Quoted in Middle East ReMe^ .^ Vol 18. 
No rP..•?(). 
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meantime US secretary Vane acknowledged deterioration in Saudi-US 
relations because of "clear" and "sharp" differences over Egypt-Israeli 
treaty. The Saudis made their dislike of the Camp David accord clear 
from the time the agreement was signed, specially highlighting their 
objection to the absence of the provision for Israeli withdrawal from the 
occupied territories other than Sinai, for Palestine selfdetermination and 
for Arab sovereignty in East Jerusalem. The US officials were astonished 
that Saudi officials actually meant what they said 
Moreover, in consonence with the Arab cause and Palestinians 
interests, Saudi Arabia had started to think that Arab solidarity can be 
preserved only by maintaining relations with Arab radicals and it was not 
necessary to have a very strong alliance with United States. Meanwhile 
proposal for the sale of F-15, recommended by US President Carter to 
Saudi Arabia, was bitterly opposed by theCongressmen. They viewed it 
that too much close association with Saudi Arab and other oil producing 
countries may harm the US and Israeli interests Israeli Prime Minister 
Begin also said it was a 'very dangerous move\ ' '^ 
According to one Senator, the US supply of advance mili tary 
equipments to Saudi Arabia and at the same time to Israel had casted an 
ominous shadow over the security of Israel, Obviously it was the test 
time for US friendship with the two countries which were virtually on the 
opposite directions. As the criticism on F-15 supply to Saudi Arabia spread 
over. Petroleum Minister Mr.'Zaki Yamani declared that Saudi Arabia was 
capable enough to finance its development with much reduced oil supply 
and other circumstances.^" 
49 Tillman. P Seth. The US in the Middle East Interestand Obstacles. Indiana Press 
Uni\ersit> of Bloomington 1992. PP 109-111 
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On the contrary, some of other Senators and US experts supported 
US- Saudi posit ive relationship and indicated that Saudi Arabia was an 
old significant and powerful ally that had to be compatible with US. Lastly, 
the decision was taken in favour of Saudi Arabia but the differences were 
there because of Saudi criticism over Camp David Agreement and its strong 
support to the radical Arab states. All these circumstances changed the 
direction of the entire trend and very interestingly and unexpectedly Saudi 
Arabia started to think of Soviet friendship 
Saudi Arabia never looked with an eye of discord toward Soviet Union 
nor it liked its atheistic outlook and communist system, thus, refrained 
from having good relat ion with Soviet Union. The new geopolit ical 
situations that happened in Iran and stirred the whole area - constituted a 
challenge to the So\ iet Union also. Though Soviet Union did not touch 
Iran as Shah was pro-American but the Soviet interest with north tier and 
Iranian warm water were still alive. The Khomeini revolution also blocked 
all the ways for Soviet Union which called for an appropria te Saudi 
response. The Saudis felt that they had to have a devise and a more 
sophisticated approach which would take into consideration Saudi Soviet 
proximity. Saudis seemed very much concious of dubious character of 
US attitude - any time any aid might be ceased by the US. The Camp 
David agreement was criticized by.the Soviet Union too and apart from it 
- Soviet and radical Arab states had normal relationship, hence the grounds 
were totally paved for Saudi-Soviet axis. 
Crown Prince Fahd stated in News week interview "while we have 
ideological differences with the USSR, this does not mean we should 
ignore the importance of Soviet role in globalpolit ics".*" 
51 Ro\. Yaac. The USSR and the Miisliin world (ed). George Allen and Unnovin, London. 
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Saudi Arabia was just about to establish diplomatic relations, Soviet 
Union intervened against Mujahideen in Afghanistan on 29th December 
1979. All the situation topsyturvied as the Soviet move was sharply 
criticized by the international community, Saudi Arabia was also among 
the criticl states and all the moods were changed 
D- Major Events in 1979, Threat to Persian Gulf and Saudi Reversion 
to l!S:-
The year 1979 was fraught with major events of the world politics 
and its repercussions, among which, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
was of enormous significance so far as its after effects, reactions and 
counter reactions were concerned. Saudi Arabia.severely condemned the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistanat Islamic conference held in Islamabad 
in January 1980 and deseribed it as a shrewed act and strategy to capture 
oil rich region in Persian Gulf Communist inter\ention should be stopped 
and they had never dreamt of such sort of in\asion in Thrid World countries 
in 20th century This time Saudi Arabia also realized Soviet power.^-
The per iod from 1978 to 80 in which spec ia l ly 1979 brought 
tremendous changes specially in West Asia and in other areas too. The 
fall of Shah of Iran and occurance of Islamic revolut ion in Iran, Egypt-
Israeli treaty of 1979, upheaval in Pakistan after the execution farmer 
P.M. of Z A. Bhutto, hostages crisis in Iran, the Mecca incident of 
November 1979. Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and in subsequent years 
Iran Iraq war of 1980- all these triggered off precarious situation and 
threats in the Third World countries and also greatly changed the foreign 
policy and decision making process in man> smaller and big countries. 
The thrust of decision centred around the security now. 
-'^ 2 Ibid. P269 
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Persian Gulf because now US twin pillar diploma.cy was at stake.Iran One 
of the US's two pillars now out of its influence and the remaining pillar 
was only Saudi Arabia, the ambivalent ally. The importance of Saudi 
Arabia enhanced in the eyes of US and gradually some events made Saudi 
to realize US importance again for security than ever before. At the time 
of Iranian revolution US-Saudi relation were slightly strained. Since 1978 
developments Saudis suspected that US was not smart enough to check 
peoples 'revolt in Iran and Shah of Iran was overthrown. US could do 
nothing, hence the future of .Saudi Arabia was also uncertain. So, what 
was the use of so enormous investments and military support that failed 
at the time of crisis in Iran, therefore, what to say for Saudi Arabia in near 
future .^~^  
The Mecca Incident;-
The foundation of Saudi authority was questioned by the seizure of 
the Grand Mosque of Mecca in November 1979, Shia disorders in Qatifi 
Qasis in Nov 1979 and Feb 1980 had been st imulated by the Khomeini ' s 
regime Apart from it, other Gulf states as UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, 
Oman were also frightened by some Shiats" turbulence. Mecca incident 
was criticized by USA and it started to pay more attention on Saudi 
security lest the opposition might overthrow Saudi Government like in 
Iran or any Soviet approach might eclipse this important and valuable 
ally and remaining pillar."'' 
Being unable to act as a balancer be tween radical Arabs states and 
US and Egypt Saudi Arabia found itself failing to safe guard its own 
position in the Persian Gulf. There were many challenges around and Saudi 
.^ .•'^  Tillman. P Setli. op cit. P IDS 
54 Kuminholm. R Bruce. Persian Giilf and US. Policx Piiblicalion. New York. P 96 
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government and it again realized its dependence and reliance more heavily 
on US support.'^ 
On the other hand therfe was a need of some deliberate efforts for 
security point of view . US had only one pillar and other smaller Gul f 
countries which were to be beefed up militarily due to the chal lenge and 
unfavourable unrest in Persian Gulf area. US got a green signal and 
agreement in the projection of military force in "Persian Gulf. Increased 
production of Saudi oil from 0 - 5 million to 9.5 million (approximately )-
helped to bring them much closer than ever before. Naturally,this was a 
sudden positive direction sofar as US economic interests were concerned 
related to the petroleum import. When President Carter entered he had a 
benign view for Soviet Union'specially after detente period But the Soviet 
aggression on Afghanistan changed his mind and US felt a great threat of 
Soviet escalating tentacles and recently it had played a calculative card 
through Afghanistan to access in the Gulf region. Automatically, US had 
to get prepared with ready forces in the Gulf and tliis decision and practical 
move was expressed best in Carter doctrine of 1980 as he declared. "An 
attempt to any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gu l f region 
will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests. And this will be counter 
measured if necessary through military force.'"'^ Rapid deployment force 
(RDF) was stationed around the Gulf countries and in Indian Ocean ( 
Diego Garcia) base.''^ 
Now the Saudis moved.closer to direct military col laborat ion with 
US but it was somewhat reluctant to offer US RDF bases on their own 
territory. The main reason was US ' sheer neglegence toward the Pales t ine 
55 Middle East Re\ie\\. Vol 19. No 4. Summer 1987 P52 
56 Great Decision. Foreign Polic> Association New York. 1988. P57 
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problem despite so much hue and cry "* 
Now It was necessary to seek a new philosophy for dealing with the 
region as the US had to be much more awakened in its policies towards 
West Asia 
1 Prevention of Soviet military expansion and the limitation of the 
number of Soviet clients and radical and anti- western regimes in the 
area 
2 Security of friendly powers and their strategic assets 
3 Continued flow of oil to the US Japan and Europe 
4 Limitation of regional conflicls that might impede other US interests 
in the area such as Arab Israeli dispute, Iraq war and Lebanon-war 
etc/^ 
Very interestingly. Carter doctrine had some contents of the doctrines 
of former US Presidents i.e. Truman Doctrine of 1947 and Eisenhower 
doctrine 1957. And his own doctrine of 1980 January ,including all three 
of them are related with US interest in WestAsia but the postures , 
requirements, exigencies were different in each of them, the thrust 
objective was to contain Soviet Union Truman, therefore , directly 
indicated communist threat while supporting Greece and Turkey in 1947-
48, Eisenhower named it an agression' of outsider (USSR). Eisenhower 
went even further by proclaiming America 's Commitment to the defense 
of entire free world As 
1 US vital interests are world wide^:^3^Jie«Tg4>o(t'h4i'e;mispheres and 
every continent • . .^ > \\ 
1 ( Ace. No '' // 
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2. Community of interest with every nation in the free world. 60 
By and large, the magnitude in which these doctrines were declared 
are almost same in the nature. Truman, Eisenhower and Carter were among 
those who took keen interest in West Asian security. At the time of Truman, 
Cold war had just started and it wa? necessary to check Soviet threat to 
Greece and Turkey. During the peric)d of Eisenhower, cold war was at its 
height and US had to take somehow more swift and invincible measures 
to check Soviet influence. And, at the time of Carter, a period of new cold 
war or cold war II had started aftef Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
and that posed a threat and perilous postures in Afghanistan, West Asia 
and all over the world . It was hightime that changed the entire gamot of 
US foreign policy. Carter's disillusionment about Soviet postures changed 
his views. His preparation to anchor the Gulf region from external threats, 
cemented US -Saudi relations for the further years and time to come. 
60. Ibid. P50 
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Chapter-IV 
Major Events Determining the Thrust of Relations Between 
US and Saudi Arabia - The Reagan Administration 1981-88. 
A'Implications of Camp David and Egypt Israeli Treaty, 1979. 
President Carter had not left a bed of roses for the next incumbent 
Still every problem was unsettled and the world was passing through 
various crucial stages due to the major events in the world and specially 
in West Asia that mushroomed in late seventies. The Soviet aggression in 
Afghanistan had given a severe blow to the United States and the second 
important menace was Khomein's Iran. This was the time when the illusion 
of superpower friendship of early seventies was shattered down and with 
Afghan incident the period of new cold war and fresh superpowers rivalry 
started. The difference was that the theatre of their objectives shifted 
from the 'domination of entire world ' to the 'domination of the Third 
World' . This led to the arms proliferation in the world and hence armament 
competition intensified. 
Unlike Carter and Ford, president Ronald Reagan was a firm believer 
in Soviet containment. His decisions to assist militarily to anti commumist 
guerilla in the Third World, later come to be known as Reagan doctr ine. ' 
The most prominent feature of Reaganism or Reaganian policies was anti-
Sovietism and the basic objective was to turn West Asia into an anti-Soviet 
bloc. Soviet Union had taken full advantage in West Asia during the 
Nasser period and Supported all its clients-Iiaq, Syria, Algeria, Libya and 
Egypt with weapons and finance but since the 1967 Arab -Israeli crisis, it 
did not move forward and the aid rendered to the radicals was meagre. 
1 Neuzealand International RcMew \ol 15. NO 3 Ma\ 1990. P4 
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Soviet Union had lost its significance with the arrival of Anwar Sadat, 
apart from it Arab communist parties could not play a worthwhile role 
where they operated as in Iraq, Syria and Jordan. Thirdly,increasing price 
of oil after 1973 oil embargo enabled them to import technology from 
West and Japan. Finally, the beginig of Iran-Iraq war (1980) had badly 
splitted the Arab world and it was difficult to decide for the Soviet Union 
whom to support. ^ 
On the other hand, US was very much concious about Gulf security 
and in its each and every move it wanted to give a tough blow to the 
USSR. US AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia and Operation Bright Star' 
were the cause of grave concern for Soviet Union. 'Operation Bright Star' 
was a military exercise to develop the capacity of a quick intervention if 
there is any outside threat to friends. Secondly, AWACS approval was 
more irritating thing for Soviet Union because this was to strengthen US-
saudi relations and Gulf security. This might have provided facilities to 
the US; RDF in direct proximity to the extremely rich Persian Gulf oil 
fields. Though Moscow had close ralations with the so called radical Arab 
states including Libya, South Yamen and Algeria they all overlooked 
Soviet 's intervention in Afhanistan an did not say anything. There was 
another group of moderate states including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, 
Iran, Qatar, sudan, Tunishia, Somalia, Morocco and Bahrain . That 
criticized Soviet moves very stringently.'' 
Another shock for USSR was GCC's formation in May 1981. It was 
cohesive front of six conservative Gulf countries i.e. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
Qatar, Bahrain,United Arab Emirates and Oman to enhance their internal 
2 Kaiippi. V Mark. & R Criag Notion: Soviet Union and the Middle East in the 1980. 
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and external security and to strengthen their military preparedness for 
their joint defence. GCC was the development aftermath of Iran-Iraq." 
The Reaganian diplomacy of strategic consensus ' for Gulf security 
arrangement was another problem for the USSR. The Gulf security 
arrangement was to include -Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan 
particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt as military allies, presumably on their 
common fear of Soviet expansionism though 'Operat ion Bright Star' did 
not have any link with 'strategic consensus' but hidden purpose was to 
prepare a strong anti-Soviet alliance the "Bright Star ' military exercise 
was headed by RDF as a device for intimidating progressive governments 
in West Asia such as Libya, Ethiopia and South Yaman . It was a technique 
to strengthen pro-US regimes in the region "^  
Saudi Arabia never liked Egypt-Islaeli treaty; Despite of US-Saudi 
relations after 1979-80, Saudi government still was firm on Palestinian 
cause on August 7, 1981 Crown Prince Fahad in an interview anounced 
eight point Fahad Plan this included 
1. Israeli wi thdrawal from all Arab te r r i tor ies occupied in 1967, 
including East Jerusalem. 
2. The removal of Israeli settlements on Arab land establishement after 
1967. 
3. Guaranteed freedom of worship for all the religions in the Holy 
places. 
4. Affirmation of the right of the Palestine people to return to their 
homes and compensation of those who decide not to do 
4 Middle East Re\ lew Vol 19. No 4 summer 1987. p 51 
5 Bark. L Dennis To promote Peace. US Foreign Polic> In Middle East 198Us. Hoo\er 
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5. UN control on West Bank and Ghaza strip for a transitional period 
not exceeding a few months. 
6. Establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as 
its capital. 
7. Affirmation of the right of all states in the region to live in peace. 
8. The UN or some of its members to guarantee and implement these 
principles^ 
Instead of making new initiatives, the plan reinsisted traditional Saudi 
comprehensive plan. It called for establishment of palestine state in West 
bank and Ghaza with in the framework of UN General Asembly resolution, 
the plan marked Saudi Arabia's first attempt to play an active and leading 
role in resolving Arab-Isreali conflict. Despite some constraints due to 
Syria's objection on the plan the Saudis were convinced that the time was 
high to pursue their plan and at this finest hour some resolution could be 
brought out.^ 
The Fahad plan was somehow controversial and triggred off various 
opinions and interpretations. Egypt criticized but mildly, Israel criticised 
sharply saying it as "an attempt to liquidate Israel in stages and this would 
be an obstacle in West Asian peace process" The US was caught in a 
dilemma, it remained committed to the Camp David Agreements but on 
the other hand did not want to discourage Saudi Arabia, as recently the 
stale relations had got refreshed and redefined and both of them had 
realized each other"s need in the crisis. President Reagan and Secretary 
Haig considered it because there was no clause which negated Israel. Saudis 
wanted their plan to be considedred in the next meeting in Fez at Morocco 
6 Long E David The United States And Saudi .Arabia- Ambivalent Allies, West view 
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to be scheduled on Nov. 25, 1981." The radical Arab States and Soviet 
Union had also crticized the Plan, they presented their own proposal totally 
based on PLO' s right and independent Palestinian state. Unfortunately, 
neither Fahad plan nor the proposal of radical states was approved in pre-
Fez meeting on Nov. 22 ,1981. 
After the death of Sadat (assassination of Sadat on October 6, 1981), 
president Mubarak moved forward to consolidate its regime and now the 
chances were bright as Saudi Arabia and other centerist regimes also took 
interest in this direction, and this was U S ' long desired objective for West 
Asia.* 
In the same year in mid November 1981 in G.C.C. meeting Saudi 
Arabia supported Kuwaits view which confirmed the need to keep the 
region as a whole away from international conflict specially the presence 
of military fleet and foreign bases. But this was indirectly a strong support 
to nonaligned country. Meanwhile US declared Saudi Arabia a major air 
and military command base for US RDF. '" 
President Reagan had repeatedly declared that they would not let 
Saudi Arabia fall either from trouble within or from aggression of outside. 
In 1981, debate in his successful proposal to permit the sale of 85 billion 
dollers worth of militry aircraft to Saudi Arabia, Reagan said in press 
conference that "Saudi Arabia will not be permitted to be an Iran."" 
B. Lebanon war 1982. Reagan Plan and Second Fez Plan. 
Another Israeli invasion began on June 6, 1982. The war was 
8. Long. E David. ...Op cit. ...P-125-126. 
9. Kauppi. V. Mark... .op cit. P.P 99-102 
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disasterous and resulted in a great resentment among Arab states against 
US and Israel. President Reagan was not prepared for this because he 
never favoured such sort of act from Israeli side. Secretary Haig gave a 
green signal to Israel to attack on the Palestinian base in south Lebanon 
the outcre benefilted Israel '-
By early July 1982, Israel was making clarification that removal of 
Palestinians from west Beirut was necessary. Reagan was not at Washington 
at that time, might be the situation would have taken a different turn in 
his presence. He was a t tending European Economic Conference at 
Versailles, when he returned, the situation was quite grim. US alone voted 
against Israel in Security Council resolution on June 26, 1982, that called 
for Israeli pull back from Beirut and for Palestinian forces in Beirut to 
withdraw existing camp. The Middle East negotiator, Philip Habib, went 
to Jerusalem and Damascus to bring about ceasefire The US refused to 
talk with PLO directly and Habib had to shoulder this responsibil i ty 
through Lebanese government representatives but failed to bring peace 
and Beirut was terribly bomborded. Lastly, PLO signed an agreement with 
Lebanon to withdraw from Lebanon and Syria. This affected US-Saudi 
relations because Saudi Arabia had long been involved in Lebanon since 
1974 when a civil war broke out there . In the meantime President Reagan 
asked Secretary of state to quit the office in July 1982. His policy of 
unconditional commitment to Israel to oust PLO from Lebanon, placed 
the US in an awkward position After his departure Reagan maintained 
some distance with Israel '"" 
The new incumbent George Shultz as Secretary of State was more 
12 Killerman. Barbara Jeffer> & Z Rubin (Ed ) Readership and Negotiations In the Middle 
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concious about West Asian problems and US interests there. He was 
expected to be more practical in restoring US-Israeli traditional relations 
andgood relations with PLO as well. As he joined the office, US policy 
took a decisive turn. President Reagan proposed a new peace initiative 
and this plan reiterated the idea of Israeli withdrawal in return for peace. 
It called for immediate freez on Israeli settlements and asked for self 
government by the Palestinian of the West Bank and Ghaza stripe in 
association with Jordan. The proposal clearly recognized Arab character 
of occupied territories and rejected the Israeli claim of sovereignty. Reagan 
reaffirmed US support for a five Year transition period outlined in the 
Camp David accord during which the Palestinian residing in West Bank 
and Ghaza would have full autonomy over their own affairs.' ' ' 
Naturally, the Reaganian stand was stringently criticized by the prime 
Minister Begin who rejected it absolutely. Shortly after nine days, Arab 
League states presented a plan for palestine at second Fez Summit in 
Morocco on September 9.1982. This proposal had analogy with Fahad 
plan of August 1981. '" 
The US Policy took a different turn in December 1983 after Yitzhak 
Rab ins visit to US and gradually US returned on the same line and Arab 
cause was neglected again. Saudi Arabia was not happy with this posture. 
Saudi Arabia decided to turn to France for the purchase of air defence 
missiles and this was announced in January 1984 in reaction to the shift, 
of US policv towards Israel. '" 
14 The US Department of State Biilletme The Quest lor peace-principal US statements 
and documents relation to The .Arab Israeli Peace Process. 1967. Go\ eminent Printing 
Office Washingdon D C 198?. P P 017-108 
i> DaMd. E Long op cit. P 129 See details of Second Fez Plan (9th September 1980. 
H' Ibid PP 12"-128 
64 
All the plans were not very similar in their nature, they were different 
on certain grounds, if a comparison is made. 
* While two Arab plans called for the establishment of an independent 
Palest inian state,the Reagan plan advoca ted only a Palestinian 
autonomy in association with Jordan 
* The Arab plan favoured return of East Jerusalem to Arab rule, while 
Reagan plan pleaded undivided Jerusalem. 
* Fez plan II of 1982 September mentioned PLO as the Palestinian's 
role representatives while Reagan did not 
* All the plans ended in glorious conclusions, it was not revived till 
1988 under modified form.'^ 
C. US AWACS Deal With Saudi Arabia :-
The Reagan administeration pursed a two fold foreign policy towards 
West .Asia - First West Asia peace process and second Gulf Security 
arrangement that had already begun through Carter 's doctrine The Carter 
doctrine had already established a background for Reaganian strategies 
especially through R D.F and F-15 deal with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf 
s ta tes . T h e new adminis t ra t ion dec ided to u p g r a d e the US-Saudi 
relationship by agreeing to sell the fuel tanks and air to air missiles they 
requested for their F- 15 fighters as well as five Airborne Warning Control 
System AWACS aircraft 
Another important aspect of his strategy was anti-Soviet nature of 
Its policies The strategic consensus was meant to keep away Soviet 
advancement and Arab resistence Reagan's purpose was to gain the 
cooperation of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan "* 
J""' Le»ic20uesk>. Gcoxge Antenam Presidents in The Middle East. Dube U/in ersity Press. 
1990. PP 266-267 
IJ^  Spainer John .American Foreign Polic\ Since World War II. Mc Graw Hills. Pnblication. 
compan\. Ne\\ Delhi. .19K9. P'!I9 
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The Reagan administration announced on March 6, 1981 that the US 
was ready to sell reqiured additional equipment, except for bombs racks 
to Saudi Arabia to counter a growing threat from the Soviet Union in 
West Asia The administration further agreed in April 1Q81 to sell Saudi 
Arabia additional F-i 5 and five AWACS of their own, pending their 
delivery scheduled for 1985.'*! 
The total cost of the AWACS planes to be deployed in 1985 was 
estimated at 5.8 billion dollars. The four airforce AWACS planes that 
were sent to Saudi Arabia at the time of Iran -Iraq war in October 1980 
were to remain their until the new deliveries -" 
The Reagan administration viewed the sales as vital to preserve and 
enhance the US interest and'influerice in the area, particularly in the wake 
of the Iranian revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The AWACS 
and F-15 enhancement sales issue had its origin in the arms sale package 
for Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia in May 1978. 
The Carter administration had to provide specific assurances to 
Congress regarding the Saudi use of the F-1 5 and had to limit the offensive 
capabilities of the aircraft in order to win Congressional support for the 
role of 60, F-15 to Saudi Arabia. Saudi interest in AWACS' was encouraged 
by seeing its capabilities first hand when it was perated in March 1979, 
during the north Yamen and south Yamen conflict In September 1979 
Saudi Arabia formally requested for AWACS deal with US. After some 
months in 1980, Zebignew Brezinsky visited Saudi Arabia and Saudi gave 
a list of items they wished to purchase i.e -MERZOO, CFTS AIM-9L and 
19 Seih. P Tilhnan .. . op cit. 1982. P119 
20 Bradle>. C paul Recent US Plic\ in the Persian Gulf 1971-82. Thomas & Rutter 
Grantham. New York, 1982. P 118 
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Sidewinder missiles etc.-' 
Subcommittee on September 17, 1981 made a reference with Israel's 
strong support "We must not let our friends worried about one another 
(Saudi Arab and Israel that diminishes our commitment to their security 
or hinder our plans to extend strategic cooperation with them. --
President Reagan and Secretary Haig had always some differences 
so for as their country's foreign relations were concerned. Reagan always 
looked AWACS sale to Saudi Arab with a posi t ive angle despite the 
Secretary's reluctance and Congressional opposition. The security concern 
was aa major feature of his Gulf policy and for this to equip up Saudi 
regime was a very important and inevitable question. He announced on 
1st October 1981 that "It is not the business of other nations to make US 
foreign policy " This was a harsh responsive indication to the Israeli prime 
minister Begin who sharply opposed any defence pact with Saudi Arab 
and specially on AWACS -' 
Despite its support for Saudi Arabia the Reagan administration also 
maintained with its allies in the region , particulry Israel. If it allowed for 
AWACS deal to Saudi Arab, the conditions imposed on Saudi Arabia were 
also very diplomatic and strategic so far as Israeli security was concerned. 
The conditions were 
1. No AWACS flights outside of Saudi, Arabian border would be 
permitted without prior US consent 
2. No AWACS would be used against Israel that might threaten its 
security. 
21 The Congress and the US Foreign Polic>. US Go\t Printing Press. 1982 PP25-26 
See details also in Hearing Conimitee on Foreign Relations. Arms sale package to 
Saudi Arab. 97th Congress. First session. Oct. 1 to l.'^ . 1981. Washington 
22 Seth. P Tillman. opc i t .P120 
23 Bradl>. Paul op cit . P 119 
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3. Third world country modification to AWACS equipment would be 
prohibited and no third party country personnel would be allowed to 
perform AWACS maintenance. 
4. A detailed plan to ensure the security of AWACS technology and 
equipment was a matter of great concern to many Congressmen who 
feared that AWACS plans might fall into the hostile hands . 
5. An assurance that AWACS intelligence shared with the US sould not 
be transmitted to the third parties.-" 
Some of the Congress members were too adament to this sale to Saudi 
Arabia because Saudi Arabia opposed Camp David accord of 1978 and 
Egypt- Israeli treaty of 1979. Moreover, it refused to offer a base for 
R.D.F immediately aftei Carter doctrine was announced.^^ When Israel 
expressed great concern on this step of US, Reagan administration assured 
Israel that any arms package to Saudi Arab Would not harm and endanger 
Israeli security and the principal reason for thay decision was Soviet threat 
to the Persian Gulf. Only two Senators John Tomer and Gold Water 
supported this plan.-'' 
On the other hand Saudi Arabia looked Israel with suspicious eyes. 
Petroleum minister Ahamd Zaki Yamani's reaction was very sharp. He 
pointed out that Israel and international communism are the principal 
dangers to Saudi Arab and Gulf as a whole. In New York he addressed oil 
executives and decalred that "Soviet threat reinforces our (US-Saud) 
friendship and Israel is threat to US". He was certain and confident that 
the US would not reverse from its promises. Those who favoured this 
deal expressed that Saudi friendship was vital and valued for US interests 
24 Bradle\. Paul:.... Op. cit.. P 120 
25 Congress and US foreign polic\. US Government Printing Press. Washington 1982. P 
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in West Asia and for the defense of oil fields -^  
Truly speaking, the administration was in a deep trouble with its Saudi 
Arms sale proposal. The proposal could not be effectively presented 
regarding AWACS/F-1 5 package to the Congress The administration had 
to face a lot of sharp condemnation and at that time Legislative (Congress) 
was getting strong over executive (President ) Later on Saudis were 
offered a compromise in which the US would retain joint control of the 
aircraft in 1990s in exchange for a fuller compliments of electronic 
equipments on the planes The Saudis by all accounts rejected any 
agreement that would lead to joint control. Secretary of State Alexander 
Haig and Secretary of Defence said that rejection of this proposal would 
be a serious set back to their effort to counter Soviet threats in the region. 
President Reagan vowed very strongly that Saudi Arabia would not be 
allowed to be an Iran that indicated that US had earlier planned to sell 
AWACS to Iran during the Shah's period He further stated that the deal 
would not compromise their security -^  
Evidently, it was total failure so far as US-saudi relat ions were 
concerned at that time Neither Saudi Arabia could get AWACS planes 
easily, it had to face severe cnt icsm, nor it was appreciated for its efforts 
to support Arab cause and palestine The relations during this period 
remained troubled, ambivalent and insecure between both. 
After a long hue and cry. President Reagan paid a gra t i tude to 
Congressmen as Congress approved the proposal for F-15 and AWACS 
and James Baker played a ke>' role in this process 
The impact of the AWACS was likely to extend for year to come 
2" Ibid P26C> 
28 Facts on File Vol 41 . No 213^. October 2-9 F'l' 7(l>-7(lh 
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because the sale promised to entail US involvement with Saudi AWACS 
operations beyond 1990s. The administration asserted that the sale would 
not affect Israel's military superiority and in the long run would contribute 
to the stability in the Gulf. In a press conference President Reagan 
supported Fahad plan as Saudi Arabia for the first time considered Israel 
as state A month after, US and Israel agreed on a proposal (memorandum) 
of understanding based on Reagan's policy of strategic consensus. But 
the US had suspended all this after December 18,1981 when Israel annexed 
Golan Hights . As a matter of fact, it was Israel that betrayed and initiated 
tension that led to the Lebanon war of 1982. Obviously, Israel reacted 
sharply.-^ Palestine problem remained standstill and reactions on AWACS 
continued for a long t ime. 
D- US And I r an - I r aq W a r : 
US took full advantage of Iran-Iraq war as it continued for eight 
years. The US and many other powers took hands off postures on the 
ground that they could have little effect on the outcome of the conflict. 
The US took a sharp turn when Iran became more violent in 1985-86 and 
it started heavy retaliation that inflicted neutral shipings enroute to Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia Consequently, US moved a substantial number of naval 
ships to the Gulf and managed all its efforts to protect international 
shipping. By the end of 1987 there were approximately seventy NATO 
warships in Gulf including tw enty nine Stingers " 
Significantly, the US wanted to give a tough blow to Iran indirectly 
29 Robert. G.Darius <fc John. W. Amies (Ed.) Gulf Security Into 198()s - Perceptual and 
Strategic Dimensions. Hoover lustilute Press. Stanford UniversitN. California. 1984. 
PP. 104-103 
30 Maill. Onopick Hanns W The Gulf War Regional and International Dimension. Printer 
Publication London. 1989. P. 1.32 
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or directly, that is why Iraq come closer to US and US supporeted Iraq 
wholeheartedly at that time, for the first time US and Iran were on opposite 
directions , and hostage problem enhanced the US resentment. Moreover, 
US had hidden intention to weaken two nonaligned countries. These two 
contries-lran and Iraq are nonaligned countries and both of them were 
loosers in that war The differences among the Arab nations and their 
disunity paved the way for US interest to be fulfilled in West Asia 
Eventually, Soviet-Iraq relations at that time were strained and US 
took all possible advantages as the circumstances were favourable to it. 
US supported Iraq as never before and it was used as tool against Soviet 
Union (whose Iraq was an ally and friend) and Iran (whose it was enemy) 
on international chessboard Iran was already declared as terrorist state 
by the US. In reaction Iran declared US as a 'Club of Saitans. ' 
Gulf States Response: 
The Gulf Sheikhdoms moved towards Saudi Arabia to seek protection 
from the harmful repercussions of Iran Iraq war. On the other hand Saudi 
Arabia was also interested to expand its security cooperation with smaller 
Gulf states e g , Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and U.A. E. etc. Eversince grand 
Mosque and Kaba was attacked in 1979, Saudi Arabia took a different 
turn for its internal security and enlarged its circle including all the smaller 
Gulf states. Much attention was paid on internal security and AWACS, F-
15 etc. were purchased to serve this purpose. 
As far as US policy towards Gulf was concerned it had to face some 
problems in early 80. 
1 The determination of the Gulf states to a\oid any US military presence 
in the Gulf. 
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2 Growing perception of US as pro-Israeli imperialist power 
3 Growing Soviet threat in the region. 
All these challenges compelled US to improve it credibility with Saudi 
Arabia and other Gulf states thiough the sale of sophisticated weapons "' 
Concomitantly, Saudi Arabia found itself m the ironic position of 
having a negative cashflow problem in its current account. However, 
economic and commercial relations were not disturbed with US. In 1982, 
US exports of industrial product including (weaponary) to Saudi Arabia 
exceeded 9 billion dollars with another 500 million dollars in agriculture 
product '-
In US - Saudi Joint Economic Commerce Commission (1974) with 
its eight formal session in October 1983, held in Riyadh, the senior US 
officials reviewed with their counterparts the progress achieved over the 
last years. Two major programmes were signed in the area of emergency, 
m,edical se rv ices and technology t ranspor ta t ion . Apart from it the 
commission expressed its appreciation to all of the participating Saudi 
Arabian ministers and US agencies for their commitment and dedication 
in achieving goals of US - Saudi economic and technical cooperation "' 
Surprisingly, despite some strains and lack of confidence du;e to 
controversy over F-1 5 and AWACS package, their economic relations 
remained sound. The Reagan administrations primary concern was to keep 
away Soviet Union and its influence. He gave importance to anti- Soviet 
stand than any th ing , ne t only in West Asia put in Latin America, 
31 Darius. G Rober op cit. P lo.'i-tolOg 
32 E Long. DaMd op cit . P 85 
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Elsalvadore, Nicaragua and even in South Asia also 
In 1984, the U.S. president was re-elected and his second term in its 
later years was quite deferent in comparison with the first one. The intensity 
of cold war had reduced and an era of competition slowed down. However, 
US policies towards Saudi Arabia continued to be flexible (smooth) as 
they were in other stages earlier. President Reagan authorized the 
immediate sale to Saudi Arabia of 200 'Stinger" air to air defence missile 
in May 1984 This deal was in connection with neutral shipping that was 
attacked by Iran. Such fatal activities could have threatened Saudi Arabian 
oil fields and supplies on which much of the industrial infrastructure 
depends. Saudi Arabia was ready and shortly after the proposal was 
approved it paid for weapon and its transportation. US was really very 
much concerned to the growing Gulf war influence in West Asian area. 
With this delivery the US sent fuel tanks CFTS for 101 tanks sets which 
were sold to Saudi Arabia in 1981.""' 
In the same connection the Under Secretary of State for political 
affairs (Armacost) presented statement before a subcommittee of the 
Senate on 5th June 1984. He pointed out four pronged US Gulf policy 
consisted of ." 
1- Free flow of oil to the West from West Asia, 
2- containment of the influence of the Soviet Union, 
3 - Firm and quick response to the request of Gulf states and Saudi Arabia 
and 4-Lastlv peace in West Asia and harmony between Arabs and Israel 
At that t ime Iran was a vigorous challenge to US and its allies. Had the 
war spread to the G.C.C. borders, it would have endangered Saudi Arabia 
-•^ 4^ Department of State Biilletine Vol. 84.No. 2088. Jiih. 1984. P.81 
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and denied oil supplies to the free world. Access to Persian Gulf oil is 
vital to the world economy. Gulf countries were exporting nearly 8 million 
barrel oil per day to the (European state) free world. At that crucial 
moment provision of 's t ingers ' and the tankers were firm proof of US-
Saudi relationship. " 
After one month of joining his office of second term in January 1988, 
King Fahad urged to president Reagan to take full advantage of his land 
slide victory to in\olve the Us more vigorously in West Asia peace process. 
In a joint communique released by the White House President Reagan 
and king Fahad both leaders agreed to a comprehensive Middle East peace 
process. "'*' 
The US played an active part in the effort, the visits tothe US of king 
Fahad in February 1985 and Hosni Mubarak's visit in March 1988 provided 
opportunities for finding ways to peace process. Assistant Secretary of 
State Richard Murphy made an exploratory trip to the region in April 
1983. Secretary Shultz recently visited the area and met with Israeli prime 
Minister, Jordanian king Shah Hussain and Egyptian president Hosni 
Mubarak These recent discussions were centrally based on two objectives. 
1. The prospects for direct negotiations between Jordanians, Palestinians 
and Israelis on terms that all can accept it. 
2 The second was to strengthen ties between Israel and Egypt. Despite 
the chances were least bright to solve the problems but the US was 
optimistic ha\'ing faith, commitment and determination of its friends 
>5 Depannient of .State Biilletine. Vol X4 No 2()SX. Jiii\ 1984. P-8()-81. Hearing before 
the Committee on Appropriations. US Senate. 98 Congress. II Session. US Go\ernnient 
Press. Washington 1984. P 6-(See details) 
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in the region towards peace "^  
In early March 1986 the US A d in in i strati on sent to Congress an 
informal notififcation for sale of additional air to air, air to sea and ground 
to air missiles to Saudi Arabia for defense with an assurance they did not 
pose any th rea t to I s r a e l . Four new c o n s i d e r a t i o n s led t h e US 
Administration to take these steps immediately."*' 
1 Iran's escalating influence and crossing of Shattal Arab river. 
2 US Administration's willingness to support Saudi self defence that 
would be a deterrent to Iran 
3 The unstable situation of South Yamen exacerbated by Soviet Union. 
4 US Saudi bilateral relationship and their credibility with other Gulf 
states '" 
These were the major US policy determinants towards Saudi Arabia 
to make its US position strong and to check the Soviet influence in West 
Asia. Saudi Arabia has been the only country which could support US in 
its own interest. The strengthening of Saudi air defence capability was a 
major contribution in Saudi defence and most important aspect of this 
v\ as it did not pose threat to Israel The deal had total cost of 3 54 million 
dollars."' 
As usual, this proposal was also disapproved by the Congress by a 
decisive margin of the votes. One of the discontentment of Congressional 
opponents was that some of the missiles sold to Saudi Arab might be 
"^ 7 Depanment of Stale Bulletine \o\ 85. No 2100. Juh 1*)85. P P 63 to 65 
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transferred to the te r ror i s t s hands . However , a c lass i f ied General 
Accounting Office report disputed that idea that there was no any evidence 
that any of weapon or 's t inger ' had fallen into the hands of terrorits. Some 
other Congressmen criticized Saudi Arabia for financing PLO." ' 
This refusal triggered off President 's resentment as he endured 
another set back in Congress and obviously later on it would have become 
the prestige matter on President 's side. President 's Deputy Secretary 
declared on May 7, IQ86 that Congress had discouraged and endangered 
their longstanding securit>' ties to Saudi Arabia. The President would not 
allow to happen that The proposed sale was more in favour of US interest 
than the Saudi's. It was necessary to defend its ally against radicalism, 
terrorism and communism."-
Consequently, president sent a message to Congress in which he 
referred longback US Saudi relationship what was started b \ President 
Roosevelt and King Abdul Aziz in 1943 and endorsed by each president 
since then This longstanding policy would not be allowed to be dismantled 
because it was against their vital interests Moreover, priority would be 
given to the security of Isiael. However, great impoitance was to be given 
to the oil rich Gulf states. Saudi willingness to stand against the Iranian 
threat has been a key factor in preventing the chaos in the region and this 
showed Saudi Arab ' s confidence and faith in US commitments . He 
expressed anxiet>' if the sale of arms was to be shut off because that would 
\\eaken the US credibilit\ and Saudi ability to defend themselves He 
stressed that Saudis had pro \ed their friendship and goodwill they assisted 
the US efforts to support responsible government in Egypt, Jordan and 
41 Facts on File. \ol 46. No 2?1\. M:n 2. 1986 P .'^ 32 
42 Weekix Compilation of Presidential speeches Ma\ 12. 1986. P 597 (US Go\ernment 
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Sudan *' 
Ult imate ly , president Reagan won Congressinal approval but 
Congres ' s pressure reduced the weapons package to less than 10% of the 
Saudis required list of arms "" In the month of June 1986, President Regan 
reminded Congress about the sale of AWACS. He pointed out that already 
deployed AWACS significantly contributed to the Gulf stability and 
security, the President admired Saudi efforts towards peace in West Asia 
and Saudi mediation mission to pacify Iran-Iraq war. The Fahad plan of 
1981, the Arab endorsement in 1982 at Fez, singificantly. and irreversably 
modif ied the Arab consensus of three ' N o s ' initiated at Khartoom 
conference during the oil embargo period of 1973- 7 4 - 'no recogniftion,' 
no negotiation" and 'no conciliation" with Israel. *'' 
Significantly, Saudi Arabia sought to convince the modernization and 
expansion of its force by obtaining arms from the US Unfortunately, 
the Reagan administration could not make Congress satisfied in most of 
the cases , specially in Saudi mat te rs The present arms deal was 
reorientation and rebuilding of US strategic relations with Saudi Arab 
after the failure of F-15 package and Saudi moved toward Britain and 
France for weaponary. Reagan administrat ion began to fight against 
Congressional obstacles and lastly won enough by resorting to veto power 
whenever necessary.**" 
Soon in June 1987, administration recommended for 1600 Maverick 
missi les of 360 million dollars, to enhance Saudi Maverick inventory 
capacity through RASF with an anti Tank missile But lately, Reagan had 
4" Weekh Compilalion of Presidcinial Speeches. M;n 26. 1^86. P 675 
44 Facts on File \ol 46. No 231>. Ma\ 1986. p 4()X Col 3 
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to withdraw this proposal because of strong Congressional opposition. 
President greatly regretted on this suspension but assured the Saudi 
Government that US would be there at the t ime of crisis and if necessary 
it would provide 'Mavericks ' from its own defence stock. *"" 
In October 1987, Secretary of State visited Saudi Arabia and tried 
his best to make the Saudi authorit>' assured of US instant assistance 
during the crisis time shortly after his visit. Prince Abdullah went US 
and reaffirmed US Saudi relationship of 50 years. ""^  Whatever the US 
Saudi relat ionships remained during the Reagan period but frequent 
Congress opposition automaticalK drifted the Saudi direction for arms 
sale towards China Saudi Arabia purchased 25 C-SS 5 from China despite 
US and I s r a e l s grave concern Reac t ion and anxiety prevai led in 
administration and in May 1^88 Secretary of State for Near Eastern 
matters proposed that in the light of .US foreign policy towards Saudi 
Arabia this rid\V gaiS WOUld iirclude Buiiig 's leiiuwal-uf upuiatiuu and 
maintenance contract for the Saudi AWACS programme This also 
included KE-3 aerial refuelling tankers and five Saudi AWACS with 
their electric mstiuments Saudi .Arabia had to purchase these systems 
because of Iranian threat 
The Secretar\ for Near East Richard Murphy said—"Our relationship 
with the fr iendh Arab states in the Gulf including Saudi .Arabia have 
been \ i talh important factor for our own national security interests. To 
the extent that Saudis choose to relax on I S and for this to happen we 
must continue to be seen as reliable and consistent supplier" "" 
Though the security dimension of both the countries US and Saudi 
4- IHK1 1' M.^-^M I Acc. No i ! 
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Arabia were centrally on normal grounds and their mutual interests were 
vested in that, specially during 1980s it was not free from constraints, 
pressure and tensions Both the countries shared broad objectives but 
many times differed in their priorities Saudi Arabia always fought 
for Arab cause directly or indirectly and financially supported PLO ( 
sometimes in low voice or sometimes in articulated way). On the other 
hand, US, despite supporting Saudi Arabia, ( not let to cease fabulous oil 
flow from those states to it), never compromised on Israeli security. Both 
of them reacted accordingly so far as Israeli factor was concerned. 
Some of Saudis did not realize and recognize US contribution 
somewhere and (sometimes totally selfless) they had been suspicious of 
US approaches and behaviour. Those Saudis argue that Saudi security is 
the guarantee to maintain the avialability of petroleum (here US economic 
interests were hidden) And if Saudi Arabian security is jeopardized by 
Communist or Iranian threat, at that moment US support to Saudi Arabia 
and is just 'show o f f nothing more than that and through these activities 
only US interests are served, ""^  
However, Saudi and US interests converged on common desire to 
check Soviet influence and spread of radical and fundamentalist threats 
but on certain issues they differed Specially Israel and PLO were the 
crux point of their differences. The special relationship was to be more 
strengthened but since 1979 conditions in West Asia and the world were 
not favourable and congenial in which US Saudi relationship could have 
flourished in a very special manner as it was imagined in mid 1970s after 
the end of oil embargo. Both the countries were drawn into the bewildering 
chain of global issues as Islamic revolution, Egypt-Israeli treaty, Mecca 
50 Quandt. B William Saudi Arabia In the 1980. Foreign polic>- Securit\ and oil. 
Brookings Institution. Washington. 1981 PP 141-144 
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incident, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Lebanon Conflict, Iran-
Iraq war, inter-Arab dispute all these presented a multi tude of tension. 
US-Saud i d o m e s t i c ma t t e r s , Saudi susp ic ion and Congres s iona l 
deprecation of any arm deal to Saudi Arabia had brought a distance 
between them. Though their economic and commercial relations remained 
' unaffected, a gap in their mutual relationship was realized from both the 
sides. Both maintained a degree of ambivalence towards their relationship. 
Evidently, US did not let Saudi Arabia to be as Iran as they repeatedly 
expressed; and Americans got success in doing the things settled 
according to their requirements and objectives. 
The Reagan administration passed through two major terms of eight 
years. His first term 1981-84 passed through an intense and severe cold 
war; the other four years 1984-88 were milder in their approach and foreign 
relations. Though President Reagan continued his anti-Soviet approach 
but cilice the ai'i'ival 6f sovi^t leadef Goibachev iheii ihltikiiig ;^iaiiea to 
change. A realization prevailed between the two rival superpowers that 
ideological war could not be won by either of them. This cold war was 
the preparation of actual Third World War, nuclear armament, idea of 
star war, amassing of nuclear weapon and their terrible and disasterous 
effect were jus t burden on their economy. 
Therefore, Ronald Reagan's second term in US presidency roughly 
coincided with the end of a period-of uncertainty in Soviet leadersiiip. 
In the annals of US-Soviet relations Reagan had become the first 
president who had moved actively and frequently towards the direction 
of disarmament. In less than three year, he had four high yielding meetings 
including first summit in Now 1985 in Geneva, in 1987 in Island at 
Rykjavik, in April 1987 again in Geneva for INF treaty and that was 
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ratified in Washington in the same year in December The forth one was 
in Moscow in June 1988. All these were testimony of a different kind of 
approach of the superpowers On his part Reagan felt restlessly to do 
something eventful of historical importance On the other hand, Gorbachev 
also played contributory role to bring international peace and security to 
move actively and pragmatically toward the end of mutual rivalry. This 
resulted into a striking departure from the conventional position of teaching 
each other lesson as potential rivals to look forward to a new modalities 
of bilateral conduct '^ 
The objective of Reaganian policy was not just to contain Soviet 
Union but to defeat communism and conquer the ideological war. Reagan 
was one step further than Carter 's 'Human Right ' and he used it as a tool 
to defeat Communism and demoralize the Soviet Union.^-
The Reagan administration had to crack very hard nut many times 
due to the differences with Congress but the President did it f irmly." 
No matter how far Reagan was adament and firm in his decisions 
and policies but his second terms" second half passed very coolly Signing 
of INF treaty in 1988 and different disarmament summits and most 
impor tant by Gorbachevian policies and their own rea l iza t ion of 
annihilations and disasterous effects of the cold war-all these presented a 
picture of relief and calm atmosphere after a long time Iran Iraq war 
came to an end in July 1988 and agreement was signed on August 20, 
1988, President Bush won the election in Nov 1988. President Reagan 
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left behind a period of intense cold war and reduction of cold war and 
president Bush entered into an era of threshold. Generally some regional 
problems were settled down but many of them remained unsettled specially 
Arab-Israel and PLO problem A whirlwind of political crises was waiting 
to blow in coming years that stirred again many things in international 
politics. 
CHAPTER-V 
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Chapter- V 
The Post Cold War Period — Gulf War , Soviet Disintegration and 
US-Saudi ties -1990-1992. 
A. Post Cold War Period And In terna t ional Scenar io . 
Though this period seems very short, nobody could have ever guessed 
that so many major events Would take place on international landscape, 
so dramatically. The end of ideology, end of Superpowers ' rivalry, German 
unification, settlement of regional conflicts and changes in socialist world 
with the unrest in West Asia leading to the Gulf War, 1991, and then the 
most important - the collapse of massive Soviet empire and lastly US 
supremacy in the globe all proved to be responsible factors to give the 
directions to the world politics. Gorbachev's immediatpi rpfr>rm<! inrlnHing 
Glasnost and Perestroika brought startling changes in various aspects of 
the Soviet system- polity, bureacuracv. armv. forf ig" p'^^^^y, /jf^ TT^ p.ct^ r 
matters, decision making and especially in economy. Glasnost,the freedom 
of expression and Perestroika restructuring of the Soviet system^became 
the catchwords because these included human factor which was never 
discussed before in Soviet watertight system. The thawing of iron curtain 
of Soviet Union brought some positive developments with it so far as 
international scenario was concerned. 
Four general approaches were incorporated by the Soviet Union fOr 
prevention of crisis and conflict. 
1. An agreement on general principles. 
2. Creation and recognition of spheres of influence. 
3 . per iodic general negotiations with US president. 
4. The reduction of US-USSR nuclear risk arms control was politically 
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important in the context of managing peaceful coexistence.' 
The arrival of Gorbachev was harbinger of open and free society. 
Gorbachev had spun a network of change and although he could not control 
every event that landed in it, no one doubted that he was the pivotal figure.^ 
Cold war seemed to be concluding to a historic end and US took full 
advantage of it. This transitional period 1989-1991 December changed 
many things which had taken place since 1945-to 1988. D.S. Kamatekar 
rightly said "The international scene is totally transformed like a landscape 
shaken by a major earthquake.""^ 
US position in West As ia ; -
Traditionally, US has always been keeping an upper hand in this 
region. During the intense cold war the competition was quite tough and 
it never let the Soviet Union to spread its tentacles m tneir are<i Of luflutjlice 
and US remained always greatly sccessful so far as its interests were 
covered. 
The moment US realized the 'weak ' position of erstwhile Soviet Union, 
it started designing and implementing various policies and strategies 
vigorously soas to its own interests and also to ensure its complete 
domination over the entire world, in short, assuming the role of Super-
Co. Following few events confirm the trend. 
B. I raq i aggression on Kuwait and th rea t to Saudi Arabia :-
Hardly two years had passed after the Iran-Iraq-War ceasefire with 
1. Campbell. M. Kurt and S. Neilolac Farlane. Gorbachev And The Third World 
Dilemnra, Routledge. New Feterlane London. 1990. P.263 
2. Kamatekar. D.S, Foreign Polic\- New Directions". Hindustan Times. April 2, 1993. 
3. Kamatekar. D.S. Foreign Policy—New Disections." Hindustan Times. April2.1993. 
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slight calm and peaceful position, the year 1990 altered the entire situation 
in West Asia again. The whole world underwent a massive change and 
many chaotic events took place. The policies initiated by the President 
Reagan and continued by President Bush had Political motivat ion to 
maintain Iraq as counterweight to the anti-American government and to 
wean away Iraq from the influence of the then USSR. Having suffered 
from reverses during Iran-Iraq war and having been cut off arms supply 
from the USSR, Iraq had moved towards US (not ideologically but 
Politically). The LIS subsequent responses were positive and Iraq -US 
re la t ions grew closer. Fur ther commerce and t rade r e l a t i ons were 
established since 1982. But Iraqi criticism of US in February 1990 
embittered the relationship perhaps for ever."* President Saddam Hussain 
accused US of its exploitation of oil and futuristic plan to enjoy unusual 
freedom in West Asia due to declining position of USSR. He pointed out 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as an agent of imperialist country that is US . 
Moreover, he sharply criticized US imperialist designs. Naturally, 
these differences made both the countries poled apart and triggered of US 
wrath. 
Despite the recognition of Kuwait in 1963 Iraq did not give up its 
territorial claims of two islands Warba and Bubiyan and these were to be 
annexed . The problem of boundary demarcation and delimitation was 
created by Kuweit in 195 1 and Iraq was ready to do it on the condition if 
both the islands were included in Iraqi territory but Kuwait did not agree. 
After sometime in 1954 Iraq put forth claim to modify her frontiers with 
Kuwait not only to have a free access to the Gulf but also to be able to 
defend her narrow coastline and to play her role as Gulf state. 
4. Congressiona/ Quarterh; voJ.XIVI. Ilnd session. 1990. Washington. P.P.7I7-722. 
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In 1969 situation took a new turn, Iraq sought for stationing its troops 
in Kuwait territory to protect Umme Qaser. Ultimately this resulted into 
border tension.^ 
After a long tussel Iraq became ready to withdraw from Bubyan and 
Warba and tension was somehow cooled down. During the Iran-Iraq War 
1980-88, Kuwait provided a large amount of financial assistance to Iraq. 
Meanwhile Iraq was busy in war with Iran, Kuwait directly involved to 
sell crude oil from Rumaila oil field, (the controversial oilfield between 
Kuwait and Iraq) on behalf of Iraq. '' As Iraq realized and awakened, it 
started to put pressure on Kuwait on three counts 
1. Annexation of Warba and Bubyan islands to its boundary (the old 
tension). 
2. Kuwait should pay the compensation for oil it drawn from Rumaila 
oil field without keeping it into the knowledge of Iraq. It should pay 
also for a loss due to the lowering of world oil price because of 
production of oil by Kuwait and U.A.E. 
3. Thirdly Kuwait itself must be of its 19th state as Kuwait was part of 
Iraq during the Ottoman" empire.^ 
Kuwait 's official suggested that they were ready to compensate debts 
and finance but they were too adament to make any compromise on 
boundary. After two weeks threatening to Kuwait, one fine morning on 
August 2, 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait." 
5 Khadduri. Majid. Socialist Iraq Since 1968. Middle East Institute Publication. 
Washington. 1978 
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As crisis deepens and Iraq postion became more vulnerable in view 
of the possible attack of US, Iraq invoked the palestenin issue to mobilize 
Arab masses with the twin objectves of undermining the Saudi position 
and to challenge the US domination in the region . However needs to 
point out that Saudi Arabia, the Godfather of G.C.C. and a friend of 
Kuwait had signed a non aggression Pact with Iraq. Saudi Arabia did not 
oppose Iraqi aggression strongly Looking power less ly it was totally 
dependent on US assistance. It just limited itself upto the open doors for 
Sheikh Alsabah of Kuwait Furthermore, a major pipeline that daily carries 
almost 1.5 million barrel of Iraq crude oil to the Red Sea port of Yambu, 
crosses Saudi territory constituting an Iraqi right of access that would 
have given to President Hussain a pretext for an attack on Saudi Arabia if 
Saudis interfered with this pipel ine . Thirdly, I raqi aggression also 
coincided with a severe criticism on Egypt by hardl iners of the PLO who 
accused of Hosni Mubarak of being puppet in the hand of US. The entire 
region was dragged on the verge of disaster and specially monarchies were 
in danger; how could Saudi Arabia be spared if it would have happened, 
naturally US took a sharp turn to defend Saudi regime as well as Kuwait.^ 
The US-Iraqi rivalry intensified, the US propogated the idea that 
Saudi Arabia was the next target of Iraq and its t roops were very close to 
Saudi border. Practically Iraq had no such intention. But now Washington 
had finally and openly designated Saudi Arabia as US protectorate and 
US as its benefector. Now Saudi territorial integrity was in jeopardy and 
this became US responsibility to protect it from foreign attacks. Despite 
Saudi unwillingness US imposed its will on Saudi government at this 
crucial juncture. In the eyes of Arabs it was humiliat ing position and a 
confirmation of Arab suspicion about the reasons for Saudi passivity and 
9 The Times of India. Lucknow. August 5. 1990 
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subservience on the Arab-Israeli issues. On the other hand Iraqi military 
on the border of Kuwait had posed ex t remely threatening si tuat ion 
especially to Saudi Arabia.'" 
Automatically, US economic interests started getting suffered and 
chances were more to be worsened but US took full advantage of its 
strategy making the circumstances fit and moulded according to its 
requirements. 
Pres ident Bush immedia te ly o rde red for UN sanct ions ( t rade , 
medicine, economy) against Iraq. " Immediately after Iraq invasion, I 
ordered an embargo of all t rade with Iraq and many other na t ions 
announced sanct ion. Add i t iona l ly U N O G.C.C . and Arab League 
courageously announced its opposit ion to Iraqi aggression. As I have 
witnessed throughout my life in both war and peace, Americans have 
never wea \e red when her purpose is driven by principles" " 
For the first time in his tory of cold war after 1945, both the 
superpowers US and USSR stood together against Iraq. Moscow declared 
a world wide halt against its closest ally Iraq and called this action as " 
brutal and illegal invasion on Kuwai t . " ' - Moscow being no more an 
adversary of US, supported Security' Council resolutions 660, 661 , 662, 
665 and 678 And US finally became successful in imposing embargo 
against Iraq. Had Gulf war erupted some few years earlier at the period of 
intensive cold war, Washington and Moscow would have stood as bitterest 
enem> supporting their respectu e allies as US to Saudi Arabia and Soviet 
Union to Iraq "The show down between Iraq as key client and Saudi 
10 The Times of India. Lucknow. August 1. 1990 
11 Congressional Quarierh. 1990. P726 
12 New York Times. August 4. 1990. P6.col 1 
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Arabia the old vital friend of the US could have embroiled the Superpowers 
in regional upheaval and conflict of superpowers.'^ Definitely, it could 
have taken the turn as similar to Korean War of 1950-53. 
Though Moscow was mild in its strategies and insisted peaceful 
settlement, on the contrary, US ultimately used force. Since Moscow was 
at the verge of disintegration, it could not oppose strongly Bush ' s 
strategy. President Bush soon announced the deployment offerees on Saudi 
border under the 'Operation Desert Shield, 'some of Congressmen objected 
but lastly it was approved by both the Houses of Congrss. The President 
said — 
"Iraq has massed an enormous war machine on Saudi border. Saudi 
government requested our help. The sovereign independent Saudi Arabia 
is of a vital interest for us. Any agression against Saudi Arabia meant US 
military response. Any outside aggression on Saudi Arabia would represent 
direct threat to the national security of this country. This decision which I 
shared with Congressional leadership, grous out of longstanding friendship 
and security relationship between Saudi Arabia and USA. The forces of 
both the countries US and Saudi Arab would work toge ther if any 
aggression happens from Iraqi side".'^ 
The US had started to feel a kind of threat in the region since the 
Iranian revolution ocurred as Saudi Arabia's security was also at stake. At 
that t ime 'Carter doctrine' and 'Reagan doctrine' did not let Saudi Arabia 
to be the second Iran, enventually, at this time Saudi Arabia was considered 
as the next target after Kuwait and it was necessary for US to protect its 
interests in West Asia by managing Saudi Security and it was very easy 
\?. Newsweek. Vol CXV. Sep 17. 1990. No 12. P 9 
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for US to mould the situation according to its requirements. 
C. US Foreign Policy and Defence of Saudi Arab ia—Objec t ives and 
Strategles:-
Saddam Hussain's defiance and US monopoly had shattered the vision 
of a peaceful better world in aftermath of the cold war Secretary James 
Baker before the LosAngeles World Affairs Council expressed that the 
invasion was indeed a historic challenge to the rest of the international 
community It was regional challenge very precarious for West Asia. 
President Bush outlined four major foriegn policy goals towards West 
Asia. 
1. Immediate unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait 
as mandated in UN Security Council resolution 660. 
2 Restoration of Kuwait 's legitimate government . 
3 Release of all the hostages (US citizens) 
4. Commitment to the Security of the Gulf and stabili ty of Saudi 
Arabia.'^ 
President Bush's primary concern during and after the Iraqi invasion 
was to provide security to Saudi Arabia An Iraqi attack towards them 
would have forced US for a direct military intervention, because it would 
be a direct threat to US economic interest President Bush pressed the 
Saudi government to accept US military presence on its territory. Though, 
Saudis maintained a close relationship with US and purchased most of 
the military equipments from them but they never liked foreign presence 
on their sacred soil. Some of the Saudis had always suspicious eyes and a 
comer of disliking and mistrust for them. Moreover, the Saudi government 
being the guardian and custodian of Holy Mecca and Medina could have 
15 Department of Stale Bulletine. Vol No 10. No\ 5. 1990 PP 234-235 
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been harshly criticized by the Islamic world. But in the early days of August 
1990, Saudi officials felt Iraqi threat much greater than the US military 
presence inside the country. By the end of third week of August around 
50,000 US army reached to Saudi Arabia.'^ 
Gradually, most of the Western countries including Britain and France 
and many of Arab countries such as Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan and others 
joined. King Fahd in his speech to the people of Saudi Arabia justified 
this measure for the participation of fraternal Arab and other friendly 
forces. According to him it was purely defensive and necessary for security 
purposes. "They will leave the Saudi territory immediately at the request 
of kingdom." '^ 
This support at that time was momentous for Saudi Arabia and Saudi 
government took a sigh of relief. A favourable condition took place 
fortunately for US and King Fahad paid vote of thanks for it when he 
paid a visit to Washington .'* 
Pres ident Bush devoted much of his energy in construct ing an 
international coalition to oppose the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. He hoped 
that broad international participation would reduce the burden on the US, 
it would increase the effectiveness of sanctions and justifiy US presence 
in Saudi Arabia. He succeeded in his strategy despite some dissatisfaction 
of among Congressmen because this was extra expenditure at the time of 
crisis. Apart from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria were the first Arab states 
to jo in it. This growing co-operation in Arab world left Iraq all alone. 
Even Saudi Arabia could not understand US strategy that it would leave 
16. Congress and Nation- A Review of Government and Politics: vol.III. 1989-90. 
Congressional Quarterly. Washington. 1993. P.302. 
17 Vital Speeches of the Day; Vol 5(). No.22. Sept. 1990 P67.'5 
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its troops permanently on its grounds. All assumption and the thinking of 
Fahad that US would withdraw all its soldiers on the request of Saudi 
Arabia — were based on illusions and imaginations professor Baker of 
King Fahad University said "Our relationship with US is not that of a 
client to a Superpower but more like an employment or employer to an 
employee".'^ On the other hand President Bush justified his strategies 
successfully The US support to Saudi Arabia and instant response of any 
request by Saudi government at this crucial juncture strengthened US-
Saudi ties. President categorically said to the United Nations former 
General secretary Prese De Cuellar in a meeting that Saudi Arabians were 
free to make any request they want and they (US) would recommend He 
further clarified that he was not going to cancel any arms deal for Saudi 
Arabia.-" 
In this connection when President was asked about the defence of 
Saudi Arabia he positively replied that the integrity of Saudi Arabia and 
its freedom were very important so far as US vital interests were concerned 
with it. Deputy Press Secretary assured US military assistance to Saudi 
Arabia. He expressed 
"The United States has close and valued relationship with its long 
time friend Saudi Arabia. It was in the spirit of this relationship that the 
US responded favourably to King Fahd's request and sent troops to the 
kingdom. For more than a decade the US has made available to the 
kingdom defense articles and services Consistent with this policy and in 
response to the current threat, the administration recently provided Saudi 
Arab equipment on an emergency basis".- ' 
19 US News and world report. \o\ 102. No 11. September 17. 1990. P.P 35-36 
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Following consultations with the Saudi government and the Congress, 
the administration had determined that it was in the interest of the United 
States to equip Saudi Arabia with additional material "We believe that it 
is essential that the US be able and willing to provide training equipments 
to solidify Saudi defence system Such support constitutes a key dimension 
of our over all strategy toward the persian Gulf and could serve as well to 
protect American l ives" -- A broad consensus prevailed among US 
administration and Congressmen to project Iraq as an enemy of entire 
Arab world that \yas to be opposed at every cost and Saudi Arabia should 
be protected with the consideration of vital interests. However, it needs 
to be emphasized here that the issue of restoration of Kuwaiti government 
and the security of Saudi Arabia was mere pretext, the real intention of 
US was to ensure the continuous supply of oil and to prevent the 
emergence of emy power which poses threat to its hegemony. 
Though King Fahad had expressed in press conference that US troops 
are temporary only for defense purposes, internally, the Saudi leaders 
themselves were feeling threatened and requested for US help .It was not 
purely temporary,there were so many pressures, economic burden from 
US side that Saudi Arabia had to accept it and US became fully successful 
in creating a reverberation for Saddam Hussain as strong foe of Arabs 
and especially it might harm Saudi Arabia 
The US challenges and Iraqi obstinac\' led to the war- the Gulf war 
1^ *^ 1 and it was full fleged wai in the region Further, negotiations were 
stopped Resolution 678 in persuance of liberation of Kuwait, practically 
commenced on 16/17 Januar\ IQOl in the form of Operation Desert 
Storm'which was for all practical purpose of US-Iraq direct military 
WeeklN compilation of the Presidental Speeches. Vol-2(). No 38. Sept 1991). P24 
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confrontation) In this war Iraq suffered heavily On Febraruy 28, 1991 
Bush announced that war to liberate Kuwait was won and declared 
ceasefire Subsequently, withdrawal of Iraqi t roops from Kuwait started 
Ultimately, US regained its lost image in West Asia and won the heart of 
Arabs as being protector and patron of them against their own brother 
country On the other hand. Prince Bandar Bin Sultan of Saudi Arabia, 
thanked the US president for his assistance and protection and President 
thanked Saudis for their steadfast cooperat ion At this t ime, US as 
victorious power was feelmg happy and at this finest hour President Bush 
declared New World Order The miserable condition of the Soviet Union 
provided for US a suitable and favourable environment to impliment that 
No one was there to countervail this New World Order.-" 
President Bush succintly summed up nat ional interest and old 
objectives after the end of cold war and at the time of Gulf war and after. 
He expressed "the survival of the US as a free and independent nation 
with its fundamental values are intact in New World Order its people and 
institutions are secure".-" 
The Israel Fac to r : -
However, this was the high time for US New World Order to be 
prevailed and the US with its triumphant approach played a multipronged 
role in West Asia and in the world as well The US role toward Israel, Iraq 
and its friend states, in Arab world and toward former Soviet Union all 
reflected its hegemonistic designs and overactivity By and large, at every 
step Soviet Union danced to the tune played by the US as no other 
alternative was there The US. tactfully, kept away Israel inspite of several 
2> Region;)! sur\e> of tlie world and Middle East and Nortli Africa. 38th Edihon. 1990. 
Europa Publication London. P494 
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provocat ions US knew very well if Israel responded Saddam Hussain 's 
attack, it would convert into an Arab Israeli conflict as Saddam Hussain 
wanted and tried to turn the attention of the international community 
toward it. President Bush never preferred this crisis to take a colour of 
Arab Israeli war because in that situation the entire US- Arab starategy 
would have failed. To make this, d iplomacy successful and strong US 
projected Iraqi image very disdainfully in a form of hostile and enemy 
country for Arabs and other Western powers including France and Britain 
In early stages Israel could not anticipate any Iraqi attack on it. Israeli 
military leaders said that Iraqi president was aware of Israel 's strength 
and they were confident enough that Saddam Hussain would not start any 
war at the time when an international alliance was against him . In addition 
, Israel found its one time bitter enemy Syria on the opposite side against 
Iraq. 
Cairo-Damascus axio that had sparked a disasterous attack in 1967, 
now was aligned with coolition force under US umbrella - against Iraq. 
Nevertheless, Israelis were even confirmed in their second thought that 
this alliance would not last long. President Assad and Saddam Hussain 
for a moment might oppose each other but they belong to the same radicals 
rejectionist group that opposed Israel and they would always support PLO. 
A section of Israel was deeph- concerned and shaken by Palestinian 
support to Iraq and some Israeli leaders were contended to note that US 
might pressurize the Palestinian radicals to loosen their grip over occupied 
for territories. Consequently, Palestine can also be dominated easily as 
since 1948. On the other side.eventhough Iraq was surrounded by the 
25. US News and World Report: September 17. 1990. P 3b 
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coalition of Arab - Western hostile forces, and not Israel, Saddam Hussain 
chose to attack on Israel, exclusively for political purpose.^^ But Saddam 
Hussain forgot that he was not equal to USA and Iraq's most confident 
friend Soviet Union was loosing its strength, no country was there to stand 
against coalition force with Iraq as a balancing and viable factor.-^ Israel 
very diplomatically kept mum as per US instructions and did not make 
any pre-emptive attack on Iraq. They did not want to be played in the 
hands of Saddam Hussain. As a result against Iraq by US Israel's image 
shined more in the eyes of Congress, Administration, Public Opinion and 
Pentagon as well, whereas Israel felt some sort of discomfort departing 
from its traditional policy of quick shift and effective retribution and 
retaliation against any Arab state.-* Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria all 
had publicly indicated that they would understand the situation if Iraq 
attacks are responded by Israel. But Jordan was very critical of this stance 
and many times it had warned primier Shamir that if Israel crossed the 
Jordanian air space enroute to Iraq, Jordan would be compelled to respond 
to Israeli attack whereas Saudi Arab, Syria and Egypt were not in that 
mood. Had any Israeli reaction happened against Iraq all those three Arab 
states would have been mute spectator or situation would have been 
somehow different. Might be Arabs would have got divided into two 
groups Jordan, FLO and Iran group against Israel with Iraq and the other 
one with coalition force but Israel did not retaliate and situation remained 
as it was. Saudi government also concluded that they had a common interest 
in promoting more stable regional status quo -" 
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Another lurking fear for US in this condition, i.e. in case of Israeli 
retaliation, Arab- Israel War and Arab rift was failure of US Arab 
strategies. US tried to maintain a balanced relationship with Israel and 
Arab states as well. Moreover, Arab states know very well that they cannot 
go against US that is the only alternative Steven Spiegel, a US policy 
analyst, expressed his view point in these words "In specific circumstances 
pressure on Israel does not guarantee improved relations with leading Arab 
states, and aid to Israel does not prevent expanded contacts with Pro-
American Arab regiines".'" 
Israel was well concious of the development of its infrastructure. 
They were not p r epa red to bear mass ive a t t a c k s and cha l l enges 
unnecessarily. 
Secondly, US Israeli relations got revitalized as US took care it during 
Iraqi aggression In response, Israel was ready to cooperate with US in 
peace Process for West Asia and now it was obligatory for Israel to 
cooperate in peace process ' ' Though this triggered off suspicion between 
the two countries but at last both of them realized the need of each other 
and relations were purely normal. 
President Saddam Hussain could not achieve its objectives at terrible 
cost to his country and his people, whereas Israel had gained an appreciable 
position since not letting the war to be converted into an Arab- Israel 
war 
President Bush addressed a joint session of Congress on March 6, 
1991 in which he indicated four key challenges to be confronted. Firstly, 
to work jointly to create shared security arrangements in the region 
(^1 Ibid . Px-i 
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America will be there with its allies to repel any aggression but that does 
not mean to station forces in Arabian peninsula but a joint exercise of air 
and ground forces, US vital interests depend upon a stable and secure 
Gulf Order. 
Secondly, the US must act to control the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. Thirdly, the US and West Asian countries must create 
new opportunities for peace and stability in the region. 
Forthly, to establish and foster economic stability of the region for 
the pacific settlements - as West Asia is rich in its natural resources.'^ 
Significantly, it was hightime for US to use its brink manship with a 
rhetoric for peace and New World Order. And these recent experiences 
during Iraqi aggression on Kuwait, defence of Saudi Arabia and restoration 
of Kuwaiti government - all proved to be catalyst in this US measure. US 
was well aware of the time to appease Israel and Arab strategies both 
simultaneously. Arab world was well aware that it could not challange to 
US directly and at that time situation was more delicate as the Soviet 
Union was not in position to be a strong rival against any of US move. US 
itself paved the way in Gulf to serve its interests by taking a lot of favours 
of Saudi Arabia. 
D. Soviet Role in Gulf War: -
The Soviet policy aimed at to make a political settlement of some 
issues if possible. But the circumstances \ \ere not so easy going. Soviet 
Union, due to multiple crises at home had to take economic aid from US 
and naturally to appease US, Soviet Union could not convince Iraq nor 
!2 Problem of coinmunisin. Jiih August 1991. Vol XXXX. No 4.PP 12-14 
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challenge US strength and it was not in position to protect Iraq from heavy 
attacks from all capital side. 
In view of Robert, O. Freedman, the Soviet policy analyst, "At key 
juncture it cooperated with USA but it also tried to mediate the conflict 
and preserved its position in Iraq. While Iraq responded to the allied attacks 
by bombording Israel, the Soviet ministry of foreign affairs was worried 
about the implications of an expanded war ' . ' " 
Soviet Foreign ministers ' effort to settle the problem through 
diplomatic measures could not be fruitful Soviet leader Gorbachev in 
later stages did not like Iraq's defiant activities. Ultimately Moscow 
favoured US in working out the operations- 'Desert Storm' and 'Desert 
Shield' and ultimately it had to accept defeat of Iraq.'* Iraq was left into 
the lurch. Iraq fought all alone the massive costly war without any sort of 
assistance from any corner of the world. This incident also exposed the 
mvth' of Arab solidarity as no Arab nation came forward to support- Iraq 
in view of the U S pressure. 
Exaluating Soviet behaviour during the crisis caused by Iraqi invasion, 
it was a mixture of Gorbachevian new thinking and traditional actions. 
The crux of new thinking was Moscow's insistence on peaceful political 
settlements of the crisis. Moscow's 'Minimax ' policy was an attempt to 
sustain traditional linkages with Iraq and to play a key role during the war 
to be as mediator only. 
L'nrest in Arab World and Road to Peace:-
In March lOQl, the six Arab states together with Syria and Egypt 
V, Ibid. PP 14-U) 
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had issued the Damascus declaration calling for enhancement of economic 
cooperation and the establishment of Arab peace keeping force to maintain 
security in the Gulf. The war costed for Saudi Arabia around 50 billion 
dol la rs and Saudi Government had to borrow from US to meet its 
expenditures. By April, 1991, Saudi Arabia indicated to Egypt and Syria 
that it would not like to welcome more coalition trooias. King Fahd was 
totally against now to offer further because this move of offering Saudi 
land to foreigners was bitterly criticized by oppositional religious groups. 
Egypt, Jordan, Yamen and syria were facing economic problem. The 
breakdown of economic and security arrangement created some problems 
of disunity. Egypt tried to pick up the pieces of Arab unity. Since all the 
Arab states sought good relations with Washington: Cairo offered its 
services as a broker.The emerging US- Syria relations at this t ime proved 
very important for Egypt that led a New Arab Order. In this regard 
President Mubarak and King Fahad played a vital role to bring Hafezal 
Asad the Syrian Presiden.t.-oloser-tD-l:JS"sponsored peace process or West 
Asian peace talks with Israel.'" 
The US President Bush watched the situation very carefully and all 
these developments during the crisis had shaken the foundation of Arab 
world and the picture of Arab phenemenon was radically changed. Most 
of the Arab regimes were found on the side of vanquished victor.'* 
Madrid peace conference in October 1991, Moscow conference in 
November-December 1992 and Washington conference 1993-rounds 
respectively in further years proved US" earnest effort for West Asian 
peace and settlement of Arab Israel constant tension and disturbance Now 
the US was trying to balance the situation. It was not in favour of any 
-^ 5 Ibid, p 79 
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other Arab Israel war because all these confrontations proved to be too 
harmful and annihilating for Israeli infrastructure and development . Gulf 
war demonstrated the mere fact that Arab arid Israeli have been talking to 
each other, and it would not resolve the problem of the region. The old 
Order was still smouldering. Secretary Baker was busy in fashioning a 
global policy that could accommodate the transformation of the Soviet 
Union into cumbersome CIS. '^  
The weakening position of the Soviet Union and dramatic change in 
its foreign policy from competition to cooperation, played a very important 
role to make US diplomacy successful. 
E. Soviet Position and Disintegrat ion:-
Soviet role dur ing the Gulf war had been negligible so far as its 
strong stand and veto power against UN sanctions to Iraq were concerned. 
Had it been in a position to oppose US harsh decisions against Iraq, the 
situation would have been entirely different as seen many times during 
the cold war, for instance, Korean war of 1950, Vietnam war 1965 to 
1975 and Arab-Israel war of 1967 
So\iet Union was busy in coping with its turbulent domestic problems 
and could hardly pay attention to the policies towards West Asia and other 
decision making processes during the Gulf war. There were so many 
economic and political problems prevailing in Soviet Union that led to a 
masssixe country into oblivian. 
Later on, foreign minister 's resignation brought a serious situation 
and there was no remedy except to be a mediator during the crisis for a 
' " Prohlcm of comiminisin. Jiil\ .August. IWI P-12 
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superpower which was loosing its grip & solidarity in terms of a strong 
power Consequently, Moscow totally failed to convince Washington to 
avert the crisis peacefully, nor it could influence its ally not to go on 
wrong paths so defiantly/" 
The Soviet Union tried to deal with the situation but his efforts 
miserably failed. New thinking and new trends in foreign policy and in 
internal affiars to a certain extent seemed beneficial but at the time of 
their failure and inapplicability, when Soviet crack-down started, the 
attempts to reform Soviet empire led to its collapse and Gorbachev had to 
pay an expensive price '*' 
Political, economic, social and organizational structures were so 
paralysed that no e\'olutionar>' change was possible - that Gorbechev was 
trying through two reforms Glasnost ' and 'Peres t roika ' . The Soviet 
economic crisis was clearly visible in declining growth rates, increasing 
scarcity of exploi table resources and most important the worsening 
imbalance between military production and general production specially 
consumer goods ""' 
Enormous bureaucratic structure had got polluted by corruption 
earlier than Gorbachev's arrival They increasingly neglected their goals 
of serving the civilians and political economic corruption encompassed 
i t •»' 
The demand for independence from Baltic states— (Lithuania, Latvia, 
Estonia) \Nas most serious issue So\iet-German pact of 1939 brought the 
"sy The Economist. Jamian 1989. P 1 ^  Sec details in Mainstream. Vol XXX. No 12.Januan 
1992 PP"^2-'!•' 
4(1 Foreign Affairs Vol 70. No .^ . 1991 Winter P U),S 
41 Seminar. Ma\. 1992. P 19 See details in the same issue on P2() 
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Baltics into the Soviet territory and this was rejected in 1989 by the 
Congress of Peoples Deputies and they were declared independent in 
March 1990. But this did not solve the political problem and triggered off 
another ethnic problems and independent nationalities specilly in Baltic 
regions "*-
Ultimately, mismanagement of modernization and traditional values 
proved fatal to the Soviet structure. After coming to an extent of reforms 
and changes Gorbachev moved backward The conservatists were seeking 
to maintain some linkage with old system for which Boris Yeltsin was 
striving for *' 
The centre was loosing its control and credibility over the republics 
and gradually all became free breaking the structure of Soviet Union into 
CIS 
The unsuccessful coup of August 1991, led by conservatives brought 
the half of disintegration of the country. Coups led by Boris yeltsin speeded 
up and three Baltics and three other - Moldivia, Arminia and Georgia 
encouraged other three Ukrain, Bylorussia and Uzbekistan."'* 
Gorbachev lost the balance in his team in Kremlin between the 
rad ica l s and hardl iners His c loses t friend Alexander Yakolav and 
Shevardnadze (brains behind perestroika) had already gone "' 
The Sla\ states passed a resoulution to establish the independent 
states ' Commonwealth at Minsk and Gorbachev resigned as President on 
December 24, 1991 *" In its last sitting USSR Supreme Soviet dissolved 
42 Ibid . PP 19-20-21 
4"> The Economist. Vo lO . No 7122. August 1991 P2 
44 News statesman and societ>. Vol 4. No 169 December. 1991. P6 
4.> Seminar. Ma> 1992 P2 
46 US Department of State Despatch Vol 2. No 52. Dec "50.1991.? 11 
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itself on December 16, 1991, alongwith remaining structure of USSR. 
The USSR was dead and Commonweal th of Independent States (CIS) 
emerged with a vague structure on Dec 25, 1991. The Soviet Union became 
a part of history US recognized and welcomed it "^  Soviet disintegration 
brought an unforeseen change in the world politics. The U S ' long desire 
and George F. Kenon's prophecy that USSR would be no more in near 
future, p roved correct. The US was happy as its chronic adversary 
collapsed During the Gulf war, as US was fully aware of Soviet position, 
it started to neglect former USSR in every matter though there was no 
mutual rivalry. Gorbachev had always tried to have a friendliness with 
USA. All the agreements, settlements, negotiations and talks initiated 
or participated by Gorbacheve, were not given importance and there was 
no weightage of USSR' s initiative Soviet Union misca lcula ted and 
underestimated US strategies And its internal problems did not let it to 
do worthwhile what they could have done in normal circumstance and. 
sound posit ion The Soviet Union ' s legacy t ransmit ted to Russian 
Federation Soviet disappearance left an unhealthy vacuum for its former 
rival US and US started playing one man show in every matter any time , 
any where it desires 
F. US Supremacy and the New World Order : -
The demise of Soviet Union, which had been serving uptil now as 
counter balance force against US. proved to be a boon for US and death -
knel l for other social ist Coun t r i e s US wanted to shou lder all the 
responsibility of self made and self assumed New World Order for the 
replacement of old world order 
In the words of Jaques Delors in his address to IISS in March 1991 
47 Jindal Niriiial. US foreign Polic> Issues .And Perspecti%es Lancers. New Delhi, 1991, 
P196 
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"all around us, nacked ambitions,lust for power national uprising- all are 
contributing to create potentially dangerous situation containing the seeds 
of destabilization and conflict, aggrevated by the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction. Since these developments have been defined as the 
major security challenges to the global community, the US has assumed 
the responsibility of maintaining N.W.Order. "* 
A couple of months after the col lapse of the old world order, 
reconciliation process started in Combodia and Afghanistan (half of the 
problem of Afghanistan was already solved by Gorbachev, the former 
So\ ie t leader in 1988). The new international climate made favourable 
impact on democratization in South America. The transformation of 
former Communist countries towards democracy which had taken place 
in a dramatic way. opened up a transitional period Significantly, a non-
ideological, basically pragmatic stream came into forefront which laid 
emphas is on d i sca rd ing the concept of mi l i t a ry confronta t ion and 
utilization of most well proved means to achieve economic efficiency as 
market liberalization etc. '^ 
As per US perspec t ive . New World Order occupied a primary 
significance but still there is no clear outline that could have defined 
the contours of US led New World Order except its supremacy. President 
Bush aimed at -
1 The need for collective cooperation against any external 
aggression (He refered to Iraq). 
2 The US had d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to lead in 
defusinginternational crisis. 
4S Journal of World Affairs. Vol 1. JUIK' 1992.P27 
49 Jindal. Nirinal. op cil.P 197 
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3. The universal application of market economy both internally and 
externally. 
4. Democracy, good governance, human right, economic liberalization, 
elimination of weapons and reduction of arms in future. 
The US proposed a collective resistance and suggested the grouping 
of Western nations under US leadership like group of seven industrialist 
countries or big five to impose their 'will" on the world. The New World 
Order was specially designed to serve the interest of North. The end of 
the cold war and allied action in Gulf reflects western nations ' solidarity 
and monopoly . It outlined the unity of north against south on the issues 
pertaining to military security access to resource market and political 
system to the interest of Western nations "^ In nutshell, the US-declared 
New World Order ' was totally in favour of western hemisphere and was 
to be implemented according to the US will This led gradually to the 
NATO's eastward expansion including Russia in coming years. 
In the context of US-Iraq confrontation, the New World Order is 
viewed by many Arabs as heralding a process of recolonization of Arab 
land through US military intervention The US intransigence with so 
much force and zeal to "defend Saudi Arabia and liberate Kuwait", had 
conveyed a cynical message that it only cares those Arabs who are rich in 
resource and have oil . ' ' The US military presence in Saudi Arabia gave 
Washington a tremendous geographical ad\antages . Saudi Arabia and 
the Gulf Emirates took a graxe risk when they appealed for US forces to 
defend them against Iraq because later on they had to face total US 
imperialism in the region Americans made no visible effort to bring out 
5(1 Middle East International. Jamian 11. 199P21 
51 Middle East International. March 8. 1991. P27 
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a just settlement for the Palest inians and the situation became more 
vulnerable and dangerous because of the US increasing opportunism in 
West Asia.'-
However, the Americans gave all this a colour of US victory over 
cold war or triumph of ' Liberal ism' over 'Communism' According to 
president Bush this Gulf war was the first test in ' New World Order ' in 
which they had been successful and passed out that test. He admired the 
good performance of force as "this victory belongs to finest fighting force 
this nation has ever known in its history. He expressed "We lifted the 
yoke of aggression and tyranny from a small country."" President Bush 
in his address before joint session of Congress on March 6, 1991, apart 
from this commitments to peace in West Asia s tressed a secur i ty 
arrangement in Gulf through maintaining US joint excercises involving 
both air and ground forces and US naval presence in the region. 
G. Gulf Security Ar rangemen t and the US Strategy: (Oil Fac to r ) 
President Bush in his speech of March 6, 1991, stated that the US 
and its allies must work together to create a shared security arrangement 
in the Gulf region which implies allied exercises for the perpetuation of 
western domination of the region. "We must take together to create shared 
arrangements in the region. Our vital national interests depend en a stable 
and secure Gulf We must act to control the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and missiles issued to delivei them At the same time 
peace brings real benefits to e\ery one We must do all that we can to 
close the gap between Israel and Arab states and Israel and Palestinians.^* 
52 US Department 0 State Despatch. March. 11. 1991. P 163. See details in Nirmal Jindal's 
book PNo 177 
5.1 Department of State Builetine. March. 11.1991 P(^l 
54 Journal of Foreign Affairs. Vol 2.No 1. June 1991 P .V) 
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It can be construed that the US tried to maintain a balance approach 
and friendship for both the sides-whether Israel or Gulf States. On the 
one hand, US did not want to break Arab strategy so far as its interests 
were concerned - as Iran (upto Shah), Saudi Arabia and oil rich small 
G.C.C. etc., on the other hand, US strongly supported Israel as its spoiled 
child. It has always been successful in maintaining its arrangement for 
security and keeping its strong bases in the Gulf specially military bases. 
It has two phases — security to deter the Soviet influence and security for 
oil 
The US" main aim in the Gulf is to ensure for itself and its allies a 
continuous and secure supply of cheap oil and to keep control on oil rich 
regimes. On the other side, the main aim of Gulf states and Saudi Arabia 
is to produce oil without hinderance. to maximise their oil revenues and 
security against the outside aggression whether neighbour or any other 
power as seen in case of Iraqi aggression on Kuwait. It is clear that the 
interest of US and Gulf states including Saudi Arabia coincide and they 
complement each other."^ 
One American objective as stated above was to ensure the security 
of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states Mr. Baker and Pres ident Bush 
proposed a new security arrangement through the Gulf Cooperat ion 
Council stationing local troops under the UN flag. This new arrangement 
left the options for army, navy and air presence according to the exigency 
of the time Mr James Baker indicated to Iran as major nuclear power 
which was even a very good friend of US upto Shah's period. Presently, 
Iran was creating a challenge for US- Saudis ties and US-GCC friendship. 
The US leaders do not have the kind of confidence in present day what 
they had in Raza Shah for entrusting it with regional pol iceman 's role.'* 
55 The Hindustan Times. Feb 15 ls)91. After the War b\ Nihal siiigh 
5(. Foreign .Affairs Vol 71,Nol-'^ 1992. P7X 
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The exception remains only Saudi Arabia and other small states for 
the fulfilment of its long term interests in the region. So far as its short 
term interests were concerned Egypt and Syria were included for the t ime 
being . 
This turn in Saudi behaviour was reflexive of ' l i t imus test ' as timely 
fixation of particular attitude and after some time Saudi Arabia turned 
back on its line and Saudi US defence commitments strengthened. Saudi 
Arabia was now more willing to do U S ' bidding though it strained its 
relations with Arab allies and it was taken as total failure of Pan Arabism 
and Arab nationalism.''^ 
This is US strategy to have a strong stand in Gulf area sometimes it 
met to its failure and sometimes success. Since 1971 when British influence 
was withdrawan from there the US policy towards Gulf became more 
particular. At that time there were two objectives to protect oil and to 
counter Soviet influence. The region had gained extraordinary prominance 
in modern times mainly on account of enormous oil reserves located there 
and dependence of contemporary world on it. 
The US is by far the world's biggest guzzler The country uses 17 
million barrels a day. 4 3 % of US energ\ needs are met by petroleum 
products. Since the invasion of Kuwait, some price increase has been 
greater than those mandated by the laws of supply and demand. The 
department of state analyst said that if Saddam Hussain is forced from 
power peacefully, Iran and Saudi Arabia could dominate OPEC, leading 
to a relatively stable oil market."^* 
57 Congressional Quarierl\. Fall IV9i. Washington PP31-.'54 
5S Midstream- Monthh Jewish Review. Vol 9 No 1 Jannar\ 1991. P 11 
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In 1980. Saudi Arabia bore a .severe set back because of the decline 
in demand of OPEC oil. The economic boom in Saudi Arabia was followed 
by recession and large deficit. They realized that possession of oil reserves 
does not guarantee a market. They started its increase in capacity again 
before the crisis of 1991. The new goal was to expand the capacity from 
the current 85 million barrel today to 10 million barrel a day other OPEC 
countries had the same plan.'' ' 
During the second half of the 1980, Saudi Arabia's military outlay 
was average around 14 million dollars. Since Iraqi-Kuwait crisis emerged, 
Saudis have placed a very large order for military equipment with US 
manufactures - worth about 20 million dollars. This was a long term 
contract Saudi Arabia and its allies, lastly, planned to sell more and more 
oil to meet and finance much larger military budgets and increased Arab 
aids. However, any crisis in the Gulf may lead to deficit again as in case 
of 1983-89.*° 
The US interest (economic) has always been fulfilled by oil rich 
countries including six small states i.e. Kuwait, UAE Qatar, Bahrain, Oman 
and its old friend Saudi Arabia The US had evolved a typical strategy 
after bearing a lesson from 1 973 oil crisis that it started to sell high cost 
weapons and other good in the pretext of security and stability of these 
regimes. The US twin pillar diplomacy was on of its innovative Gulf 
security arrangement strategy. This introduced direct military presence in 
the Gulf and after Iranian revolution Saudi Arabian protection was the 
foremost requirement of US. 
39 Ibid. P12 
60 Quoted in conimentan. Vol 65. No 6. June. 197X. P "?.'! Arms and Saudi connection'. 
b\ Steven Rogers and Hans Shaked. See details in New York Times. Januar> 24. 198li 
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President Carter proclaimed in his doctrine on January 23 , 1980 " 
The future of Saudi Arabia and the future of United States tied together 
very closely in an irrivocable way. An attempt by any outside force to 
gain control of Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital interest of 
US 'and will be repelled by any, mean necessary inc luding military 
forces."."' 
In present Gulf war 1991, Iraqi military infrastructure was strong 
and all these were made by US during Iran -Iraq war. Now this jeopardized 
pro Western regimes specially Saudi Arabia and US had to seek out a new 
alternative for security of Saudi Arab and other oil rich countries. Saudi 
Arabia became a leading partner of US and came closer to US than ever 
before. 
H. US -Saudi Ties After Gulf War:-
During the cold war,US objectives were determined according to the 
lines of USSR's moves and perceptions of objectives, i.e. 
1. Containment of Soviet influence in the region. 
2. Continued access to Persian Gulf oil resources at resonable prices. 
3. Preservation of the security and stability of friendly states especially 
Saudi Arabia. 
4 To keep a watching eyes to control West Asia through Israel. 
Generally US Saudi relations have been on cordial lines except some 
differences. For the security arrangement in the Gulf during 1969-72, the 
US focused a lot of importance on Iran under its twin pillar diplomacy. 
As the part of Nixon doctrine, Iranian hegemony in the Gulf was intended 
61 Agniion. Marc\: Post Cold War - US Seciint> Strategies for the Persian Gulf. RAND 
Publication. SANT.AMONICA. USA. 199.^  PP.S-ly 
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to promote regional stability and to deter against the Soviet threat to the 
western economic interests in West Asia. Saudi Arabia was at second 
position but after the fall of Shah of Iran, Saudi Arabia became the centre 
for the Gulf Security. 
After the end of cold war, threat from Soviet Union was minimised 
US-CIS relations are cordial and in this situation US-Gulf objective are:-
1. Continued acess (flow) of Persian Gulf oil at reasonable price. 
2 Preservation of Arab territory and security from outer threats. 
3 To defend Israel at any cost "-
Not only Gulf war appears to be responsible for the alternation in 
US policies but post cold war developments played a very important role 
in this direction. Gulf war was one of the mainfestation of US supremary 
in West Asia after the Soviet collapse. 
However, Saudi Arabia and US both require each other very much to 
fulfil their respective interests. Very much concious of each other ' s 
geopolitical significance, diplomat-ic, economic and political importance. 
Both the countries always made efforts to make their relations ver\ much 
strong in this area. But lately, some differences emerged in Royal family. 
Crown prince Abdullah opposed any permanent presence of US force in a 
Muslim state (Saudi Arabia). King Fahad was mild in his approach and 
could have allowed stationing of other equipments *'"' 
Four a l t e rna t ives were prepared: 
1 Saudi defense Independence. 
62 Los Angles Times. October 22. 1'>>H, Jolm M border Saudi Balk at Storing US .Arms' 
PS 
fr^  Agiiuon. Marc>. op cil . P 35-42 
112 
2. Defence of all Gulf states 
3. US-Saudi Condominium. 
4. US as disengaged balance. 
The key features of these strategies are large defense expansion in 
Saudi Arabia, US- Saudi cooperative defense of Arabian peninsula, US 
reliance on security arrangement with participation of the GCC states and 
maintenance of a stable military balance in the region. 
In post cold war environment, Saudi Arabia may be in a better position 
to have adequate defense capabilities against potential enemies. During 
the peace time US would provide Saudi defense expansion training, arms 
transfer and intelligence. Large Saudi weapons purchase would help to 
expand foreign market for US. For Saudi Arabia this alternative could 
bring the reduction of tension among Saudi decision makers in royal family 
and Saudi society. 
Secondly, a substantial defense expansion would be required for US-
Saudi intensive cooperation and coordination would be expected and US 
w o u l d p rov ide assistance in Saudi condomin ium would be more 
compatable to Egypt Israel and some other states "^  
Par t ic ipa t ing non Gulf states would require power projec t ion 
capabil i t ies . This would enhance cooperation with other Arab states. 
Shireen Hunter refers to this strategy as an "all Arab pillar strategy".*^ 
Fourthly, the US would attempt to regulate programmes of arms 
transfer. For this, regional intervention and multilateral participation were 
(i4 SAIS Review, wriiuer/ spring. l^ .'VI. P K^ ^ 
65 Hunter Shireen . Lessons of the Pasl and Need for New Thinking. P.P 43 to 49. Qouted 
in The abo\e rexiew 
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greatly preferred. But tio formal arrangement for security in the region 
would be made. The US would pursue a well designed and smooth policy 
of maintaining balance whether to join or oppose any group of states. 
This strategy may provide the US with a greater likelihood of maintaining 
the economic good will of regional oil producing states. *^  
Though these alternatives were assumed by US to make its position 
strong there is no certainty whether they are going to be successful or not 
as circumstances and changes in world politics do not remain static. 
As far as US-Saudi re la t ions are concerned US Saudi defense 
condomin ium carries some weigh tage . US may prefer to maintain 
cooperative security arrangement with the Saudis for several resons. i.e. 
to preserve a familiar sort of diplomacy, to increase the likelihood of 
special construction' of US economic and political interest and to maintain 
military interest in the region. 
So far as arms control in the region is concerned all arms should not 
be stopped. A plan to reduce arms transfer to the Gulf may be possible on 
two goals. 
A. First the transfer could be structured roughly to enhance the defensive 
capabilities of the arms recipient. 
B. Secondly such regimes must not hamper US balancing role if 
necessary (whether it is intervention) and Israeli security should not 
be threatened by the arms control arrangement for Persian Gulf. 
Moreover, arms competition in West Asia would be a burden also on 
Israeli security and economy. ''' 
After Soviet disintegration, many development and changes took 
(i(> Ibid, PP63-65 
67 Ibid^ P.P63-65 
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peace in world politics in which US tried its best to maintain self- assumed 
World Order under its own leadership. Immediately after the decline of 
one superpower the world environment had become very unhealthy, due 
to the lack of balances. As US had projected a danger to Arabs from Arabs, 
they cynically shifted under US umbrella but later, gradually they started 
to realize that their wealth not is being used for their own advantage. 
They also feel that their wealth is ploughed back into America which 
promptly pumps off some of it to Israel. With the military, diplomatic 
and political backing of the US, Israel has made its mission to humiliate 
and dominate the Arabs. This happened many times in 1948, 1996, 1967, 
1973 and 1982, still nothing has been settled down. 
Recently, in 1994^ some realization has prevailed there specially 
among Saudis, they do not want to see Saudi Arabia as a 'puppet ' of US 
Congress, Administration and decision making bodies.^". 
6X Ibid PP 66-67 
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Chapter-VI 
Conclusion 
The pathway that is sought out through deliberate efforts of nations 
to reach to a certain decision and resolution is not very smooth and easy. 
The varying situations, turmoils, political trenches, uncertain behaviour 
and abrupt attitutes of the global politics determine the salience and nature 
of the relations among the countries They too directly influence decision 
making process and settlement of the problems existing among the states. 
Superpower involvement in the Third World region - especially in West 
-Asia, reflects the nature of relations between small powers and big ones. 
This rivalry in West Asia is the manifestation of their different behaviours, 
incl inat ion, trust , mistrust , susp ic ions , faith, a l legiance, approach , 
pressures, constraints, success, failures, attraction, repulsion, conflict and 
cooperation Though in the context of U.S. Saudi-relations, Soviet Union 
had a very negligible role but it greatly affected US foreign policy towards 
this region. 
The US-Saudi relations, u i thin the parametre of US foreign policy 
towards West .4sia are viewed with two angles - Cold war period and 
post-cold war period. These two phases are quite important by virtue of 
their different characters 
After the world War II, US and USSR both emerged ideologically 
confronting superpowers. Consequently, many military blocs came into 
existence led by two hostile hemispheres - Capitalitst and Communists . 
Their aims and objectives were to counter the rival activities and to fortify 
their position accordingly. The world \ iew to analyse US foreign policy 
was entirely different at that time and since 1985,the cold war started to 
cool off and gradually diminished with the dramatic end of a superpower. 
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West Asia region had been playing a significant role since its early 
days of Ottoman empire and after 1945 it became an arena for superpowers 
game. Due to its immense strategic, economic and the political values, 
the entire region soon became the attraction of super-power rivalry. Each 
nation began to identify itself with one superpower or another, depending 
upon its political and economic interest. 
Historically, U.S. maintained its link with Saudi rulers ever since the 
creation of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1923. Initially, U.S. companies 
ARAMCO and SOCAL have played very important role in cementing 
and strengthening US Saudi relationship. The discovery of oil in 1933 
brought the two nations closer to each other. After the creation of Israel 
Saudi Arabia could not oppose US policies towards Palestine but supported 
Palestine as far as it could. It had to adjust with US in the world setting. 
On the other hand US policy makers were always guided by the "Monroe 
doctrine of 1823 and Washington's farewell speech. U.S. remained neutral 
before the World War I and for a short period they broke down their 
neutrai l ty and after the World War I, they were back to the policy 
isolationism. Since the end of World War II, US got fully involved in 
world affairs. After the world war II, West Asia became more important 
for both the superpowers including the former USSR. The Soviet 
objectives at that time in West Asia were as follows. 
1 Not to let the European states and US use the West Asian Oil. 
2. To have its influence among the socialist Arab regimes. 
3. To counter any US move in that area. 
On the other hand US had its object i \es in West Asia to fulfil its 
economic interest and to keep Soviet Union away from there. More 
precisely these objecti\es were as follows: 
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1 To counter the communist influence at any cost m West Asian region 
2 To use oil and natural gas and to encouiage to do same to its ally 
count!ies (Western Europe) 
3 To support Israel at any cost and to keep an eye on Arab activity 
through Israel 
4 To Project itself as defender of Arab Gulf states from external threats 
From 1947. Truman doctrine. Four Point Plan 1949, Eisenhower 
doc t r ine 1957 and o ther all these have been US fo re ign po l i cy 
manifestation for West Asia to minimize the Soviet influence The creation 
of Israel was a great set back for the entiTe Arab world but Saudi Arabia 
could not do anything to pre\ ent the creation Major security, military, 
economic, political, diplomatic and traditional relations were maintained 
so far as their mutual interest were concerned 
The year 1970 was ver\ significant because after the death of 
President Nasser it became very easy for US to get strong position in 
West Asia. President Sadat was much more realistic, practical and pro-
US and his policies to West Asia that directly suited to Israel And his 
approach torward US pro\ 'ed to be catalyst for US in achieving its 
objectives B n t a i n s depaiture from this area had created vacuum and this 
was filled by the US 
During both the crises in West Asia - June 1967 and October 1973 
Arab - Israel Wars, US - Saudi relations got very tense but military, 
economic and diplomatic relation were not curtialed US wholeheartedly 
supported Israel and on the other hand Arabs did not get worthwhile 
support from So\ iet Union The then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 's 
'shuttle ' diplomacy and step b \ step diplomacy played a very crucial role 
at that critical moment to bring peace and through this^they regained Arabs' 
fa\ our and pacified their anger Materially, US- Saudi relations remained 
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unaffected but there were some warnings which were given to Saudi Arabia 
and other OPEC countries that oil should not be used as weapon in future 
again 
Iran was already one of the major ally of US and one of the confident 
country in West Asia at that time Iran, since Shah's arrival in early 40's 
had been a centre of oil exploitation and Americanization. Being situated 
in the Gulf it served the purpose of security arrangement also. Secondly, 
it was known as one of the important pillar of US foreign policy. Equally 
important pillar was Saudi Arabia In mid seventies US was busy in 
modernization of the defence structure of Saudi Arabia. US paid attention 
on these countries specially and this diplomacy was called twin pillar 
diplomacy. 
President Carter strengthened relations with Saudi Arabia King KJialid 
and President Carter made a deal of F-15 that triggered off a bitter 
contro\ers> specially m Jewish lobby in the Congress In the meantime 
Camp Dax'id Accord was signed between Sadat, Begin and Carter in 1978. 
In that Palest inians rights, self determination and their recognition were 
totally ignored. Consequently, there was mixed raction among Arabs. It 
was bitterly criticized and Saudi Arabia also expressed its resentment 
against it. Next year Egypt-Israeli treaty in March 1979 enhanced the 
Arab wrath and Egypt was expelled from the Arab League and Organisation 
of Islamic Conference 
-Another reason why Saudi .Arabia opposed Camp Da\ id Treaty and 
Egypt- Israel peace Treaty, despite being backed by US, was that they cut 
a sorry figure of Saudi Arabia and undermined its position in the region 
which Saudi did not like. In reaction Congressmen uere too adament 
negati\ ely to release F-15 sale to Saudi .Arabia Apart from it, some other 
-Arab countiies i.e. Iraq Jordan, and Syria had broken off d ip lomat ic 
119 
relations with Egypt after signing Camp David agreement and treaty with 
Israel during 1978-1979. 
Saudi Arabian resentment came out in some other form - for instance 
Saudi Arabia for the first tinie thought of Soviet friendship, the staunch 
communist empire. These two poles apart countries suddenly realized 
their mutual significance Soviet Union was not happy with Sadat 's pro-
US policies and it had also criticized Camp David Agreement etc. This 
was the best time for Soviet Union to estibalish diplomatic relations with 
Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately, Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan and 
this act was internationally criticized. Saudi Arabia was amongst the critics. 
Another important event in 1979 was Iranian revolution led by Khomeini. 
The entire panorama changed in Iran and now Islamic Revolution was a 
great disappointment for US. Consequently the strategy of twin pillar 
d ip lomacy w e a k e n e d . On the other side Sovie t i n t e r v e n t i o n in 
Afghanistan and then its greedy glances towards West Asia was a great 
threat for US. The entire focus now moved entirely on Saudi Arabia -
The only remaining single pillar in the Gulf These new developments 
and especially Mecca incident of November 1979, made Saudi Arabia 
much scared of Islamic fundamentalism. On the other hand US had to 
strengthen its only pillar Saudi Arabia lest the revolution inight take place 
in Saudi Arabia also. As a result, Saudi concern to its security reverted 
back its attention to US plank. 
Significantly, Saudi Arabia realized that only U S was the true 
protector and defender of Saudi security and interest In this connection 
Gulf Cooperation Council was formed in 1981 and US took full advantage 
of the time and deployed R.D.F. in Qatar, Bahrain and other G.C.C. 
members to repel Soviet influence. The R.D.F. presence was taken into 
consideration under the Carter doctrine and US-Saudi collaboration again 
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started. 
President Reagan's arrival was a severe blow to the Soviet Union 
and for him that Communist empire was an evil to be kept off at any cost. 
As president Reagan's first four years were tough in their approach his 
foreign policy towards West Asia was quite solid and realistic. These 
policy postula tes reflected through AW AS deal with Saudi Arabia. 
Opera t ion Br igh t S ta r , ' ' S t r a t eg ic C o n s e s u s ' and some pos i t ive 
instructions to Israel to achieve peace in the region. 
Fahad plan of 1981 was initiated for the sett lement of Palestine 
problem but it was not totally against Israel and naturally President Reagan 
and secretary of State supported it. This was to be discussed once again 
in Fez meeting but radical Arab states including Syria and Iraq were not 
m favour of Fahad plan. Lastly, it could not get success and the situation 
remained uncertain. 
The situation got more tense and complicated when Israel attacked 
on Palestinians residing in Lebanon in June 1982. At this stage President 
Reagan was not in favour of any attack on PLO in Lebanon. At that state 
of affairs 'operation Bright Star' and 'Strategic Consensus ' group unitedly 
criticized Israel. Lastly, PLO withdrew from there but entire syndrome 
was unsettled and precarious 
Secretary Haig 's diplomacy was a total failure and distorted the US 
image among Arabs. Consequently. Reagan maintained a slight difference 
and distance with Israel. President Reagan introduced Reagan peace plan 
in Sept 1982 but it was not favoured by Israel because it did not consider 
an\ room for Israeli government in Ghaza strip and West Bank. After 
nine days of his Reagan plan, Fez plan II was introduced that reaffirmed 
Palestinian self government with its capital in Jerusalem. King Khalid 
u a s already reluctant and after his death in June 1982, King Fahad did 
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not appreciate this type of US attitude. He announced to purchase missile 
from France and China. This Saudi move expressed its displeasure with 
US. 
I k e AWACS deal was already proposed since Carter 's administration. 
The programme was upto 1985. After a long controversy AWACS was 
transferred to Saudi Arabia but the condition were all in favour of US. 
i e no AWACS was to be used outside of Saudi Arabia and no AWACS 
was to be used against Israel. It was very hard nut to crack because there 
was a tug of war between the Congress and the Administration which 
was persisting since last two years due to Reagan's support to Fahad plan, 
Saudi reluctance and sullenness over Camp David Accord and subsequent 
Saudi indifference during 1979 on Egyptian-Israeli pact. 
However, economic and trade relations were on cordial grounds. In 
his second term President Reagan after one year (1984) changed its point 
of view and even decision making . The arrival of Soviet President 
Gorbachev changed his outlook and Reagan started to tackle Soviet Union 
with a different angle, technique and different diplomacies. For the first 
time in history both the superpowers emerged on the same lines. The US 
kept a watch on Arab activities and Saudi Arabia was declared not to be a 
second Iran, in the same year 200 stinger defense missiles were sent to 
Saudi Arabia to appease it 
Some of the Saudis were suspicious of US activities and its efforts 
and declaratory diplomacy for Saudi security that only US is its protector 
and defender and is the onl\ option. But truly speaking only Saudi 
protections was not enough, they all wanted US support to Arab cause . 
-After sometime, US behaviour seemed to be fake and farce and all its 
act i \ i t ies gave an impression of exploitation and hegemonism. This was 
the time when Saudi Arabia had imported Chinese C-SS.2 missiles and 
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Tornado Fighters from Britain Though it was a matter of deep concern 
for US but I 'S did not interfere in Saudi internal decision making matters. 
This was very critical time for Saudi security and it was concerned and 
concious specially on two grounds. 
1. Due to political implications of Iranian revolution Khomeini declared 
that Islam opposes monarchy how come Saudi Arabia remain a monarchy 
with in a Islamic parameter. Hence, it threatened Saudi monarchic 
legitimacy. It was Sheits sectarian revolution which was a great threat for 
Saudi Arabia. 
2. Secondly, uncertainty and Saudi lack of faith in US (for the time 
being). 
Both the countries shared broad objectives but they differed on many 
issues according to their requirements, priorities and other interests. In 
1987, US Secretary of state George Shultz paid a visit to Saudi Arabia 
and immedia te ly after two w e e k s Crown pr ince Abdul lah went to 
Washington. U.S.-Saudi friendship was reaffirmed and in August 1988 
Iran-Iraq crisis resolved Consequently, situation somehow was on lighter 
grounds. 
The year 1990 and weak position of Soviet Union and its subsequent 
disintegration ploughed a fertile ground to blossom US interests in the 
entire world. This led to US supremacy in the world. A litimus test between 
Iraq and US vanished away. Iraq started to criticize US for its unnecessary 
interference in West Asian affairs. 
Unfortunately, the situation fuelled the fire when Iraq claimed on 
Kuwait and declared it its 19th state. This was the appropriate time to 
project itself as defender of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, for US because 
next target was Saudi Arabia (but this could not happen). At this state of 
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affairs during the time of Gulf crisis, US foreign policy for Saudi Arabia 
and West Asia - generally came out as follows: 
1. To defend Kuwait directly through coalit ion force against Iraqi 
aggression. 
2 To emerge as Saudi Arabia's friend in need. 
3 To keep up its security arrangements through G.C.C. and Saudi 
Arabia 
4 To play a role of balancer and mediator for West Asian peace process. 
5 To implement US policies of direct military activism or prompt 
in tervention. 
6 To declare a New World Order 
7 To project Iraq as enemy of All Arab states. 
8 To control oil flow for e\ er 
Q To finish the remaining influence of weak Soviet Union for ever. 
All above the new objectives and frontiers developed in US foreign 
policy towards West Asia specially after the Gulf war, 1991.. Over all an 
ambi\'alent relationship developed since 193 3 between US and Saudi 
.Arabia L'S interest in West Asia has always been stregthened on three 
major grounds -
1 Exploitation of Petroleum 
2 Israel factor- an open support to Israel 
3 .Anti-communist and anti-Soviet propogation Saudi Arabia never had 
an\ fnendh' ties with Soviet Union and this situation proved very fruitful 
for US 
Saudi .Arabia most of the time, was threatened by Iran. In this case it 
became imperative on the part of Saudi Arabia to seek military and 
economic assistance for internal and external security Saudi Arabia was 
not an Eg\ pt that half of the time remained Soviet Union ' s friend and 
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after the death of Nasser and in subsequent years shifted under the US 
camp. The central factors that determined US-Saudi relations and threats 
that strengthened their friendship- are their compatible and broad shared 
objectives like-
1. Being never on Soviet lines and not to go under the socialist camp. 
2. Being oil rich (Saudi Arabia) and its export to US. 
3. Saudi Arabia being in need to be technologically and militarily 
advance. 
4. Saudi Arabia being a monarchy, US took full advantage of it and 
exploited as much as it could. 
5 US economic intesests that always fulfilled in Saudi Arabian market. 
6. The US security arrangement in the Gulf with twin pillar diplomacy 
or signle pillar or multipillar diplomacy. 
7 Being threatened by fundamentalism US is itself allergic with this 
type of developments. And it never supports, Libya, Iran, Iraq, Chad 
and even other central As ian r e p u b l i c s . Apar t f rom it, th i s 
fundamentalism never suits to Saudi Royal family. Therefore, US-
Saudi collaboration was considered necessary to curb this sort of 
tendencies and radical trends. 
8 The US-Saudi relat ions h a \ e left a pos i t ive affect on G.C.C 
relationship when US diplomacy of having faith in Iran started to 
collapse. The other remaining state to be used for its economic interest 
was Saudi Arabia and even some other G.C.C nations Qatar, Bahrain, 
UAE also played an important role. 
The G .C .C . as col lect ixe f ramework proved a very effect ive 
instrument for legitimizing its hegemony in the region and manipulation 
of other resources is being done without an\ limit and control. Moreover, 
the entire G.C.C mechanism which distribute the oil has to look and listen 
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to the US instruction. They know very well their weakness and for them 
there is no other option except US to defend their security from internal 
and external threats. 
As Saudi Arabia has got a big market for oil export in US, similarly 
US has got a prosperous market in West Asian in general and Saudi Arabia 
in particular for arms, other commodities and technological material sale. 
Lastly, the entire thrust of Saudi foreign policy is guided by the view 
point of security and that security is assured by US. 
Significantly, Saudi Arabia has long been a base client country for 
US. They support mutually each other. During the Gulf war when Saudi 
Arabian security was being threatened; US had already stationed its troops, 
though the purpose was not ver>- transparent just for Saudi security but to 
get a permanent root in Saudi land and soil (Despite Saudi reluctance and 
unwillingness for their prolonged stay) 
US projected Iraq as threat for the entire Arab world. On the other 
hand Iraq wanted to give this crisis a tinge of Arab-Israel war. US neither 
wanted to loose Arab strategy nor Israel's faith. US even does not want to 
let Israeli infrastructure weaken by devastating wars, therefore, it tried 
its best to a\oid .Arab-Israeli u a r and prohibited Israel to retaliate on Iraqi 
move and attacks during the Gulf war 9 1. 
The latest problem remained-as it is. Saudi-US relations could not 
take an\ positn e setp in this direction Saudi Arabia supported . \ rab cause 
and rendered economic and sometimes military help to Arabs. Many of 
the times Saudi Arabia could not be assertive and articulative so far as US 
perception is that a permanent presence of a strong Israel does not harm 
the .'Vrab interests and Arab strategy whereas Arab 's view is entirely 
different, according to them Israeli wars have brought a disasterous effect 
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on the Aiabs as a whole 
This bone of contention since 1998 has been threatening Arab security 
Palestinians' suffering cannot be explained in words They should be given 
the recognition and self determined government as their territories have 
been usurped by Israel 
Diiectly or indirectly, US pressurizes Saudi Arabia to safeguard Israeli 
interest Israel too serves two puiposes - to appease Jewish lobby in 
Congress secondly it is an open window to keep an eye and control over 
the Arab activities Hence, there arises no question to ignore Isiael in 
comparison of an> other Arab state It has always been given priority by 
US 
Keeping in \iew of so many circumstances, US has compelled and prepared 
the svndiom for itself to keep an upper hand in the region And the 
psychosis of self imposed supiemacx enhanced and increased around the 
world lmmediatel> after the Gulf v\ar and Soviet collapse, no power was 
there to challenge it and option was for Arabs except US US intransigence 
and hegemonistic accessabilitx everywhere has unnecessarily created an 
unhealthy atmosphere in world politics Its self assumed role of Super-
Cop can be seen anywhere an\ time whene\er it desires Its sets global 
agenda, tries to legitimize it and makes other nations to follow it 
Another development in L S foreign policy came out after it tried to 
emeige as balancei between Aiab and Kiael more prominenth than it 
had been e\ei during the Aiab-Israeli wars Peace process meetings under 
US superMsion gained -.ome momentum at that time They had started 
from Madnd conference of October 199! 
Da\ b> day. the US undei the pretext of New World Order exploited 
mans countries But last \ ea i s (1 996) experience a l s o p r o \ e d a tough 
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time for US itself. 
It was direct breach of international law and sheer imperialism. " U S ' 
self imposed and self declared no fly zone and safe heaven and direct 
involvement through the policy of UN sanctions and coercion against Iraq, 
are something very challengable and reflexive of dangerous precedent in 
international Law through the the law of jungle" ' 
What could international community say against US and what is the 
use of UNO that totally represents US interests-US also learnt a lesson 
fiom this war. Neither it proved beneficial for US nor for Arabs. It also 
taught a lesson to Arabs and opened their eyes They became more concious 
and their views gradually changed On the other hand,due to persisting 
unrest and political turmoil, it became difficult to exploit oil very easily. 
(As seen in 1973 war though the nature of crisis was quite different). The 
entire panorama of US foreign policy is fraught with various diplomacies, 
priorities and intersts based moves in kliedoscopic change of the world 
affairs 
During the time of cold war the entire decision and policies were 
charactenzed and guided by the communist threat and strategies to keep 
it av\ay After the collapse of Soviet Union US established its New World 
Order to make everything according to its desire and to safeguard its vital 
interests President Bush and other subsequent Presidents are being guided 
by the classical Monroe doctrine and Washington's advice. 
Immediately after the demise of Soviet Linion, the World became 
unipolar but it did not last for long There emerged other major powers 
creating multiple blocs as challenges" for US Now U S has became more 
aware with the operating and emerging challenges 
1 The Times ol India (EdUorial). September 5. l^ )y() 
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With the disintegration of Soviet Union the U.S. became more 
conscious of designing its strategies and policies so as to establish complete 
control over the flow of oil. It would not allow the other powers to capture 
oil flow neither it would bring any basic change in its foreign policy 
towards West Asia. As far as West Asian peace is concerned US role is 
ambiguous and dual faceted. Many times US becomes reluctant to all these 
complexities and generally wants the Arabs to accept Israel as permanent 
reality in the region. It, thus, plays important roles to protect its vital 
interests of Israel and its own as well. 
Being a mediator it has been busy in bringing peace in West Asia 
very assiduously because it does hot want to see the destruction of Isreal. 
Moreo \ e r , US will have to face difficulty in exploring West Asian 
resources. 
The US policy towards west Asia is based on commitments for Israel 
and .'\rabs both. US has to project a clear image in the eyes of Israel and 
.4rabs both If any shade emerges in West Asia whether of peace or conflict 
it would be controlled by US Since the ver\ creation of Israel, US had 
made some commitments with it and at the same time with other Arab 
states In case, Arab-Israeli tention takes place US would emerge as peace 
maker through United Nations directly or indirectly During the 1967 and 
1973 wars same situations happened and after this, in Gulf war, US was 
there to offer good offices for peaceful settlement. (This is another aspect 
of reality that in West Asia instead of peace, more unrest is prevailing). 
This dual appeasement is more successful for US and fatal to .Arabs 
specailh after So\ iet disintegration The field is clear, there is no sharply 
di\ ided ' \ r a b " and it becomes easier for US to handle both Israel and the 
. \ rabs at the same time 
. However, whether it is Saudi .Arabia or any other Arab country, US 
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is very particular and practical in its approach. After the Gulf war as Saudi 
Arabia became a leading partner of U S But situation is not the same 
with the passage of t ime US Saudi Arabia are g o o d f r iends bu t 
simultaneously they are ambivalent allies They can categorically criticize 
if their interests get jeopardized Somewhere a declining trend is appearing 
on the scene. 
In the light of hypotheses which were framed, the findings can be derived 
as follows 
1 US-Saudi relations from 1945 onwards have been running smoothly 
on political, military, economic and diplomatic grounds 
2 The US presence in West Asia became essential in order to protect its 
trade commerce and military interests So far as the Gulf area is 
concerned the main client country of this area is Saudi Arabia- It 
seems that it became imperative on the part of Saudi Arab to seek 
military and political assitance keeping in view its security 
3 Historially, if one looks back from 1970 onwards there are various 
events and occasions on which US and Saudi Arabia both differed 
1973 oil embargo and Arab-Israeli crisis proved very detrimental 
for US-Saudi relationship It made a wide gap between them and 
Saudi Arabia criticized US openly to support Israel against Arabs. 
On the other hand OPEC country's oil embargo brought a negative 
effect on Western countrties But after some years when all the affairs 
got settled, they gave new touch to their relations For instance 
specially after the Iranian ie\olut ion . Afghan intervention and some 
othei external threats of 1979 Both of them realized each other 's 
need according to their own interests. And fortunately the situations 
and circumstances proved favourable for both (whenever they came 
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closer). 
4. Constraints and pressures from both the sides Saudi Arabia and US, 
sometimes negatively affected their relationship. There have been 
some differences between Congress and president as seen in F-15 
and AWACS transfer deal. On the other hand somet ime Saudi 
Government and general public opinion sharply differed -as seen 
during Camp David Accord 1978 and Lebanon war 1982 and so many 
times when US did not care for Saudi Arabia and its sentiments for 
Palestinians 
5 So far as military deal and oil flow is concerned both the sides US 
and Saudi Arabia tried their best to make it successful. During Reagan 
and Carter administrations there were some differences in Congress 
and Administration but both the presidents easily convinced the 
Senators and proposals were approved for Saudi Arabia. Ultimately 
it was in US interest. On the other side Saudi Arabia projected US its 
strong friend. 
6 Both of them are anti communist and this factor brought them much 
closer Hence. Saudi Arabia became an staunch ally of US. 
7 US always tried to keep any of oil rich country its permanent ally. 
Before 1979. Islamic revolution in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iran both 
were used as twin pillars. After the fall of Shah, Saudi Arabia was 
gi \en special attention and a single pillar in the Gulf. And after the 
Gulf war 1991, G.C.C. mechamism as multipillar strategy is serving 
US interests in the Gulf. The US Gulf security arrangement had two 
aspects 
1 SecuritN of its oil flow 
2. And security of oil exporting countries from external and internal 
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threats. (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, UAE etc.) . 
So far as twin pillar diplomacy and shuttle diplomacy of US is 
concerned it has been very successful Saudi Arabai 
Pa t t e rn or Paradigm that has Emerged after the Study:-
1 US-Saudi relations are based on their circumstantial requirements 
and basic interests. There seems hardly any room for selfless feelings 
and pure friendship They pose like emotional friends but in actual 
sense they -do. what they want and what serves their interests in 
reality They are very Practical in their relations. 
2 Generally it looks like on smooth sailing but it is not so Some of the 
regional and theii internal matters s t rongly have proved very 
detiimental for theii cordial relationship 
3 Though occasionally, but there have been sharp tensions between 
them 
4 Evidently Israel factor is there and US ' open support to it- has been 
pro \ ing for a long itme very detrimental for US-Saudi relationship 
5 On the other hand ,from Saudi side, the staunch group (that never 
liked US friendship with Saudi .Arab) has played a negative role in this 
connection The pattern which is seen is ambivalent Sometimes it does 
not g i \ e an\' clear picture . There are some constraints, pres5:ures, internal 
problems , national interests, requirements , needs and realizations from 
both the sides that greatly influence and determine their relationship - -
whether cordial or strained according to variations in circumstances. 
During and after the Gulf war 1991,US Saudi relations were very 
cordial as per their requirements Saudi apprehension was there and it 
was thieatened by Iraq , automaticiiUy it had to look to its friend. On the 
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other hand, US strategy was there to make the time useful and fruitful by 
exploiting Saudi Arabia in the pretext of its defense fiom external threats 
The weak position of Soviet Union proved as catalyst at that t ime leaving 
US unchallenged As per king Fahad's statement US iioops were to leave 
Saudi land immediately after the war but the scene topsyturvied and they 
did not lea \e the Saudi land Saudi Aiabia gradually realized its mistake 
that It had gi \en much iibeities to them Consequently, US troops took 
their own tune in leaving the Saudi land This led to the tense relationship 
between the two The US had maintained that it kept troops to protect its 
interests and its allies a projection which implies that both's objectives 
were identical On the other hand, the Saudis implied that "protection of 
allies" - as a part of policy foimulation was fine but if (it was temporary) 
The> did not like a piolonged stay of US troops 
I Since this realization strarted, Saudi government began to think to 
be film on then o^\^^ m o \ e s Some incidents fiom 1993 onwards 
stiained their relationships In octobei 1 994 at the time of Iraqi threat 
to Kuwait, US again got leady to letaliate and tried its best to use 
Saudi lands again but Saudi -Arabia lefused 
II In June 1996 there was a bomb blast in Dehran tolling the l i \ e s of 
23 Amei leans 
III Still unsettled Palestinian question whereas US poses itself a leader 
of peace process but of no avail and Aiab Israel tensions are yet to 
b e r e s o h e d Saudi Arabia ne\ er likes this 
1\ lmp io \ ed Saudi- Iranian relations have made US nights restless 
\ And the most glaring factor has been in (recent months) Saudi denial 
to use its land in recent US- liaq crisis in Feb 1998 Even Saudi 
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Arabia refused to speak any word in favour of US. 
Recent development in Gulf leading to US Iraq tension and provoking 
global warfare, has unfolded multi -hued panorama in West Asian politics 
The subtle and vehement reaction of the Arab World and other Westerr 
countries i.e. Russia, China and France specially against US hegemonistic 
moves- has posed a great challenge to US. The US and Britain have been 
of the same voice and in this case they accused Iraq of having chemical 
and biological weapons intending to blow Israel. United Nations special 
Commission forcibly searached out whatever the material was there. US 
and Britain are still not having any soft corner to lift up economic sanctions 
against Iraq.In this connection. Secretary of State Madeline Albrights' 
"Shuttle d ip lomacy ' in seeking the support of U S ' European and Arab 
allies could not gather momentum for US support, Saudi Arabia had 
asserted that it would not offer its air bases for any possible US military 
strike agianst Iraq. 
In a blunt warming Russian President cautioned that Mr Bill Clinton 
might pro\ oke a Third World War if he declared miltary strike against 
Iraq Meanwhile L'N General Secreatry played a very positive role tb 
settle down the matter but Arabs .and some of European countries had 
been \ er\ critical of US during these days. General Secretary's diplomatic 
skill and instant style to resolve the tension succeeded to a great extent. 
Apparently, US takes up it as victory as Western inedia also orojected it 
as US triumph but, in reality ,US intransigence and unnecessary forceful 
interferences in a Third World country - all have proved peurile now and 
this does not make analogy between US monopoly and a nation's victory. 
US got a severe blow on account of unanimous criticism of Arab world-
and rift among the European countries specoally amongst the Secrity 
Council s members . (France. Clvina and Russia bitterly criticized US 
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move) The entire international community too had not shown any 
enthusiasm to US line rather stands firm in its opposition to US activities. 
A n o t h e r s e v e r e set back that US is r e a l i z i n g in Gu l f r eg ion is 
rapproachment between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The re-orientation of 
relations between Riyadh and Iran has significant implications for the 
geopolit ics of the region in post cold war world 
The fiist sign of collective protest against the US and tentative 
acceptance of Iran was evidenced in Autumn 1997 when most of the Arab 
states boycotted a US sponsored economic summit and simultaneously 
endorsed the meeting of 54 nations Organization of Islamic Conference 
in Tehran in December 1997. The OIC summit was attended by crown 
prince and deputy primier Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz and foreign minister 
Mr Saud Al Faisal . Iranian economic and polical compulsions and 
reallocation of oil production quotas under OPEC to give an expression 
to Aiab solidarity and to resist US domination with in the region, all led 
to a broadened friendship between Saudi .A^rabia and Iran 
Another important thing is that though Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia 
ha\ e different kind of attitude towards Iraq but there is a new look and 
mood within the region Economic requiiements are dominant priorit>' as 
nations grapple with the competing demands of globalization. 
The US policy of dual containment to keep Iraq and Iran isolated 
and undercheck. has led to limited success Within the UN Security 
Council. Russia. China and Fiance ha \ e taken positions to stand \ iably 
against US monopoly, and moreover. EL' nations aie keen to re-establish 
their contacts with Iran ' 
2 Tlic Tunes of India. March 24.1V'J.S 
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So far as Saudi- US future trends are concerned they are not very 
heal thy presently, despi te m a i n t a i n i n g their essential r e l a t ionsh ip . 
Comparatively, Prince Bandar Bin Sultans government would be more 
practical and realistic in future. Saudi Arabia, would not loosen its 
friendship with US because (no other option left) nor US would leave 
Saudi oil flow so easily but a trend of Saudi submissiveness and softness 
would disappear very soon. 
In comparison with past history or specifically with in the time frame 
of 1970-lQQl, the US -Saudi relations from 1992 onwards seem very 
strained Though they still maintain their basic relationship but a flow of 
friendship has got eqlipsed After any gap and souring relat ionship 
between these two countries - tliey always realized each other's importance 
for their purposes and intersts and patch up every thing. 
Alwaxs this pattern of mending the fences has been apparent so far 
as US Saudi relations are concerned but recently somehow a declining 
trend has emerged This paradigm is not zig zag but indeed ups and down 
are there iu their relatoinship After a long healthy and friendly relationship 
there are sometimes slight or strong tensions between these two countries. 
In the liglit of recent developomnent it does not sound very healthy and 
ameliorating 
.-\s the entire mechanism has changed some how and taken another 
shape, US is getting tough time but it is very consistent in its nature and 
basic roots of foreign policy 
Iran. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, & G C C. or whatsoever state gives 
an impression of being as challenge against US, US knows very well how 
to tackle without breaking its cudgel .At the spur of moment Arabs do not 
understand what is happening with them but after some months they feel 
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that they are made fools and left fai behind The echoing US monopoly is 
really pernicious to fair settlement of West Asian problems. After all it 
openly supports Israel by voting in UNO for it. Israel always gets a green 
signal and does what it wants. For instance it very courageously is busy in 
constructing new colonies containing 65000 houses for Jews in occupied 
areas. 
Since some awakening has developed among the Arabs and they 
have opened their eyes, the US is not feeling very easy to exploit the 
natural resources from there. The global scene is mult ipolar now, there 
are some great challenges for US itself It may exert its efforts in West 
Asian peace process that would be beneficial for both the Arabs and the 
Jews. 
No state has any control on rapidly changing world circumstances. 
No situation can be trappd in its exact framemork, hence, US-Saudi 
relations may take another turn after this bitter situation. Saudi Arabia 
after gixing up its softness and submissixeness would be much more 
Practical in its approaches and ties with US. 
There is awakening and realizations from both the sides- US and 
Arabs. US would be concious enough to tackle the situation and Saudi 
Arabia would be realistic and very vigilant in its moves so far as its 
relationship with US is concernced. US is giving enough time to tackle 
Saudi reluctance and recent Saudi indifference. Simultaneously Saudi 
-Arabia is enhancing its relations \suh iian it is concerned how to reap 
the fruits from both Iran and Saudi .Arabia US is very much concerned to 
maintain good and cordial relations with Iran because it is erecting a 
formidable infrastructure. It has direct link with Turkmenistan, other 
central Asian countries and Caucacious states that may be of the great 
significance for US in future The Secretary of State has made a land-
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mark speech about US relations with Islamic republic of Iran. She gave a 
high shine to the Clintonian polilcy in words that President "Khatami 
« 
deserves respect because he is the choice of the Iranian people." ' Iran and 
Saudi Arabia may emerge again as twin pillars for US in future but the 
steps and responses at least from Saudi side would certainly be very very 
cautious, careful and entirely pragmatic 
.5 The Times of India (SuuduN Tunes). June Zl.lV'^S 
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Appendix-II 
Table :1 
Import of Crude Oil By USA (1975-1996) 
(Thousand Barrels per Day) 
Year 
1975 
1976 
j 1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
I98i 
1 1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
i 1986 
! 1987 
1988 
1989 
' 1990 
1991 
1092 
j 1993 
. 1994 
j 
! 1995 
1996 
OillnipoitFroin 
Saudi Arabia 
227 8 
383 2 
885 6 
1,246 4 
1,541 5 
1,447 7 
j O-T) 7 
4120 
344 2 
311 2 
133 '^  
627 1 
6162 
952 4 
1.008 7 
1,240 0 
1,744 8 
I,67S7 
1,327 6 
1,379 3 
1,314 2 
1,298 4 
Oil Import From 
All Over the World 
4104 6 
5385 7 
668 7 
6399 3 
6430 
44^^> 
3548 6 
3392 3 
3484 5 
3268 9 
4256 7 
4628 
5082 6 
8^21 3 
5870 9 
5773 1 
6079 8 
6783 8 
7063 6 
7449 8 
7698 6 
%oftheTotal 
5 55 
7 12 
13 24 
19 48 
23 97 
27 56 
11 61 
10 15 
8 93 
4 08 
14 73 
13 31 
1874 -
17 33 
21 12 
30 22 
2761 
19 57 
19 53 
17 64 
16 87 
Source: OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin. (1980,1985,1987,1996) 
Vienna. Austna P 76. P 87, P 85. P 83 
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Appendix-III 
Table :2 
Saudi Arab's Crude Oil Export to USA (1975-1996) 
(Thousand Barrels per Day) 
1 
Year 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1 
1978 
1 
1979 
1980 
i 1981 
' 1982 
' 1983 
1 1984 
1 1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
' 1991 
1992 
1 1993 
1994 
1995 
1 1996 
ji _ 
Total oil Export 
6,601 1 
8,031 8 
8,608 4 
7.706 0 
8,817 7 
9,223 2 
9.017 9 
5.639 4 
3,920 8 
3,186 9 
2,251 3 
3,265 8 
2,623 0 
3.030 1 
3.335 5 
4.499 8 
6.526 3 
6.589 9 
6.292 9 
6,233 6 
6.290 8 
6,109 3 
Oil Export to USA 
227 8 
383 2 
885 6 
1,246 4 
1,.541 5 
1.447 7 
1.222 2 
4120 
344 2 
311 2 
133 5 
627 1 
6162 
952 4 
1.008 7 
1.240 0 
1.744 8 
1.678 7 
1.327 6 
1,379 3 
1.314 2 
1,298 4 
%of the 
3 45 
4 77 
10 29 
16 17 
17 48 
15 70 
13 55 
731 
8 78 
9 76 
5 93 
19 20 
23 49 
31 43 
30 24 
27 56 
26 73 
25 47 
21 10 
22 13 
20 89 
21 25 
Source: .Annual Statistical Bulletin, (1980.1985,1987 & 1996), 
Vienna, Austria P76, P87, P 85, P 83 
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